MARCIN A. GÓRNIKIEWICZ



CULTURAL FORECASTING
OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

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Introduction

Security studies is a new discipline within the social sciences, and thus one with an inexhaustible research potential. Its thematic scope is so broad that it not only enables but often compels researchers to draw upon the insights of numerous other disciplines. Consequently, researchers find themselves in a position where they draw from various sources of knowledge and experience, yet the research effort they undertake must ultimately serve to enrich and strengthen the potential of security studies. In other words, such academic activity involves drawing from these disciplines or fields without ever losing sight of one's own. The priority is always to maintain the course of scientific inquiry within the chosen discipline, which, for the author of this monograph, is unequivocally security studies.

The forecasting of national or international security threats is a prime example of this. This academic activity, firmly rooted in the aforementioned field, simultaneously and frequently draws upon the insights of anthropology, sociology, psychology, and even economics. Thus far, forecasters have often relied primarily on hard data (mainly macroeconomic), employing various modifications of game theory to create predictions of the future with varying degrees of success. The author of this monograph decided to approach the issue of forecasting from a slightly different perspective, as well as to closely examine the human decision-making process. It is within the human mind that a series of complex cognitive operations occurs, the ultimate outcome of which is a decision that dictates a specific course of action. This applies to both everyday functioning and the spheres of micro- and macro-politics, ultimately affecting the deci-

sions that shape both the national security of individual societies and international security on a regional or even global scale. Many forecasters have eschewed this perspective due to the difficulties inherent in conducting reliable and scientifically verifiable research into the aforementioned decision-making process.

In recent years, the author has had the opportunity to conduct research on this subject for both Polish and foreign academic institutions. This research focused on the methodology of psychological influence during military operations conducted in culturally diverse social environments (e.g., American, Polish, Russian, and Chinese). At that time, the research effort was focused on attempting to comprehend the mechanisms underlying the human decision-making process, which was invariably influenced by the cultural environment of the studied social groups. Since the dawn of our species, all human activity has been driven by the pursuit of ensuring security and developmental opportunities for oneself and one's group. This drive is common to all living beings inhabiting our planet. At the same time, however, in the case of humans, the significance of the cultural environment is paramount, as it shapes a culturally specific approach to ensuring security and facilitating development. It is difficult to discuss the pursuit of a threat-free state without considering the specific social determinants that result from upbringing within a particular cultural sphere. Consequently, the human decision-making process, as determined by the cultural environment, constitutes the foundation for research into the evolution of security for any given human collective.

In conclusion, the subject of this monograph is the methodology of forecasting national and international security threats. This issue has been formulated into one main research problem and three specific problems. In articulating the problems presented below, the author aimed to investigate the feasibility of practically applying knowledge regarding cultural determinants to threat forecasting. Notably, this publication contains numerous terms that are not commonly encountered, even in literature dedicated to forecasting

or the broader field of security studies. The first chapter is devoted to this issue, presenting an interpretation of fundamental terminology. Furthermore, the third chapter provides a rationale for the use of specific, more complex terms. Deferring a portion of this exposition to a subsequent chapter was motivated by the need to first familiarise the reader with a thorough justification for the adopted interpretation. The second chapter explores the genesis of threat forecasting methodology, which, in its contemporary scientific dimension, unfortunately has a relatively short history. Nevertheless, to understand the evolution and significance of this field for security studies, an introduction tracing its roots back to antiquity was deemed essential by the author. The fourth and fifth chapters detail the research conducted to resolve the specific research problems and, ultimately, the main problem, the conclusion of which is presented in the final section. The fourth chapter presents an examination of the decision-making processes across ten culturally diverse societies, aiming to determine whether previously accumulated knowledge can be applied to this process. The fifth chapter, devoted to an analysis of the previously obtained research results, attempts to assess the practical possibilities of utilising existing achievements (primarily from the field of anthropology) in cultural forecasting. Finally, the sixth chapter presents the implementation of the research objective in the form of the author's original proposition of codes and stages for the cultural forecasting of national and international security threats.

The main problem, specific problems, and the objective of the research adopted in this monograph are presented below.

The main research problem is as follows: *Is it possible to apply cultural forecasting to effectively predict national and international security threats, based on the cultural determinants of the studied societies' decision-making processes?*

To guide and define the course of the research, the author assigned a hypothesis to the aforementioned research question, which derived from his previous original research in the field of military

psychological operations. In that research, the author factored in the cultural determinants of social groups to construct an appropriate methodology of influence tailored to these specific conditions. This approach stemmed from the author's earlier reflections on formulating any hypotheses given the pioneering nature of research into the cultural reconnaissance of threats, and the ensuing difficulty in finding a substantive basis that would justify assumptions regarding the hypothetical solution to the main problem. Ultimately, given the higher effectiveness of military psychological operations (preceded by cultural reconnaissance) confirmed in previous research, the author assumed by analogy that utilising know.**pecific research problem** is as follows (Chapter V): *To what extent can individual codes determine the decision-making process in terms of the coefficient of:*

- *the alignment of cultural codes with individual codes in the decision-making process carried out in the international arena,*
- *the impact of the discrepancy between cultural codes and individual codes on the final outcome of the decision-making process carried out in the international arena.*

Hypothesis: *Drawing on existing research results – where the effectiveness of military psychological operations preceded by cultural reconnaissance, compared to operations based on traditional methods, stood at 60% – it was assumed that the alignment of cultural codes with individual codes should similarly amount to approximately 60%. If a greater influence of individual codes (rather than cultural ones) on the substance of a specific decision is observed, a significant shift in the decision's content can be presumed, relative to one made solely on the basis of cultural codes.*

The resolutions to the specific problems, formulated as conclusions, are included in the findings of their corresponding subchapters. In the author's view, this adopted format ensured structural clarity, enabling a seamless transition from the research assumptions to the obtained results. The Conclusion, as mentioned above, is entirely dedicated to summarising the research as a whole, thereby resolving the main problem.

The adopted **research objective**, which concerns **the development of a preliminary methodology for cultural forecasting** based on the results obtained during the research – specifically, the established cultural determinants (Chapter VI) – was divided into two specific objectives:

- to develop cultural codes that optimise the cultural forecasting process;
- to propose stages of cultural forecasting that facilitate the most effective prediction of national and international security threats.

It is worth adding that the first sub-objective was to be realised only if it proved impossible to apply previously developed codes in a complementary manner to predict national and international security threats.

The research employed both empirical methods (document review: qualitative analysis) and theoretical methods (analysis, synthesis, comparison), in accordance with the interpretation of these methods presented in the publication edited by Professor Marian Cieślarczyk – *Metody, techniki i narzędzia badawcze oraz elementy statystyki*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw 2006. Providing this clarification was deemed necessary because, within the broadly defined social sciences, one can occasionally encounter divergent interpretations or understandings of the same research methods, techniques, or tools.

This monograph also contains a list of figures, a list of tables, a name index, and a bibliography, which is divided into printed and electronic sources. Chinese names have been presented in Latin script, conforming to English spelling conventions as transcribed from Hanyu Pinyin.

CHAPTER I

Terminological Definitions

The forecasting of international relations, as an area of scientific research and inquiry, emerged in the 20th century. This applies to its modern dimension; previously, it relied predominantly on pseudoscientific, religious, magical, or simply espionage-based methods of predicting the near future. This topic is explored more comprehensively in the subsequent chapter, which presents the evolution of methods for forecasting international relations – an evolution that essentially coincided with the development of the art of espionage, and subsequently of the intelligence and counter-intelligence apparatus. Interestingly, the forecasting methodology used during the era of ancient civilisations was far superior to the methods of "predicting" the future used in Europe for almost a thousand years. Following the fall of the Roman Empire, up until the advanced stages of the Renaissance, the courts of various monarchs limited themselves to relatively primitive forms of forecasting, frequently laced with superstition. This is extraordinary given such a vast time span. This glaring inadequacy in the widely adopted prognostic approach was one of the factors that allowed the Mongol hordes to achieve such unprecedented success against the armed forces of Europe at the time. It was only the development of colonialism and the imperative to ensure the efficient flow of information – despite what were, for the era, immense distances – that marginally accelerated the development of the "forecast machinery", though it still primarily hinged on somewhat more refined forms of espionage.

The technological and scientific advancement of European societies, coupled with increasingly widespread social awareness, also exerted a positive influence on this sphere of interstate activity. In the latter half of the 20th century, the first scientific teams began to emerge, delving into the subject of forecasting in international relations, conducting research, and devising the initial, more or less theoretical models designed to help predict the behaviour of specific actors in foreign relations.

Given the expansive subject matter and the correspondingly extensive terminology, it is therefore worthwhile to establish a uniform understanding of the terms utilised in this monograph. This necessity arises from the fact that one may frequently encounter varying interpretations of specific terms within articles and books devoted to the same topics, particularly across different fields and disciplines. In principle, this should preclude any potential misunderstandings rooted in terminological interpretation, thereby making it easier for the reader to follow the author's central premise.

1.1. Forecasting International Relations

Deliberations on the terminology employed in this volume should begin with terms such as "forecast", "forecasting", and "prognostics" in the context of international relations. Accordingly, the term "forecast" (Polish: prognoza), as per the electronic version of the *Słownik języka polskiego PWN [PWN Dictionary of the Polish Language],* is defined as[1]: *the prediction of future phenomena or events; the prediction of the future based on a horoscope; the prediction of the future course of an illness*. Conversely, the term "social forecasting" (Polish: prognozowanie społeczne), according to the Encyklopedia PWN [PWN Encyclopaedia], *is*[2]: *the formulation of predictions regarding*

[1] *Słownik języka polskiego PWN*, „prognoza", https://sjp.pwn.pl/sjp/prognoza;25725–73.html, 10.10.2017.

[2] *Encyklopedia PWN*, „prognozowanie społeczne", https://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/ency-klopedia/prognozowanie%20spo%C5%82eczne.html, 10.10.2017.

future states of affairs, processes, or events based on scientifically justified premises, i.e., forecasts [Polish: prognozy – derived from the Greek "prognosis", meaning "foreknowledge", "prediction"].

The presented definitions may be considered relatively brief; hence, it is worth referring to definitional interpretations that devote more space to these terms, such as the *Encyklopedia zarządzania [Encyclopaedia of Management]*. In its electronic version, forecasting is defined as[3]: *the rational, scientific prediction of future events, which entails inferring unknown events based on known ones. Several types of predictions can be distinguished: rational, common-sense, scientific, and irrational.*

What, then, do the authors of these definitions understand by these specific types of forecasting? The answer is as follows:[4]

Rational predictions occur when inference is a logical process proceeding from a set of historical facts. If these premises are based on experience, we are dealing with common-sense rational prediction. Conversely, scientific rational prediction occurs when scientific methods are used in the inference process. Irrational predictions arise when facts have not been provided and when there is no logical connection between the premises and the conclusion.

It therefore appears that the forecasting of international relations fulfils the aforementioned criterion of scientific rationality. The definitions cited above clearly indicate that a forecast is the prediction of future phenomena or events, whereas scientific forecasting is a methodology based on forecasting through scientific methods, designed to ensure the greatest possible objectivity.

A notable approach to the interpretation of forecasting was presented in the *Business Dictionary*, which contains the following definition of "forecasting": *Forecasting*)[5]: *A planning tool that helps*

[3] *Encyklopedia zarządzania*, „prognozowanie", https://mfiles.pl/pl/index.php/Prognozowanie, 10.10.2017.

[4] I. Penc-Pietrzak, *Planowanie strategiczne w nowoczesnej firmie*, Wydawnictwo JAK, Warsaw 2010, pp. 10–11.

[5] Original version: *A planning tool that helps management in its attempts to cope with the uncertainty of the future, relying mainly on data from the past and*

management in its attempts to handle the uncertainty of the future, relying primarily on past and present data, as well as an analysis of current trends. Forecasting is based on assumptions derived from the experience, knowledge, and judgement of management. Future calculations are developed for the upcoming months or years based on one or more techniques, such as the Box-Jenkins model, the Delphi method, moving averages, regression analysis, or trend prediction.

In the case of business forecasting, a similar interpretation could apply to international relations, considering the international status and scale of a given company (a global corporation). On the other hand, the aforementioned definition implies that some of the methods are not scientific in nature, which effectively precludes the application of this approach to the forecasting of international relations. When examining specific data at the level of interstate relations, one must rely exclusively on information that can be precisely described and classified. The "knowledge, experience, and judgements" of decision-makers do not fall into this category. Unlike large corporations, states are governed by politicians elected by the public, who typically lack adequate experience in managing state institutions. In other words, corporate executives possess not only knowledge and thorough theoretical preparation, but also practical expertise resulting from years of operating in international business. Most politicians of the currently ruling party are typically holding high-level positions for the first time. This is why they should have (and, fortunately, do have) access to a team of experts responsible for such things as forecasting international changes. On the one hand, this function is fulfilled by the heads of institutions responsible for keeping government leaders continuously informed about the situation and actions of other states (in practice, this is handled by the diplomatic service,

present and analysis of trends. Forecasting starts with certain assumptions based on the management's experience, knowledge, and judgment. These estimates are projected into the coming months or years using one or more techniques such as Box-Jenkins models, Delphi method, exponential smoothing, moving averages, regression analysis, and trend projection: Business Dictionary, http://www.businessdictionary.com/-definition/forecasting.html, 12.01.2018.

intelligence agencies, and potentially state media institutions); on the other hand, it is performed by teams responsible for the appropriate processing and analysis of this information. In the contemporary world, the lack of access to information is no longer an issue; rather, the challenge lies in the appropriate selection of valuable information from the daily deluge of data flooding global media. This function is typically carried out by various types of intelligence institutions and think tanks,[6] which are responsible for working with open-source information.[7] However, forecasting international relations and threats using scientific methods is entirely different from ongoing information analysis. Forecasters not only filter out valuable data but, above all, refine and construct new information-processing models to generate the most effective forecasts possible. This resembles a situation where intelligence agencies, diplomatic services, and press agencies continuously operate alongside scientific think tanks, while forecasters attempt to use these data to construct models with the highest possible degree of predictive accuracy. Ideally, forecasters should predict future events based solely on effectively filtered data obtained from open sources of information. In such a scenario, diplomatic or intelligence institutions would, in specific cases, merely supplement these forecasts with elements that had not been accounted for during the modelled data processing. Simultaneously, it must be noted that forecasters are engaged in developing long-term forecasts, whereas intelligence services focus on attempting to predict the near future, treating the more distant future somewhat as an afterthought. For this reason, discrepancies may arise between these two forms of data processing. It is akin

[6] *A group of people who collectively perform research and develop reports and recommendations on topics relating to strategic planning or public policy, and which is usually funded by corporate, government, or special interests* – "think tank"; Polish-English Dictionary, GLOBE, https://pl.glosbe.-com/en/pl/think%20tank, 10.10.2017.

[7] Open sources of information, i.e., publicly available data that can be obtained without the need for additional clearances or permissions; the broadly understood mass media currently constitute the most common sources of this kind (author's note).

to mixing information of different categories and delivering it to institutions with entirely distinct objectives: short-term forecasting carried out by state information bodies, and long-term forecasting conducted by scientific forecast institutions. Inherently, short-term forecasts will thus be characterised by a high level of detail, whereas long-term ones will merely delineate general trends. Nevertheless, both of these forms of forecasting the future are equally necessary; moreover, when conducted independently of one another, they can complement each other all the more effectively. Therefore, for the purposes of this monograph, forecasting in international relations is **construed as a scientific form of predicting the future from at least a medium – and long-term perspective**.

According to one of the most acclaimed Polish experts in the forecasting of international relations, Professor Mirosław Sułek, forecasting can be understood in two ways:

- as sectoral (subject-specific) forecasting, which refers to the forecasting of distinct state activities, such as political, economic, military, cultural, and social relations;
- as synthetic forecasting, which is a comprehensive approach encompassing the broadly understood activities of a given state in the international arena.

In his research, Professor Sułek also inclined towards a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to the forecasting of interstate relations. The professor defined international relations as an element of *human relations, representing a sphere for fulfilling the needs (interests) of individuals organised into smaller or larger groups, who utilise their capabilities within the entirety of social relations. In other words, human relations are relations of forces (capabilities) and interests*.[8] At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Professor Sułek's research was directed at examining these forces through the lens of differences in the potentials of individual states. In turn, the author of this monograph focused his research efforts primarily

[8] M. Sułek, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe,* Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2010, p. 9.

on interests and their accompanying intentions, namely the specific nature of the decision-making processes characteristic of the studied nations. This was accompanied by the author's endeavour to develop a forecasting methodology that makes it easier to predict the behaviour of individual societies in the international arena, in a manner that enables the identification of realistic threats to the national security of specific states.[9]

Depending on the social group, significant differences in the logic of conduct may occur, even in the pursuit of survival and development. Survival and development will be perceived differently by Russians, differently by the Chinese, and differently still by the nations of Western Europe or South and Central America. Consequently, individual nations will also adopt distinct methodologies for ensuring the fulfilment of their (subjectively interpreted) national interests. It is worth adding that the research of Professor Sułek and that of the author are mutually complementary. On the one hand, they enable a reliable assessment of state potential, a value essential in evaluating potential courses of action; on the other hand, they enable the juxtaposition of this potential against the intentions and decision-making processes of the studied social groups (ethnic groups, nations, etc.). In light of the above, it might appear that the author's research constitutes a novel, albeit merely incremental, element in the continuous development of increasingly effective models for forecasting threats, applicable both to the national security of the concerned entities and, in a broader dimension, to international security.

Quoting Professor Sułek:[10] *"The principal participants in international relations are political entities (most often states), acting as territorially organised human collectives; they are actors in international relations, equipped with resources, reason, and the will to achieve their perpetual objectives, namely survival (security) and de-*

[9] M. Górnikiewicz, T. Szczurek, *Prognozowanie międzynarodowych stosunków wojskowych na podstawie uwarunkowań społeczno-kulturowych*, [in:] *Determinanty kształtowania bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego*, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Bankowej, Poznań 2017, pp. 103–115.

[10] M. Sułek, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe…*, p. 9.

velopment (wealth and power)." Thus, while Professor Sułek focused his research on resources, the author of this monograph concentrates on the aforementioned "reason and will".

The professor's remarks concerning the possibility of predicting the future based on the past and the present serve as a fitting summary of the deliberations on forecasting:[11]

It is erroneously believed, in my view, that history (that which has passed) is known. In reality, while certain facts, documents (whose authenticity is not always certain), and interpretations are known, historians remain fully occupied. Research into antiquity and the Middle Ages continues to this day. History is constantly being reinterpreted. The same applies to the future. We are aware of numerous events, facts, documents, and interpretations. The future does not emerge out of thin air; it is largely the present, merely a little further ahead of us.

Consequently, in light of the above considerations, the following understanding of "forecasting" has been adopted for the purposes of this monograph:

The forecasting of national and international security threats is exclusively a scientific method of predicting the future from at least a medium – and long-term perspective.

1.2. Mental Programming, Culture and Its Dimensions: Cultural Codes

Before delving into the very concepts of mental programming and cultural codes, which evolved within the field of cultural anthropology, it is worth examining how anthropologists define culture compared to other fields and disciplines. Over the past centuries, scholars have employed the term "culture" in diverse, often radically contradictory contexts. This, in turn, has led to profound ambiguity in interpreting the concept, resulting in the obscurity of various definitions. Consequently, an average person would likely struggle

[11] Ibidem, p. 10.

to provide a clear answer if asked to define culture. Typical responses usually point to the theatre, cinema, high art, or art in general, potentially encompassing any form of artistic expression, or even belief and behavioural systems, history, and traditions.[12] All these answers naturally fall within the broadly understood scope of culture; nevertheless, in a scientific context, it is imperative to define terms more precisely, reaching the core of the issue and focusing on the underlying premises. Another equally vital factor influencing the articulation of a definition is its specific purpose within a chosen field or discipline of knowledge. A psychologist, an anthropologist, a sociologist, or a philosopher will each define "culture" differently based on their distinct research requirements.

Archaeology

In archaeology, the manifestations of culture are most frequently identified in its material dimension, comprising artefacts discovered at excavation sites that are the product of human hands and minds. Both the variety and the craftsmanship level simultaneously indicate the degree of developmental advancement of a given community within this specifically construed cultural context. Gustaf Kossinna, a German archaeologist who lived at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (1858 to 1931), equated archaeological cultures with linguistic, ethnic, and racial groups. According to him, a specific culture could be precisely linked to a distinct people inhabiting a particular territory. Conversely, Józef Kostrzewski, initially Kossinna's student and later his opponent, argued that an archaeological culture is most clearly *evidenced by a complex of typical characteristics found in pottery, weaponry, tools, ornaments, architecture, economy, burial rites, and other phenomena of material, spiritual, and social culture discernible in a given period and area*. This approach was largely shared by the equally renowned archaeologist Vere Gordon Childe, who noted that *"We find certain types of remains – pots,*

[12] CNK, *Co to jest kultura?,* Street poll, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-Nm-J0XiiJ0k, Czas na Kulturę, 8.09.2013.

implements, ornaments, burial rites and house forms – constantly recurring together. Such a complex of associated traits we shall call a 'cultural group' or just a 'culture.' We assume that such a complex is the material expression of what today we would call 'a people'."[13]

This realistic view of archaeological culture was critiqued by notable figures such as Stanisław Tabaczyński (who argued that culture can only be understood through the lens of "material correlates of culture" and ethnographic observations[14]). With the emergence of constructivism, there was a shift in the way culture was conceived, which also influenced a change in the approach to this issue within archaeology. Specifically, it began to be recognised that it is not possible to provide a comprehensive and fully objective description of culture solely on the basis of its material dimensions. Conversely, it was noted that archaeologists should avoid "overinterpreting" discoveries, as this can inevitably lead to erroneous conclusions. Consequently, it was accepted that archaeologists construct an approximate picture of a culture based on findings, with the caveat that this picture may undergo further modifications as new discoveries are made, or even be discarded entirely in light of new facts that alter the prevailing perspective (as was the case, for instance, with the Yamnaya culture).

Ethnography

In ethnography, which stems from socio-cultural anthropology, objects constitute a manifestation of culture just as significant as the human behaviours occurring within a given community. Ethnographers conduct research on people, ethnic groups, ethnic formations, and the correlation between material and spiritual culture. Examples of activities studied by ethnographers include sound or even musical compositions (e.g., rhythms, music, songs), literary works (folktales, myths, legends), religious practices (tales concerning beliefs, systems

[13] W. Ashmore, R. J. Sharer, *Discovering Our Past: A Brief Introduction to Archaeology,* Avalon 2008.

[14] *Kto jest kim w Polsce,* 4th edition, ed. B. Cynkier et al., Warsaw 2001, p. 961.

of customs and rituals), and all other forms of social coexistence generated within a specific community. In their work, ethnographers employ qualitative research methods, through which they strive to understand the systems of perception and cognition present in different cultural groups. The most frequently used research methods are interviews, questionnaires, and participant observation. In research practice, however, ethnographers have endeavoured to identify with the studied community as closely as possible, which theoretically precludes maintaining scientific impartiality towards the research subject. Consequently, ethnographers have occasionally been accused of unintentional bias when documenting the progress and results of their studies. Another frequently employed method involves hiring informants who originate from the studied community or related groups and possess extensive knowledge about the research subject. Thus, on the one hand, these methods have allowed for the collection of highly qualitative empirical data; on the other hand, there has always been a persistent risk of distorting the obtained results, which is difficult to eliminate. Nevertheless, to this day, ethnographic research methods are considered among the most effective for studying cultural groups, often more so than the quantitative methods used in sociology.[15]

Sociology

In sociology, on the other hand, culture is a very broadly understood "distinct area of life and activity of human groups", that is, the comprehensively understood material and non-material (spiritual) heritage created and developed by humanity in the course of the evolution of social (civilisational) life. Fundamentally, in sociology, culture is given a descriptive sense, referring to a broad conceptual understanding (which includes both the products of human hands and minds, and activities aimed at satisfying all needs, be they material or spiritual). Simultaneously, culture is understood as a general

[15] T. Wróblewski, *Wstęp do etnografii,* Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poznań 1969.

set of values and associated beliefs regarding conduct, which, during the progressive socialisation of members of a given cultural group, take the shape of specific rules designed to most effectively serve the satisfaction of needs. To summarise, according to sociologists, culture is a form that regulates the functioning of a given social group.[16] One cannot disagree with such an approach; nevertheless, from the perspective of the methodology for identifying the patterns that shape the ways of thinking, perception, feeling, or reaction among members of a given group, this approach seems less precise than the ethnographic one. The norms regulating the functioning of the group as a whole and of the members of society towards one another constitute merely a fraction of the rules that order the functioning of individuals. In other words, sociologists concern themselves with the broader, collective context of culture, but they do not focus their research efforts on the impact of culture upon the functioning of a given member of society as an individual, particularly if this individual were to function in complete isolation from their group. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at the understanding of culture within the psychological approach.

Psychology

In the psychological sciences, the primary research effort is focused on the "interior" of the human being, and more precisely on how a given culture shapes the personality of individuals raised in a specific environment. The subjects of study encompass the thoughts of the participants, as well as their feelings, reactions, and the motives driving specific behaviours. Of equal importance is the functioning of people within a given community based on specific rules of social coexistence (a system of imperatives and prohibitions, judging others, etc.). These, in turn, influence specific forms of expression both in interpersonal communication and in the individual expression of

[16] A. Kłoskowska, *Socjologia kultury,* wyd. III, PWN, Warsaw 2007; M. Golka, *Socjologia kultury*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2008, p. 360.

emotions or one's own personality.[17] In this regard, the psychological understanding of culture as a sphere that shapes the personality of specific individuals, juxtaposed with their innate traits, undoubtedly provides an interesting point of reference, which the author utilised in formulating the definition of "culture" adopted for the purposes of this monograph.

Cultural Anthropology

Anthropologists, by contrast, perceive reality more broadly and comprehensively than psychologists or sociologists. For this reason, the research area dictates the interdisciplinary nature of this field, which seeks answers to questions posed by anthropologists at the intersection of the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Such a broad scope of research stems from the aspiration to describe and understand the human being as an individual functioning within a specific social structure. Two main streams have emerged within anthropology: physical and cultural anthropology. The former concerns the biological and physiological variability of humans, while the latter pertains to human evolution conditioned by functioning within a specific social structure. In other words, the first focuses on transformations occurring within the biological organism, whereas the second concentrates on changes and their consequences taking place in the social environment.[18]

For this reason, it is precisely the achievements developed thus far in the field of cultural anthropology that seem appropriate for attempting to construct a theoretical model, one that could become the foundation of future forecasting based on patterns of perception and decision-making established within a given community, whilst simultaneously accounting for the complexity of a single human being (a decision-maker or a narrow group of political deci-

[17] Z. W. Dudek, A. Pankalla, *Psychologia kultury. Doświadczenia graniczne i transkulturowe,* Eneteia, Warsaw 2008.

[18] A. Barnard, *Antropologia. Zarys teorii i historii,* Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 2006; E. Krawczak, *Antropologia kulturowa. Klasyczne kierunki, szkoły i orientacje*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2007.

sion-makers). The journey through the scholarly output of cultural anthropology regarding the aforementioned patterns should begin with the three scientists who laid the groundwork for the research of the author of this publication: Geert Hofstede, Michael Harris Bond, and Edward Twitchell Hall. It was the research of this trio that inspired the author to investigate the possibility of utilising the knowledge they accumulated to attempt to understand culturally diverse societies, and subsequently to apply knowledge of these patterns in research on psychological operations.[19] The gathered experience and knowledge prompted the author to reflect on the possibility of developing new models of patterns that could be applied in forecasting threats to international security. At the same time, the knowledge gathered by anthropologists to date proved to be, on the one hand, directed towards an entirely different research area, and on the other, overly superficial. Ultimately, the subject of the author's research became the patterns that, to some extent, influence the shaping of the foreign policy of specific states by a single decision-maker or a group thereof. Before presenting the achievements of these individuals, however, it is worth examining the research methodology developed thus far concerning broadly defined culture, that is, the set of traits (patterns) distinguishing one group from others.

Culture: Unification, Classification, and Patterns

While examining material objects that are "products of culture" in studies dedicated to psychological operations is just as important as examining patterns of behaviour and thinking, in research dedicated to the decision-making process, focusing efforts on these patterns appears entirely sufficient.[20] An interesting point of view was presented by Ward Goodenough, who, in his research on culture,

[19] M. Górnikiewicz, *Ocena wpływu wiedzy pozyskanej w toku rozpoznania kulturowego na poziom efektywności procesu planowania wojskowych operacji psychologicznych* (kod: III.1.2.2.0), [in:] idem, *Rozpoznanie kulturowe w procesie planowania wojskowych operacji psychologicznych* (kod: III.1.2.0), Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw 2013.

[20] S. Ossowski, *Z zagadnień psychologii społecznej*, PWN, Warsaw 2000, p. 154.

distinguished two of its levels: the phenomenal (which encompasses the institutions and external characteristics of a given social group) and the ideational (which groups principles of action and acquired knowledge).[21] In a way, this corresponded to Ossowski's approach presented above, except that Goodenough perceived the sphere beyond principles or patterns of action more broadly than merely reducing it to material objects; he included everything within it, encompassing general ideas or abstract norms (characteristic of a given culture) that cannot be unambiguously linked to patterns or even knowledge. Religion or a philosophical system, which partially explain certain physical phenomena, can be treated both as knowledge (disregarding its reliability and treating it solely in terms of "knowledge" accepted on faith in a given culture) and also as an institution or an evident characteristic that distinguishes it from other social groups.[22] Crucially for the argument made in this monograph, both aforementioned researchers clearly indicate the existence of these patterns, but they continue to define them in a rather vague manner. According to Stefan Czarnowski, culture *is the entirety of objectified elements of social heritage, common to a range of groups, and, by virtue of their objectivity, established and capable of expanding spatially*. In other words, Czarnowski understood culture very broadly, linking its nature with the heritage of a specific social group.[23]

For comparison, U. Eco, believed that culture serves interpersonal communication through a system of signs that is, at least to some extent, mutually recognisable. Furthermore, A. Kłoskowska argued that culture is a relatively integrated whole that encompasses human behaviours occurring in accordance with patterns common to a given social group, developed and assimilated in the course of

[21] W. Goodenough, *In Pursuit of Culture*, "Annual Review of Anthropology" 2003, Vol. 32, pp. 1–12.

[22] W. Wołoszyn-Spirka, *Antropologia kulturowa. Wybrane materiały do nauczania antropologii kulturowej,* Wydawnictwo Edukacyjne Wers, Bydgoszcz 2007.

[23] S. Czarnowski, *Kultura*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie „Żak", Warsaw 2005, p. 12.

interaction, and which includes the products of such behaviours.[24] Consequently, this approach appears closest to the one represented by cultural anthropologists. It is also worth noting the approach of J. Szczepański, who claimed that culture is simply the totality of the products of human activity (both material and non-material), values, and recognised modes of conduct: objectified and accepted in any collectives, and transmitted to other collectives and subsequent generations. Thus, in a broader yet more precise view, Szczepański also agreed with the transmission of identical patterns of perception and functioning in a specific reality within a given social group.[25]

A problem that arises across numerous fields and disciplines, and even in discussions among individual cultural anthropologists, is the specification of what can be classified as a product of a given culture, and what is merely the result of an individual's work. When interpreting this issue through the lens of cultural determinants, these considerations may be deemed irrelevant, since everything created by humans will always be the result of a combination of specific cultural, individual, and even genetic patterns. Conversely, the question regarding the level of influence of specific patterns or traits (cultural versus individual) can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for each creation. Nevertheless, for certain scholars, such as Czarnowski or Szczepański, both art (musical and literary works) and utilitarian objects (a television, a hairdryer, a car, or a computer) constitute elements of culture. According to others, however, such as Ossowski, these are merely correlates of human dispositions. In the context of this monograph, one might consider whether the substance of a specific political decision in the sphere of international relations is more a product of culture or of the individual traits of specific decision-makers (along with their environment, which constantly exerts an influence on the final shape of these decisions).[26]

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[24] A. Kłosowska, *Kultura*, [In:] *Encyklopedia socjologii,* Vol. 2, H. Kubiak, Oficyna Naukowa, Warsaw 2002, p. 99.

[25] J. Szczepański, *Elementarne pojęcia socjologii,* PWN, Warsaw 1963, p. 47.

[26] The aforementioned correlation between cultural and individual codes was included in the research problems (see *Introduction*).

Cultural Dimensions According to E. T. Hall

To summarise, given the general consensus regarding the existence of patterns of world perception and functioning in a specific reality common to a given social group (which were somewhat enigmatically formulated at the time), it is worth examining the research of anthropologists who went a step further and attempted to describe these patterns. Let us begin this particular journey through "patterns" with the prominent figure of Edward Twitchell Hall. An ethnologist by education, Hall made a very distinct mark on the achievements of cultural anthropology. In his renowned book *Beyond Culture*, he proved that the increasingly rapid evolution of our species achieved over recent decades is, to a certain extent, the effect of civilisational progress. Humans also evolve through what they create themselves, which, together with the biological environment, constitutes their everyday surroundings.[27]

For instance, thanks to the invention of the wheel, the process of human adaptation to the environment accelerated to a degree that enabled the gradual modification of the existing reality. A modern example could be the invention of the Internet and, consequently, the development of mass communication technologies, such as social media. As a result, by exchanging information in real time, people began to mutually influence one another, thereby shaping common patterns. Consequently, the process of unifying these patterns currently proceeds in perfect symbiosis with the increasingly rapid globalisation. This also affects the perception of the surroundings, and thus the adaptation of people to their living environment. In his works, Hall also concentrated on the anthropological aspects of the perception of the world and people. Within these works, he

[27] E. M. Rogers, W. B. Hart, M. Yoshitaka, *Edward T. Hall and the History of Intercultural Communication,* The United States and Japan, Keio Communication Review 2002, pp. 3–26, Accessible at: http://www.mediacom.keio.ac.jp/publication/pdf 2002/review24/2.pdf; E. M. Rogers, *The Extensions of Men: The Correspondence of Mar-shall McLuhan and Edward T. Hall*, Mass Communication and Society 2000, 3(1), pp. 117–135.

proposed the existence of two patterns that broadly describe the functioning of people raised in culturally diverse social groups. In 1960, Hall proposed the contextual model, which consists of two culturally distinct types of communication:[28]

- low context in message reception,
- high context in message reception.

What did the difference between these two patterns consist of in Hall's view? Societies classified as low-context cultures were characterised by individualism (this value was later refined by Hofstede, as discussed below). At the same time, according to Hall, a low context also manifested itself in a focus on the exchange of facts and specific information during communication, avoiding unnecessary "verbiage". This, of course, applied to both speech and writing. In other words, good interpersonal communication was considered to be that which is characterised by the transmission of specific and clear information, leaving no ambiguities regarding the content of the message. Hence the name of the value itself, as interpersonal communication should not be interpreted in a broader context, but solely confined to the message content, time, and place. Hofstede included Swedes, Americans, Canadians, and the majority of Western Europeans among low-context societies. At the same time, it must be remembered that his research was conducted in the reality of the 1950s and 1960s.[29]

In contrast, high-context societies were characterised by collectivism, and the method of communication relied largely on body language (oral and written transmission was deemed less important). The position of the interlocutors within the social structure was also paramount. The communication style itself could give the impression of being ambiguous and leaving a greater or lesser margin for interpretation. Simultaneously, the mutual relationships between the communicating individuals were highly significant. Hall

[28] E. T. Hall, *Poza kulturą*, PWN, Warsaw 1984, p. 125–146.

[29] W. Leeds-Hurwitz, *Notes in the History of Intercultural Communication,* The Foreign Service Institute and the Mandate for Intercultural Training, "Quarterly Journal of Speech" 1990, No. 76(3), pp. 262–281.

included Arab, South American, and most Asian societies (including the Chinese and Japanese) among these populations. According to Hall, in high-context societies, up to 90% of communication was determined by non-verbal signals. At the same time, these signals could be completely overlooked by individuals originating from low-context cultures. Hall considered certain populations to be evolving towards a high context, such as Mediterranean, Central and Eastern European, and even English-speaking societies.[30]

At this point, several associations come to mind. Firstly, the societies inhabiting East and Southeast Asia, despite numerous cultural similarities, are also characterised by many significant differences. The inhabitants of South Korea are much more direct than the Japanese. The latter, in turn, exhibit greater directness than the Taiwanese. China, on the other hand, is a conglomerate of an immense number of national, ethnic, and even religious groups, where each region is characterised by its own cultural specificity, and up until the mid-20th century, also by a distinct language or even several dialects.[31] Naturally, from the perspective of an average European, Asian societies are high context, but from the perspective of an East Asian resident, this apparent homogeneity is merely a gross oversimplification. Reversing the perspective, for an average inhabitant of Taiwan, the differences between specific European nations are not of such great significance, and all citizens of the European Union are simply "Europeans".

It is worth mentioning this in the context of the vast simplification Hall employed when constructing his original cultural patterns. The situation is similar with Hall's approach to the perception of time in various societies. According to Hall, in high-context cultures, time is considered fluid; consequently, the comprehensive completion of even several tasks within a certain timeframe is much more

30 E. T. Hall, op. cit., pp. 125–146.

31 M. Górnikiewicz, *Modelowanie bezpieczeństwa militarnego Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej. Prognoza przeciwdziałania zagrożeniom militarnym Prognoza przeciwdziałania zagrożeniom militarnym*, Wydawnictwo Prymat, Białystok 2017, pp. 11–103.

important than adhering to rigid working time norms (a polychronic culture). In low-context cultures, meeting deadlines and punctuality are paramount, even at the cost of completing one task rather than several simultaneously (a monochronic culture).[32] Furthermore, in high-context cultures, building mutual interpersonal bonds during joint work is as important as completing the task together. As in the previous case, such an approach can be considered a far-reaching simplification. Without looking too far, one can point to the example of the Japanese and the Taiwanese, who are renowned for the timely and highly reliable execution of tasks they are assigned. The same applies to the Chinese, who – under the exceptionally efficient and centralised management of the CCP – managed to achieve numerous construction and urbanisation miracles in a relatively short time prior to the 2008 Olympic Games.[33]

Cultural Dimensions/Codes and Mental Programming According to G. Hofstede

It is therefore worth referring to the research of Hofstede, who, despite employing generalisations, developed a significantly more precise model for studying cultural differences than Hall, and above all, relatively accurately isolated and described specific cultural values. This Dutch social psychologist was the first and, to date, the only one to conduct such extensive field research, encompassing over a hundred nationalities and ethnic groups.[34] He drew upon the methodological achievements developed thus far in cultural anthropology, but he also strove to refine existing techniques and methods to obtain an optimally accurate result. The scale of the research activities undertaken naturally exposed this distinguished scientist to the risk of errors. Equally important is the inspiration this titanic work provided for subsequent generations of scientists, including

[32] E. T. Hall, op. cit., pp. 125–146.
[33] M. Jacoby, *Chiny bez makijażu*, Muza SA, Warsaw 2016, pp. 283–371.
[34] G. Hofstede, Geert, *Culture's Consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations*, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications 2001.

the author of this monograph. Referring to Hofstede's definitions of the following terms is not merely a nod to such an immense scientific research effort; it is also a pragmatic move stemming from the impossibility of overlooking this kind of significant interdisciplinary contribution.

In the late 1960s, Geert's passion lay in the cultural differences that determine people's ways of thinking and behaving. Born in 1928, this psychologist by no means began his career in the social sciences. In 1953, at the age of twenty-five, he obtained a master's degree in mechanical engineering. In later life, it was this technical background that formed the foundation guiding the mode of thinking he adopted in his research on cultural differences. For the next ten years, Hofstede worked in industry, acquiring invaluable, purely practical experience. The next step was embarking on part-time doctoral studies at Groningen University. It was there, in 1967, that he obtained his doctorate. He was 39 years old at the time, but, unlike many other recently minted doctors, he also possessed extensive practical experience, which allowed him to adopt a somewhat different perspective on the subject of his future research.[35] In 1965, he joined IBM as a management trainer, and in this capacity, he was also responsible for conducting personnel research. Following his retirement in 1993, he engaged in educational and scientific activities, visiting numerous universities worldwide in the process. Concurrently, he continued to conduct research on topics of interest to him. Throughout his career, he was honoured with numerous prestigious awards, and many academic institutions granted him an honorary doctorate in recognition of his merits. Citing the above biography seemed essential to the author, as it helps to elucidate Geert's unique character and career. It also serves as a robust argument in favour of tentatively adopting his proposed interpretative frameworks and the definitions of the terms presented below.

[35] G. Hofstede, Internet Archive Waybeck Machine, *Biographical information about Geert Hofstede*, https://web.archive.org/web/20100531195834/ http://www.geer-thofstede.com/geert.aspx, 1.03.2018.

Culture as Mental Programming

Given his technical education, Hofstede perceives culture as a form of mental programming. He indicates that *every human being carries within themselves a certain pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving, which they acquire throughout their lifetime*. The period most conducive to learning is, naturally, childhood; later modifications require a greater degree of effort due to the necessity of replacing previous patterns with new ones. *Using the analogy of the way computers are programmed, this book will call such patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting mental programs, or (...) software of the mind. This does not mean, of course, that people are programmed the way computers are. (...) The sources of one's mental programs lie within the social environments in which one grew up and collected one's life experiences. The programming starts within the family; it continues within the neighborhood, at school, in youth groups, at the workplace, and in the living community*.[36] Thus, mental programming according to G. Hofstede is a synonym for the term "culture", defined as a system of specific ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting. This is also how "culture" is interpreted by sociologists and anthropologists.

G. Hofstede also emphasised that *culture is always a social phenomenon, as it is, at least to some extent, shared by people living in a given social environment (...) an unwritten set of rules of the social game*.[37]

Consequently, a dimension is a cultural trait acquired by an individual during their upbringing within a specific social group. One can therefore refer to such a trait **as a specific code determining a particular mode of perception and functioning in the reality specific to a given individual (this functioning encompasses the entirety of the decision-making process and undertaken actions, exhibited behaviours, as well as reactions to stimuli originating from the external and internal environment)**. Thus, the aforementioned "mental programming" consists in the process of creating codes that

[36] G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 16–17.
[37] Ibidem, p. 17.

determine the perception and functioning of every human being. This particular form of processing knowledge and creating specific functional patterns has been the subject of research by many recognised authorities across diverse fields and disciplines. It is worth mentioning, for instance, Richard Bandler, who characterised this process in the following manner: *When we come into the world, we have an enormous amount of knowledge and experience to assimilate, ranging from walking, talking, and eating independently, to deciding what to do with the rest of our lives. Our brains quickly learn to automate behaviours. This does not mean, of course, that the mind only automates 'good' behaviours; quite often, it learns to perform certain actions in a way that brings us misery or even makes us ill. We learn through repetition. An action performed a sufficient number of times carves its own neural pathway in the brain. Once subsequent neurons learn to connect with one another and transmit impulses, the behaviour becomes established.*[38] Dave Lakhani also mentions the power of programming, citing in his book the words of Richard Taflinger, a professor at the Edward R. Murrow College of Communication at Washington State University: *"Programming leads to the formation of beliefs (...) If a person is programmed with a certain belief, they will believe it.* Lakhani himself further notes: *People behave in accordance with how they perceive their environment. However, they perceive their environment in accordance with what they have been taught. What they have been taught (...) helps in cultivating beliefs.*[39]

Hofstede's definition of "culture" seems to comprehensively express the thoughts of the aforementioned predecessors, and does so in an elegant, one-sentence formula: ***Culture is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group from another***.[40]

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38 R. Bandler, *Richard Bandler's Guide to Trance-formation*, Wydawnictwo Helion, Gliwice 2010, pp. 19–20.

39 D. Lakhani, *Subliminal Persuasion: Influence & Marketing Secrets They Don't Want You to Know*, Wydawnictwo Helion, translated by M. Machnik, Gliwice 2010, pp. 124–127.

40 G. Hofstede, op. cit., p. 17.

Summarising the entirety of the aforementioned deliberations, one may adopt the following understanding of the terms presented below:

Codes are patterns that shape perceptual, decision-making, action, and reaction processes to any stimuli, determining the comprehensively understood functioning of a human being in a given environment.

The state of mental programming is the current state of the totality of codes determining the comprehensively understood functioning of a human being.

The process of mental programming is the process of creating the codes that determine the comprehensively understood functioning of a human being.

The state of cultural programming is the current state of the totality of cultural codes determining the comprehensively understood functioning of a human being.

Cultural forecasting is an exclusively scientific method of predicting the decision-making processes of the studied societies, based on prior understanding of the cultural programming specific to these societies.


1.3. Relationships Between Individual Codes: Division and Classification

G. Hofstede also introduced a clear division between the spheres he termed "human nature" and "personality", which function in parallel with the aforementioned "culture" within the mentality of every individual. This distinction is important insofar as it introduces three elements that determine the comprehensively understood functioning of a human being as a living creature entering into any interaction with both the external and internal environment. This is also exceptionally important given the subject of this research, which is presented in detail in the third chapter. Returning to the interpretations and definitions according to G. Hofstede:[41]

[41] Ibidem, pp. 15–45.

- Human nature is a universal element common to all people, constituting the fundamental level of mental programming inherited in the genetic code. Hofstede compared "human nature" construed in this way to an operating system that determines basic physical and psychological functions, the capacity to feel emotions, the need for belonging, the ability to observe the environment, the manner of expressing joy and sorrow, and the perception of reality.
- Personality is a set of traits specific to a given individual, partially inherited in genetic material and partially acquired: *shaped by the influence of collective programming (culture) and by our own unique experiences*.

Figure 1. Three levels of human mental programming



Source: G. Hofstede, *Kultury i organizacje*, Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Warsaw 2007, p. 18.

The author of this monograph fully agrees with the definition of the term "culture" that has been adapted for the purposes of this research; however, he can only agree with the interpretation of "human nature" and "personality" insofar as it concerns the demarcation between these concepts and "culture" as a set of collective traits specific to a particular social group. It is therefore worth dedicating some attention to a detailed description of patterns and codes ac-

cording to G. Hofstede. Obviously, Geert was not the first to develop patterns of behaviour, thinking, or feeling. As early as the first half of the 20th century, social anthropologists attempted to identify the ways of solving the same problems that are specific to individual cultures. In 1954, the American sociologist Alex Inkeles and the psychologist Daniel Levinson reviewed English-language literature dedicated to various national cultures.[42] Based on this study, drawing upon the conducted review of monographs, they proposed a catalogue of issues characterising problem-solving methods regardless of the social group:

- attitude (relation to authority),
- the concept of the individual (the relationship between the individual and society, and between masculinity and femininity),
- methods of solving specific problems (control of aggression and control of feelings).

Two decades later, Geert had the opportunity to test, verify, and refine this knowledge in the practice of his own research during visits to IBM branches in over fifty different countries.[43] At that time, Hofstede examined IBM employees whose only difference was their nationality, making them an excellent research sample. To this end, referring to the results of Inkeles and Levinson, he developed questionnaires through which he could determine, based on the answers provided by the employees, their inherent value system, their problems, and their methods of resolving them. These issues pertained to:[44]

1. Social inequalities (relation to authority).
2. The relationship between the individual and the group.
3. Conceptions of masculinity and femininity, and the resulting social and emotional implications of being born a boy or a girl in a given social group.

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42 A. Inkeles, D. J. Levinson, *National character: The study of modal personality and sociocultural systems*, [in:] *The handbook of social psychology*, G. Lindzey, E. Aronson, Addison-Wesley (eds.), New York 1969, pp. 418–506.

43 G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 15–41.

44 A. Inkeles, D. J. Levinson, *National character: The study of modal personality and sociocultural systems*, op. cit., pp. 447.

4. Methods of coping with uncertainty and ambiguity, which were linked to the control of aggression and the expression of emotions.

The analogies between G. Hofstede's values and the catalogue of issues authored by Inkeles and Levinson are evident. This convergence in the results of their mutual research led Geert to propose "dimensions", that is, traits of culture. According to Hofstede, ***this dimension is a certain aspect of culture that can be measured, allowing the position of a given culture to be determined relative to other cultures.*** G. Hofstede then developed four dimensions for the first time, based on the existing research output:[45]

1. Power Distance;
2. Collectivism and Individualism;
3. Femininity and Masculinity;
4. Uncertainty Avoidance.

Another dimension was developed in the 1980s. This was Long-Term and Short-Term Orientation, developed jointly with Michael Harris Bond.[46] The uniqueness of this dimension compared to the previous ones lay in the involvement of a group of collaborators from the Asia-Pacific region, ensuring an appropriate level of scientific objectivity for the research. As a result, it was possible to isolate a value that had previously been overlooked due to the improper formulation of questions and interpretation of survey responses. The final value, added in the current century, is "Indulgence versus Restraint" – a dimension used to determine the sense of satisfaction with one's life situation, or in other words, the capacity or lack thereof to derive pleasure from life.[47] This last value, in light

[45] G. Hofstede, R. R. McCrae, *Personality and culture revisited: linking traits and dimensions of culture*, "Cross Cultural Research" 2004, vol. 38 ,No. 1; G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 35–44.


[46] G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, *The Confucius connection: From cultural roots to eco-nomic growth*, "Organizational Dynamic" 1988, No. 4.

[47] G. Hofstede, *Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context*, Scholar Works@GVSU. Online Readings in "Psychology and Culture", 6.09.2015.

of the previous five, was deemed by the author to be irrelevant to the international forecasting process (with reference to the decision-making process at the level of interstate relations). Therefore, in the subsequent parts of the text, the author has focused solely on the aforementioned five dimensions of culture according to Hofstede and Bond (as well as context according to Hall).

The triangular model presented above indicates, in line with Geert's intention, the overlapping of all codes, and establishes a specific hierarchy among them. Additionally, it employs relatively enigmatic concepts such as "human nature" and "personality". This model may therefore prove opaque to researchers striving to establish clear criteria for division among them, and thus the ability to determine the level of influence of specific codes on the human decision-making process.

Figure 2. Division of codes comprising human mental programming



Source: own elaboration.

Consequently, the author undertook the development of a classification and graphical division of "codes" based on his own concept, in accordance with the intention of creating a methodology that could help map the human decision-making process within the sphere of international relations. For this reason, indicating clear relationships between equally clearly separated groups of codes appears necessary to implement the aforementioned aim. **For the purposes of this study, the author has therefore adopted a distinction between cultural (collective) codes and individual codes**

(specific to a given person). Within the second group of codes, applying the criterion of origin, he distinguished: genetic codes (inherited in genetic material) and acquired codes (formed during a given person's lifetime based on their personal experiences).

1.4. Cultural Dimensions as Cultural Codes Based on the Research of G. Hofstede and M. H. Bond

Hofstede's contribution to the development of cultural anthropology and psychology is indisputable. While he approached the division of the aforementioned codes somewhat enigmatically, in constructing the specific cultural dimensions, he demonstrated a level of detail characteristic of an engineering graduate. The individual dimensions are discussed below, highlighting the differences between them. It is this part of Geert's work that became the point of reference for the author's preliminary research, which ultimately led to the development of an original classification of specific cultural codes identified in the international decision-making process.

Power Distance

According to G. Hofstede, this value expressed the attitude towards individuals situated higher in the social hierarchy and/or wielding any form of power over other people. It did not solely concern the simple relationship between a superior and a subordinate, but rather the entirety of mutual interactions between people in a given society, depending on the positions they occupy (the specific roles they fulfil). In societies with higher power distance, there is social consent for the existence of social inequalities, as well as for various forms of manifesting one's superior position over individuals in worse life situations. At the family level, this manifested itself in the differentiation of roles played within the family: for instance, parents versus children, grandparents versus children, uncles and aunts, etc. Depending on the role fulfilled and holding a higher position in the

family structure, one was entitled to more rights relative to the other family members. In schools, relationships between a teacher and students were also based on affording the teacher top-down respect, regardless of the actual value of the knowledge imparted to the students. The ruling class could also take significantly more liberties with the rest of society, which stemmed solely from their higher position on the social ladder. This also applied to wealthy individuals, who, with societal approval, could demonstrate their superiority over the poorer classes. Publicly flaunting one's high status was not only widely acceptable but even met with understanding and support, depending, of course, on the level of power distance in a given society. Similarly, in societies where social recognition resulted solely from one's own achievements and personal merits rather than merely from one's social position, one can speak of the functioning of a correspondingly low power distance. Consequently, asserting one's position over others in such cultures is met with a complete lack of understanding and a more or less openly expressed reprimand. Furthermore, Hofstede also noted interesting correlations occurring between the social situation and structure, and the level of power distance.[48]

Table 1. Differences between societies with various levels of Power Distance

Low Power Distance	High Power Distance
Minimising inequalities between people	Acceptance of inequalities between people resulting from social status
Hierarchy is a result of playing different roles	Hierarchy is a result of inequality
A tendency towards the decentralisation of structures	A tendency towards the centralisation of structures
Subordinates expect consultation in the decision-making process	Subordinates expect to be given orders
The management model highlights the necessity of maintaining equal rights	The management model highlights the leading role of decision-makers

Source: own elaboration

[48] G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 53–86.

Individualism versus Collectivism

In individualistic cultures, values conducive to the development of the individual are rewarded, whereas in collectivistic cultures, those favouring a given group (social, professional, hobby-related, etc.) are prioritised. The first category includes societies oriented towards the creation of outstanding individuals whose above-average abilities allow the entire group to develop. In a collectivistic culture, an individual's attempts to stand out will be frowned upon and suitably suppressed; instead, the achievement of mutual benefits without any member distinguishing themselves will be rewarded. The table presented below should clarify the criterion for the division between these two extremes defined by Geert.[49]

Table 2. Differences between societies with different levels of Individualism/Collectivism

Collectivism	Individualism
The individual is identified through the lens of the groups to which they belong	The individual is identified through the lens of their own achievements
Relationships between superiors and subordinates resemble family relationships	Relationships between superiors and subordinates constitute a contract intended to ensure mutual benefits
Employment and promotion depend on group affiliation	Employment and promotion depend on skills and achievements
The management model applies to groups	The management model applies to individuals
Interpersonal relationships are paramount	Achieving the objective is paramount

Source: own elaboration.

Masculinity versus Femininity

This is one of the more interesting values, as it stems from the norms accepted in a given society for evaluating people based on their gender. In masculine societies, there will be a clear division into typically masculine and feminine roles, as well as specific types of professions (soldier, welder, miner, teacher, nurse, secretary) and functions fulfilled within the family. Masculinity also signifies asser-

[49] Ibidem, pp. 86–129.

tiveness and the display of one's own strength, whereas femininity implies prioritising harmony and balanced feelings. Hofstede observed that, depending on the existence of this gender-based distinction, a specific kind of perspective on interpersonal relations may also emerge (one based on promoting individualistic attitudes or peaceful coexistence, even at the cost of sacrificing benefits that might arise from individual predispositions). It might seem that the characterisation presented above does not entirely correspond with reality. For example, in Arab societies, there is, on the one hand, an exceptionally distinct division into male and female roles, yet on the other, people build communities that function in closeness and harmony. In the case of this value, the aforementioned collectivism also, to some extent, merges with masculinity.[50] Incidentally, according to the results of Geert's research, the inhabitants of the United Arab Emirates are characterised by a high level of collectivism (75/100) and an average value of masculinity/femininity (50/100), while the population of Saudi Arabia features an identical collectivism coefficient and only a slightly higher masculinity index (60/100).[51] As such, this value would only to a minor extent relate to the division of roles into masculine and feminine. The characterisation of this dimension is also notable in the context of the table below:

Table 3. Differences between societies with different levels of Femininity/Masculinity

Femininity	Masculinity
A focus on caring for the quality of life and caring for others in one's environment	A focus on competing with others for a better position and material goods
People and maintaining friendly relations are what count	Professional efficiency and the benefits achieved are what count
Superiors strive for consensus and creating a harmonious workplace	Superiors strive to gain an advantage over the competition
Quality of life is more important than work and benefits	Work and benefits are more important than quality of life

50 Ibidem, pp. 129–177.

51 Hofstede Insights, Compare countries, https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/com-pare-countries/, 28.02.2018.

Femininity	Masculinity
In conflict situations, one strives for negotiation and compromise	In conflict situations, confrontation and negotiating from a position of strength are preferred

Source: own elaboration.

Uncertainty Avoidance

According to Geert, this value illustrates the drive to organise one's environment in such a way as to exclude any risk (a high level of uncertainty avoidance) or, conversely, to accept the possibility of risk arising in the context of achievable benefits (a low level). In other words, this value symbolises the tendency to engage in uncertain situations or to avoid them. In societies with a high level of uncertainty avoidance, people will experience anxiety about functioning in everyday or professional life without prior induction and the implementation of various regulations (codes of conduct). For example, new employees will receive highly detailed instructions before they commence their initial tasks, and even then, they will remain under constant supervision. In the case of cultures with low uncertainty avoidance, laws and regulations may be relatively imprecise, or they may simply be absent. The table below should further elucidate the difference between the two extremes of uncertainty avoidance according to Geert:[52]

Table 4. Differences between societies with different levels of Uncertainty Avoidance

Low Uncertainty Avoidance	High Uncertainty Avoidance
Acceptance of uncertainty as a permanent feature of life	Uncertainty is an undesirable state that must be continuously eliminated
Inherently low level of anxiety about the future	Inherently high level of anxiety about the future
No need for overly detailed regulation of life through rules	A need for detailed regulation of life through rules
Acceptance of creativity and innovation concerning existing solutions	Lack of acceptance for excessively far-reaching creativity and innovation concerning existing solutions

[52] G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 177–220.

Low Uncertainty Avoidance	High Uncertainty Avoidance
The drive to attain new achievements and social recognition	The drive to ensure one's own security

Source: own elaboration.

Long-Term and Short-Term Orientation

Long – and short-term orientation could only be observed when juxtaposing two cultures that were diametrically opposed in this regard, and moreover, by maintaining impartial objectivity resulting from the simultaneous involvement of scientists from these diverse societies. Hofstede, together with Bond, defined this pattern, which is unique compared to the previous ones, as follows: *long-term orientation signifies the cultivation of virtues that yield benefits in the future, particularly perseverance and thrift. The opposite pole of this dimension is short-term orientation, which signifies the fostering of virtues related to the past and present, especially respect for tradition, saving "face", and the fulfilment of social obligations*. Consequently, such a definition not only fully applies to the peoples of East and Southeast Asia, but also clearly references Confucianism, which immediately compromises its universal character (not all nations inhabiting that region adhere to the principles of life according to Confucius). Nevertheless, Hofstede and his team classified some of the studied societies as short-term oriented (primarily the so-called Western ones), and others as long-term oriented (East and Southeast Asia, and even parts of South Asia). In refining this pattern, the focus shifted towards the capacity for comprehensive and long-term future planning, as opposed to the lack of such an ability manifested in the daily lives of many Americans and Europeans.[53] Naturally, many other contributing factors were added, such as the ability to self-regulate one's own behaviours and emotions whlist deliberately awaiting rewards in long-term cultures (long-distance pragmatism), and being guided by assertiveness and arrogance in achieving life goals (short-distance pragmatism, often ill-considered yet sincere in

[53] G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 220–253.

terms of expressed emotions). There are countless examples, but it seems that the table below will help to highlight the key differences between these two opposing values as clearly as possible.

Table 5. Differences between societies with different levels of Short – and Long-Term Orientation

Long-Term Orientation	Short-Term Orientation
The expectation that perseverance and systematic effort will make it possible to achieve gradual and stable results	The expectation that exerted efforts should yield the swiftest possible results (not necessarily stable ones)
Respect for circumstances	Respect for tradition
Marriage is an act of moral obligation	Marriage is an act of pragmatism
The company's profits in 10 years are important	The company's immediate profits are important
Focus on one's position in the market or in society	Focus on meeting deadlines

Source: own elaboration.

Cultural Codes and International Security Forecasting: An Introduction to Chapter III

In the subsequent section of this monograph, which is dedicated to the course and results of the research, the author refers to the aforementioned interpretations of cultural patterns/codes according to Hofstede, Bond, and Hall. Simultaneously, the author has modified their understanding in accordance with the profile of this research. Given the necessity of introducing readers to the premises and scope of the profiling undertaken, the adopted interpretation of the codes used in the study has been presented in Chapter III, along with the appropriate justification.

CHAPTER II

The Origins of Forecasting National and International Security Threats: From Antiquity to Modern Times

Forecasting changes in the international arena is one of the least predictable (scientifically verifiable) research activities in the social sciences. The number of factors that continuously influence the shape of global politics is immense; further, over time, determinants crystallise that were previously unknown.[1] This, in turn, means that attempting to forecast international security can resemble navigating a thicket of increasingly rapidly proliferating unknowns. In light of the above, every forecast is burdened with a certain margin of error, and the further into the future the forecast extends, the larger this margin becomes. Therefore, is the accurate prediction of the future possible?

By restricting the research area to the determinants known to us that have a significant impact on the formation of the decision-making cycle, one can assume that, despite the risk of inaccurate forecasts, a portion of them stands a chance of proving correct. Even if this is not possible in its entirety, it may be at least partially so. The majority of the forecasting achievements developed to date have pertained to hard data, for instance, illustrating a segment of the power of states, or relying on the almost comprehensively examined

[1] M. Sułek, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2010, pp. 16–32.

power of a given entity. Professor Mirosław Sułek, who specialises in power metrics, has significantcly contributed to the development of forecasting in Poland.[2]

As early as antiquity, individual rulers endeavoured to predict future events and the true intentions of their political opponents. The forecasts at that time were heavily influenced by magical arts, interpreting the meaning of various natural phenomena, astronomy, and classical espionage. The data necessary for creating forecasts were gathered through individuals positioned in the vicinity of the decision-making centres of the era. The forces available to the given monarch, the influence of their entourage, the character profile of the decision-maker, and information regarding the opponent's intentions were all taken into consideration. Informants did not have to be individuals highly placed within a given hierarchy; it was sufficient that they had direct contact with the monarch themselves or with people close to them.[3] These were people involved in the daily functioning of the court, frequently performing menial tasks such as laundry, cleaning, or cooking, whilst meticulously gathering any overheard information. The Japanese Shinobi clans achieved mastery in placing this kind of personnel in the daily surroundings of rulers during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.[4]

It is obvious that a lack of financial or military capabilities on the part of a given ruler significantly limited the possibility of the emergence of a real threat to the international environment. However, even then, it could happen that a given decision-maker disregarded the costs, merely desiring to follow their personal ambitions. Nevertheless, the lack of material foundations meant that any potential actions directed against neighbouring rulers were doomed to fail from the outset. For this reason, gathering reliable economic, social, or political information was equally important. Essentially, forecasting

[2] *Potęga 2015*, M. Sułek, R. Konryński (eds.), Polskie Towarzystwo Geopolityczne, Warsaw 2015, pp. 12–23.
[3] B. Aladashvili, *Fearless: A Fascinating Story of Secret Medieval Spies*, Amazon.com, E-book 2017.
[4] H. Lung, *Dziewięć świątyń śmierci Ninja*, Bellona, Warsaw 2009, pp. 13–51.

activity was based on information provided for this purpose by the increasingly expanding diplomatic and espionage machinery, which engaged a broad spectrum of individuals, including merchants, inventors, artists, and any persons who, through personal relationships, might have access to information of significance to particular states.[5] In summary, this is how the intelligence apparatus known to us today was born, the objective of which was, and remains, forecasting the opportunities, challenges, and threats to a given state that may emerge in the future within the direct and indirect international environment.

In light of the above, where does forecasting based on contemporary scientific methods fit in, if the majority of critical information is acquired directly from the immediate environment of decision-makers? Even if the actual potential of states is correctly diagnosed and the gains and losses resulting from specific actions are calculated, this often proves insufficient for predicting even the near future. Evidence of this can be seen in the recent annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in eastern Ukraine, which came as a profound surprise to the entire Western world.[6] From the perspective of all rational decision-making models, the seizure of Crimea and the subsequent instigation of the crisis in Ukraine appeared to be a move devoid of any logic. The situation was entirely different when viewed from the Russian perspective, where the incurred losses fall within the parameters of a "calculated risk" taken to achieve strategic objectives deemed "essential" by Moscow. This confirms the thesis that information derived from the decision-makers' inner circle is superior to hard data illustrating the potential of states. Should the scientifically conducted analysis of state potentials serve merely as a supplement to the knowledge obtained from this environment through methods akin to intelligence gathering?

It seems, however, that this is not entirely the case. Intelligence

[5] T. Crowdy, *Historia szpiegostwa i agentury*, Bellona, Warsaw 2010.

[6] T. Szczurek, *Cultural aspects of armed conflicts*, [in:] *„Studia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego. National Security Studies*, A. Warchał (e.), Military University of Technology, No. 7, 2015, pp. 229–238.

methods are not among the most effective either, as they rely on information obtained from human sources. Naturally, data acquired in this way are collated, compared, and verified for their reliability.[7] Nevertheless, they originate from people and are ultimately merely an expression of someone's opinions and views. This implies that they may be tainted by subjectivity and, consequently, may not always prove to be accurate.[8] The human brain functions simultaneously in multiple modes, only a small fraction of which operate within the conscious sphere. Consequently, an individual does not consciously control the majority of their mental processes, and by extension, the decision-making processes in which they engage. The exact relationships between the specific modes of functioning of our brain are described in detail later in this monograph.[9] At this stage, it is merely worth emphasising that a person does not truly know exactly how they will behave in a given situation. They may hold various preconceptions regarding their own decisions and behaviours; nevertheless, if they find themselves in a given situation for the first time, both the reactions of their brain and their own body may take them completely by surprise.[10]

Does modern science, therefore, offer any possibilities of penetrating directly into human minds in order to reconstruct, even to a limited extent, the human decision-making model? Specifically, a model that proves accurate irrespective of the subjects' conscious awareness? It appears that it does. For several decades, both cultural anthropologists and psychologists have worked persistently in an attempt to understand people raised in diverse cultures. They strive to develop something akin to patterns or "codes" of behaviour.[11] The research conducted thus far made it possible to identify common

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[7] R. Jagiełło, *Wybrane aspekty wojskowego rozpoznania osobowego" [Selected Aspects of Military Human Intelligence]*, Studia i Analizy, ABW, pp. 235–241.

[8] B. Stanosz, *Ćwiczenia z logiki*, PWN, Warsaw 2002, pp. 7–46.

[9] See: Chapter III.

[10] *Mózg, fascynujący automat, magia podświadomości*, Sonja Wesolowski, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7QFRZhyIB4, 29.07.2017.

[11] G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 15–19.

patterns or codes for individuals raised within a specific cultural sphere. Although every human being is unique and possesses a distinct and entirely individualised pool of these "codes", a certain proportion of them remains shared, determining a part of the decision-making process. Furthermore, during collectively made decisions, which is precisely the nature of those regarding the future of entire societies, it is these shared patterns or codes that acquire particular significance. It is always possible that a leader's strong personality and individual characteristics will determine the final decisions. This issue was examined as part of a study on the decision-making processes of ten culturally distinct societies, which is presented in detail in the subsequent chapters of this monograph. The questions that were sought to be answered concerned the extent to which the personal traits of individual decision-makers influence the shape of states' foreign policies. Did decisions made in this manner truly deviate significantly from cultural patterns, or did they, despite everything, fall within a certain average that enables accurate forecasting based solely on the aforementioned patterns characteristic of the members of the studied social group? The aforementioned study of ten maximally culturally diverse social groups was intended to optimally and distinctly highlight any potential relationships occurring between cultural and individual codes in the decision-making process. Before delving into the intricacies of the research process, however, it is worth examining the origin and evolution of international forecasting more closely.

2.1. Antiquity: Between Espionage, Astronomy, and Magic

The modern human brain invariably operates according to a specific schema: constructing knowledge about the surrounding reality, analysing these data, and subsequently using them as a basis for creating decision-making patterns intended to ensure the survival and development of the species. Data about the world are gathered from

everywhere, and initially (during childhood and adolescence), every piece of information is treated as true, as at this stage there is no other information that partially or entirely contradicts it. Therefore, magical explanations of weather phenomena or the search for correlations between celestial events and politics should not be overly surprising.[12] Only sufficiently profound knowledge allows for the filtering out of erroneous data, or rather, the assumptions formed on their basis. In antiquity, the knowledge of multiple generations regarding the mechanisms governing the world was highly limited, and passing decades and centuries did little to correct the generationally repeated cognitive errors. For instance, the ultimate debunking of the myth that the Earth is flat required access to scientifically verifiable knowledge, and even then, it met with immense resistance from many influential circles for whom this new and truthful perspective disrupted their hitherto coherent worldview.

Thus, it should come as no surprise that the ancients treated magic and astronomy as a source of knowledge on par with information obtained directly from the entourages of rulers. This occasionally led to paradoxes; for example, spies might report that an antagonistic monarch intended to attack a given state, yet soothsayers, magicians, and astronomers would claim that this attack stood no chance of success. Of course, even then, many soothsayers had acquired the appropriate experience to avoid unequivocal "prophecies", preferring instead to navigate the realm of conjectures and more or less accurate assumptions. No specialist in "supernatural forecasts" would stake their reputation on a single throw by claiming that the spies were right or wrong. It was much more probable for them to deliver a prophecy stating that the foreign ruler was contemplating an invasion (which would align with the information obtained from spies), but that the gods were uncertain whether to favour these audacious plans.[13] Ultimately, the information obtained from spies

[12] D. Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, Media Rodzina, Poznań 2012, pp. 108–132.

[13] R. Wiseman, *Paranormalność. Dlaczego widzimy to, czego nie ma*, Wydawnictwo W.A.B., Warsaw 2012, pp. 23–69.

regarding the opponent's intentions and potential constituted the most effective method at that time for forecasting future threats to international security.

The ancient Babylonians, Chinese, and Indians achieved a specific perfection in espionage, devoting considerable space to this interstate activity in their ancient written works. It was probably through their interaction with Mesopotamian culture that the children of Israel acquired the necessary knowledge and experience in this subtle game of light and shadows, which, incidentally, later translated into a perfectly functioning system of Israeli diasporas scattered worldwide.[14] The famous Chinese strategist and military commander, Sun Tzu, dedicated an entire chapter to describing the significance of espionage in warfare. The Old Testament also abounds in numerous descriptions of events where broad and in-depth reconnaissance of the enemy's strength and intentions was employed before binding decisions were made.[15] In other words, since the dawn of civilisation, people have realised the importance of access to up-to-date information about everything occurring in their immediate international environment. A review of ancient forecasting methods should begin with one of the oldest civilisations – Mesopotamia.

Mesopotamia

Many of the information-gathering methods and techniques used today were commonly employed by Babylonian rulers at the dawn of history. Archaeologists studying the history of the Middle East, particularly in the territory of modern Syria, have uncovered numerous traces clearly indicating that the highly advanced art of espionage belonged to the everyday arsenal of means facilitating the acquisition and maintenance of power, both at the level of the entire state and within individual cities. Due to political and military upheavals,

[14] Y. Melman, D. Raviv, *Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars,* Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec 2014.

[15] E. Żyła, M. Hebda-Dziedzic, *Szpiedzy biblijnego Izraela*, "Uważam Rze", http://www.historia.uwazamrze.pl/artykul/1146654/szpiedzy-biblijnego-izraela, 1.03.2018.

conducting archaeological work during various periods of both the 20th and 21st centuries has been, and continues to be, exceedingly difficult (especially in Syria, which is torn by a bloody civil war). Nevertheless, the knowledge gathered with the utmost meticulousness by individual archaeological teams has enabled the reconstruction of the intelligence and reconnaissance structure of Mesopotamia at that time. Thanks to the thousands of written materials preserved to this day in the form of clay tablets, it has been possible to gain broad access to this ancient knowledge, the origins of which date back to nearly eighteen hundred years before the common era.[16]

The most valuable documents from that period originate from the city of Mari. This notably includes the correspondence between Hammurabi and Zimri-Lim. Hammurabi highlighted the significance of information illustrating the enemy's strength, position, and intentions. According to the ruler of Babylon, these data were essential for properly planning and executing an attack. In one of these letters, Hammurabi notes the following:[17] *I will not send soldiers until I receive information concerning the army (of the enemy).* In another letter, he writes: *At the beginning of the month of KUR, the enemy performs a reading from the entrails for a god who has not answered affirmatively. In the meantime, he is heading towards annihilation. Good; let... (the messenger) remain in place for five days, until we learn everything about the enemy. Only then may he return...* Well-conducted and timely coordinated reconnaissance allowed the army of the city of Mari to surprise the enemy. Various forms of ambushes and methods of disorientation were employed at that time. After Shamshi-Adad conquered the territory around Mari

[16] R. M. Sheldon, *Spying in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 33, Issue: Spring Year 1989, http://www.csus.edu/indiv/c/carrollt/site/optional%20readings_files/spying%20in%2 0mesopotamia.pdf, 28.02.2018.

[17] W. Heimpel, *Letters to the King of Mari: A New Translation, with Historical Intro-duction*, https://books.google.pl/books?id=tiHwDe7JmCEC&pg=PA42&lpg=PA42&-dq=mari+zimri+lim+letters&source=bl&ots=ujfuETvG6u&sig=-ne3uEplXmOYH01 TyU80K2XcfkC4&hl=pl&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiyvPiqyc3ZAhXB6CwKHUs1ClE Q6AEISzAI#v=onepage&q=mari%20zimri%20lim%20letters&f=false, 28.02.2018.

and placed his own son on the throne, he sent his heir numerous letters in which he included recommendations for effectively conducting military campaigns. Shamshi-Adad, as a practitioner of the art of war, recommended the use of numerous ambushes and deceptive manoeuvres, whilst pointing to the fundamental importance of properly conducted reconnaissance regarding the enemy's forces, intentions, and positions. Later, while commanding individual military campaigns on numerous occasions, he never missed an opportunity to lure enemy forces into a trap. However, to be able to operate effectively, he constantly required fresh information allowing him to maintain situational awareness and make accurate decisions.

The vast majority of the data acquired originated from intelligence-gathering activities. Both diplomats and messengers were fundamentally considered spies of the opposing side.[18] At that time, there existed the Zalmaqum community, known for producing many skilled spies referred to as "lisanim", that is, those who are inclined to transmit information to the enemy. This was the reason why they could not be trusted, yet simultaneously, they proved highly useful provided they were handsomely rewarded. In other words, the people of Zalmaqum specialised in espionage and worked for the highest bidder[19]. On the other hand, this lack of loyalty meant they could be ineffective and had a propensity to switch sides. In his letters, Shamshi-Adad warned his son against using their services.

Hammurabi, too, had no problem recruiting spies. During one of his campaigns, he dispatched a unit consisting of one hundred and twenty men to a city, where in a short time they managed to recruit a large group of residents ready, for an appropriate sum, to become spies in the service of the Babylonians. It also happened that, fearing the city would be captured by Hammurabi's army, there were some who agreed to act as spies in exchange for a place to sleep and food,

[18] P. P. Muszyński, *Szpiedzy w czasach dawnych. Fanboj i życie*, https://fanbojizycie. wordpress.com/2016/08/09/szpiedzy-w-czasach-dawnych/, 9.09.2016.
[19] R. M. Sheldon, *Spying in Mesopotamia*, Vol. 33, Issue: Spring Year 1989, http://www.csus.edu/indiv/c/carrollt/site/optional%20readings_files/spying%20in%2 0mesopotamia.pdf, 28.02.2018.

as well as for the favour shown to them after the conquest. There were also those who agreed out of entirely different motives, such as a penchant for intrigue and adrenaline (excitement). In the city of Mari, after its conquest by Hammurabi's forces, a special organisational unit was established, tasked with translating and analysing captured documents, storing copies of confidential dispatches, and keeping the king continuously informed of all essential matters. In other words, something akin to an intelligence centre was created, complete with an equivalent of a modern classified registry.[20] Considering that this took place thousands of years ago in ancient Mesopotamia, it clearly indicates the level of advancement in the art of acquiring and protecting sensitive information. The data acquired, which, following appropriate processing, were forwarded to this extraordinary institution, originated from multiple sources, such as gossiping merchants, artists, messengers, sailors, and refugees from other territories. Furthermore, reports also flowed in from ambassadors stationed in allied and neutral states. One diplomat, who also temporarily held command functions in the army, described many issues in detail, indicating his own "secret sources", which were presumably other officers, diplomats, and royal courtiers. It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned Shamshi-Adad, aside from spies, also utilised gossipmongers – individuals engaged in propaganda. The son of this great commander wrote in reply that a mere two "soldiers" were behind a revolt instigated among the entire army, pointing to the incomparably lower costs of this type of operation relative to the achieved results. Spies served not only to acquire information about opposing armies but also to uncover plots and hostile activities within their own ranks.[21] Nonetheless, it was precisely this information – acquired through activities that we today term intelligence gathering – that allowed for the effective forecasting of opponents' future moves, and subsequently, for

[20] Ibidem.

[21] R. M. Sheldon, *Spying in Mesopotamia*, vol. 33, Issue: Spring, Year 1989, file:///C:/Users/gornikiemarc/Desktop/spying%20in%20mesopotamia.pdf, 30.05.2017.

resolving future conflicts to one's own advantage. In the case of the city-states of Mesopotamia, predicting the future solely on the basis of divination and magical rituals can safely be dismissed as a fairy tale. This is especially true when one confronts these notions with the knowledge stemming directly from the ancient tablets, which numerous archaeologists have meticulously studied for decades.

It is worth comparing the above with, for instance, fragments of the Old Testament, which indicate that Babylonian rulers considered prophecies before undertaking real, far-reaching actions. One example is the decision to attack Jerusalem made by King Nebuchadnezzar using divinatory practices: "He shook the arrows, *he consulted the teraphim, he looked at the liver. In his right hand was the lot for Jerusalem*.[22] On the other hand, given the widespread practice of divination and intelligence-gathering in Babylon at that time, it can be assumed that divination was more of a ceremonial nature than a factor in actual decisions such as "war or peace". This raises the question of how the future was predicted in other ancient civilisations.

Persia

According to Greek sources, the Persians developed information structures based on couriers, observers, messengers, and fire-signal specialists. This allowed crucial information about everything occurring across the entirety of Asia at that time to be transmitted to the ruler within a single day. Volker Aschoff, in turn, points out that a postal system operated in ancient Persia, complete with special waystations that enabled the swift and efficient transmission of various information. Another system worth mentioning was the royal spies known as the "King's Ears", who reported on everything that transpired at the courts of specific officials known as satraps. The

[22] *The Book of Ezekiel, 21, Pismo Święte Starego i Nowego Testamentu* (translated from the original languages, prepared by the Polish Biblical Scholars Team), 3rd edition (revised), Wydawnictwo Pallottinum, Poznań Warsaw 1990, pp. 1003–1004.

objective was to acquire knowledge regarding potential conspiracies and planned iniquities directed against the monarch.[23] It can be assumed that the communication and information system of Persia at that time was far better organised than the systems operating in ancient Greece or Rome. Nevertheless, even this failed to protect the mighty empire from annihilation at the hands of Alexander the Great.

Egypt

In ancient Egypt, there existed a well-developed royal postal structure responsible for the flow of information across the empire. This was essential for the effective management of such a vast territory. This is mentioned in such sources as the famous Hibeh Papyri. A series of intelligence reports from the Middle Kingdom period have survived; they concerned the situation at the southern border, particularly from the ongoing observation of desert routes traversed by neighbouring tribes. These intelligence reports, which remain the oldest and perfectly preserved to date, originate from the years 1844 to 1841 BCE. An efficient system of royal messengers also developed in ancient Egypt; they carried out intelligence missions (both espionage and diplomatic), as well as assassinations of designated individuals. This is attested to by sources of various origins, ranging from literary and ceremonial (funerals) texts to religious and magical ones. During the New Kingdom period, an administrative informational apparatus developed, which can be likened to modern intelligence institutions. In the case of ancient Egypt, what is striking is the departure from ad hoc use of simple forms of espionage in favour of maintaining and developing a powerful permanent structure, whose primary task was to ensure the efficient flow of information between decision-making and executive centres. The foundations of a similar system, albeit in a much less advanced form, existed in Mesopotamia and Persia. In turn, the system that emerged in Rome

[23] R. M. Sheldon, *Espionage in the Ancient World: An Annotated Bibliography of Books and Articles in Western Languages*, McFarland, 2008, pp. 49–52.

towards the end of the Empire was too focused on internal affairs, making it difficult to compare Roman structures to Egyptian ones.[24]

Greece

Little is known about the methodology of forecasting threats in ancient Greece, particularly during peacetime. Certain clues may be provided by manuals written with warfare in mind, where considerable space was devoted to reconnoitring the enemy's strength and intentions through the use of spies (including double agents), dispatching secret (encrypted) messages, undercover operations, and conducting reconnaissance. It is worth noting that the art of espionage was well known to the ancient Greeks, so it would be surprising if it were not also utilised during peacetime to strengthen the position or secure better trade conditions for Greek city-states.[25] Considering the rise of this civilisation based on the development of sailing and navigation techniques, which contributed to the growth of maritime trade, it can be assumed that information about the outside world primarily originated from merchants. Merchant ship crews traversed distances that were immense for the era, reaching distant territories where they inevitably came into contact with local communities; consequently, merchants naturally gained access to up-to-date local information. Over time, Greek colonies, particularly those situated closer to ancient Persia, could also serve as such a source of information regarding potential external threats. Furthermore, one must not forget the political and social structure, which at its peak comprised nearly 150 individual city-states ("poleis"). In practice, stronger centres influenced weaker ones, imposing their hegemony upon them in a more or less invasive manner. Relationships between the individual poleis were very strong; for the Greeks themselves, the "near abroad" consisted of other Greek statelets, and thus information could originate from both merchants

[24] Ibidem, p. 45.
[25] Ibidem, p. 53.

and formal representatives operating at local power centres.[26] Oracles were also significant, playing a major role in the social and religious life of the ancients. It is difficult to determine whether the significance of a given prophecy was decisive in important political matters, or if it merely constituted a suggestion in light of previously gathered information. Given the more or less democratic nature of governance in most poleis and the tradition of debating before making important decisions, one can presume that generally formulated prophecies were treated with the respect befitting a ceremony rather than as absolute truth. On the other hand, there are no sources that unequivocally indicate that the Hellenic civilisation developed any structure serving to forecast future opportunities, challenges, and threats. The situation was similar in the Roman Empire; however, unlike in Greece, Rome underwent a far-reaching process of institutionalising such bodies, although unfortunately, they were focused on different types of threats.

Rome

In ancient Rome, the political system, complex for its time, necessitated access to "fresh" information, and every self-respecting aristocrat cultivated their own group of informants. Both the Romans and the ancient Greeks did not entrust espionage tasks to random individuals; they did so solely based on access to key people or information. Not only was the personnel of the group of spies and informers – which had been put together with the utmost care – carefully selected, but every effort was also made to ensure they were properly trained. This specific education included, among other things, "penetrating" the psyche of the individuals of interest, or in other words, developing psychological profiles. Additionally, espionage adepts learned observation and worked on their own senses and perceptiveness. On the other hand, some Roman decision-makers

[26] B. Bravo, E. Wipszycka, *Historia starożytnych Greków*, Vol. 1: *Do końca wojen perskich*, PWN, Warsaw 1988; A. Świderkówna, *Hellenika: wizerunek epoki od Aleksandra do Augusta*, PIW, Warsaw 1974, pp. 165–241.

eschewed espionage or, more broadly, reconnaissance, considering it unworthy of noble warriors. An interesting example is Julius Caesar himself, who took a very cursory approach to gathering information about his opponents. For example, the first invasion of Britain ended in failure, as merely a single ship was sent for reconnaissance, and its captain provided sparse and inconsistent reports.[27] Informants operating within Rome itself were somewhat more effective, managing to provide Caesar with a list of conspirators prior to his famous assassination. He, however, took no action, presumably disbelieving the intelligence or assuming it to be a provocation orchestrated by his enemies. Unfortunately, on that occasion, the information proved to be fatally accurate.[28]

Consequently, for a very long time, Rome was deprived of a genuine state intelligence apparatus, limiting itself merely to ad hoc reconnaissance operations conducted along the border. This did not preclude the existence of various networks of spies and informers working for specific prominent families or individuals possessing the requisite capital and contacts, such as wealthier merchants. In the late years of the Republic, the system of "private intelligence networks" was particularly prominent, effectively paralysing the possibilities of establishing a single nationwide institution capable of working independently of the immediate interests of the current rulers. This system began to change with the decline of the Republic and the dawn of the Empire. Julius Caesar utilised a network of private couriers for the day-to-day acquisition of information regarding all significant events occurring within the Roman state. For security, the transmitted information was additionally encrypted to prevent its content from being discovered in the event the messenger was intercepted. Consequently, during his reign, Augustus established a state postal service known as the *cursus publicus*, whose primary task was to inform the ruler of any threats to state security, both

[27] J. Peddie, *Conquest: The Roman Conquest of Britain*, 1987, pp. 1–22.

[28] L. Fanthorpe, P. Fanthorpe, *Tajemnica spisku w celu zamordowania Juliusza Cezara*, [in:] *Najbardziej tajemnicze morderstwa*, Wydawnictwo Replika 2010; A. Krawczuk, *Kronika starożytnego Rzymu*, Iskry, Warsaw 1994, p. 169.

internal and external. Just as the Babylonians and Persians had done previously, the Romans began to utilise the expanding road network to ensure the capital had continuous access to information about events across the empire. The information carried by the couriers was of both classified and unclassified nature. This acquired particular significance during the countless behind-the-scenes struggles for power. Over time, couriers also began to serve as professional assassins, executing orders that most frequently pertained to the elimination of their superiors' political opponents. With the development of this system, *speculatores* also appeared within military structures; they were utilised not only for transmitting information but also for all covert operations, such as espionage, arresting important politicians, guarding suspects and detainees, and executing convicts.[29] The next stage in the development of ancient Roman intelligence was the formation of "grain gatherers", or *frumentarii*, established during the reigns of Domitian or Hadrian.[30] Initially, they were engaged in the purchase and distribution of grain, which gave them direct access to key logistical elements of the entire empire: civil and military institutions, as well as a broad cross-section of the entire society. Their work involved frequent travel across the entire empire, which in turn provided easy and swift access to a plethora of information, including data sensitive to state security. Over time, their powers were gradually expanded, with the *frumentarii* (who also functioned as couriers and secret police) replacing the "speculatores". It is worth mentioning that Christians were investigated, pursued, and arrested precisely by the representatives of this specific organisation.[31] Because the "grain gatherers" disregarded all authorities and executed all orders without question, the ranks of their increasingly powerful opponents grew over time. Emperor Diocletian disbanded this formation in response to numerous complaints;

[29] M. Speidel, *Riding For Caesar*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1994.
[30] L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army from Republic to Empire*, Barnes and Noble Books, New York, 1994.
[31] W. Laqueur, *Changing Face of Antisemitism: From Ancient Times to the Present Day*, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 46–48.

nevertheless, he did not intend to relinquish such a powerful tool of governance. Almost immediately, he replaced the *frumentarii* with a new but virtually identical organisation the *agentes in rebus*. The difference was that the new formation recruited civilians rather than soldiers, and from then on, they reported to the magister officiorum – Master of Office – instead of the Praetorian Prefect. The Master of Office managed the *notarii*, or imperial secretaries, and over time this function was transformed into a Minister of Information. The new formation also became significantly larger than its predecessor, reaching a total of 1,200 members. Due to the expansion of the bureaucracy during the late Empire, the "*agentes in rebus*" also began to infiltrate specific ministries and departments as spies, keeping watch over all events occurring within the highly elaborate state administration. Unfortunately for Rome, all these formations were focused on detecting internal rather than external threats. The borders continued to be guarded by armed units, which conducted only highly cursory reconnaissance. Thus, the intelligence system more closely resembled a counter-intelligence structure and was incapable of providing reliable information regarding threats from the peoples residing beyond the Empire. Consequently, it is exceedingly difficult to speak of any formula for forecasting international threats, aside from perfunctory information received from border garrisons.[32]

India

The Indians drew up a profile of a spy who, above all, should be completely loyal, but also able to withstand the hardships of travel, hunger and suffering. Journeys lasting many weeks took place in diverse environments, where days could be scorching and nighttime temperatures could drop almost to freezing. Further, opportunities to replenish food and water supplies could be limited. There was also the threat posed by marauders, gangs attacking travellers and caravans, as well as wild animals. In contemporary times, for indi-

[32] *Espionage in Acient Rome*, History NET, http://www.historynet.com/espionage-in-ancient-rome.htm, 2.06.2017.

viduals raised in a stable and affluent Western civilisation, threats and difficulties of this kind are hard to imagine. The closest analogy to travelling the often great distances between individual states might be to cross today's demarcation lines between areas of military operations. In other words, candidates for spies had to be loyal enough to consciously sacrifice their own lives for their ruler. The Indians recommended a thorough vetting of candidates for spies, who, naturally, were not only dispatched to neighbouring states but also operated within India itself. The ruler had to be aware of all threats, including those that might emerge within his own royal family. The Indians had no objections to utilising women in the espionage service; moreover, women selected in this manner were also to be trained to seduce and subsequently murder their victims.[33] The Japanese similarly lacked such objections, though this will be discussed more broadly in the context of medieval prognostic methods, in order to adhere to the established chronology of successive eras.

China

The culture of the inhabitants of ancient China evolved under specific social conditions. It is no coincidence that the mentality of the inhabitants of the entire East and Southeast Asian region deviates significantly from the mentality of Europeans or Africans. Many factors, both external and internal, continuously influence patterns of perception, thinking, behaviour, and reaction. These differences translate into everything, such as culinary tastes, which, as is widely known, vary among inhabitants of different parts of the world.[34] This stems from the type of food that was available and thus consumed. The same applies to the preference for specific colours, shapes, sounds, or smells. Relationships with other people were influenced

[33] *Szpiegowanie jest tak stare jak historia ludzkości*, „Rzeczpospolita", http://www.polska-times.pl/artykul/1031863,szpiegowanie-jest-tak-stare-jak-stara-jest-historia-ludzkosci,id, t.html, 23.05.2017.

[34] G. Hofstede, R.R. McCrae, *Personality and culture revisited: linking traits and dimensions of culture*, Cross Cultural Research from 2004, Vol. 38, No. 1; M. Jacoby, *Chiny bez makijażu*, op. cit., pp. 9–97.

by rules of social functioning that enabled individuals to survive as effectively as possible, and subsequently to build their own position. All of this is important, as it also affects the adopted methods of forecasting the future. In the case of the ancient Chinese, these methods were divided, similarly to other civilisations, into two main categories:

- divination, prophecy, and astrology (methods of a "magical" nature mixed with scientific ones, albeit without rational premises to support this, such as mathematics or astrology);
- espionage.

The vast majority of the effort dedicated to forecasting the behaviour of other states was focused on this latter form of activity. Notably, since antiquity, the Chinese, exhibited an extraordinary propensity for developing, modifying, and continuously expanding upon both their own and borrowed concepts. Consequently, the art of espionage underwent a remarkable metamorphosis in China. Incidentally, this found expression several hundred years later in the beginnings of the Shinobi clans operating in medieval Japan.[35] These clans elevated the Chinese art of espionage to heights approaching optimally balanced perfection. Everything, however, began in the Yangtze River valley. The famous "*Art of War*", of which the entire Chapter XIII was devoted to this field, also constituted a veritable compendium of knowledge developed by previous generations. Sun Tzu's greatness did not lie, as is incorrectly attributed to him, in discovering all the principles of waging war, but merely in the optimal synthesis of the existing body of knowledge.[36] It should also be emphasised that this charismatic general contributed a great deal of his own insights, drawing on his personal experience, thereby making his work accessible to a wider audience. What is most interesting, however, is that the Chinese art of espionage stood at a significantly

[35] M. Górnikiewicz, *Geneza i ewolucja chińskiej sztuki działań psychologicznych*, [in:] *Paradygmaty badań nad bezpieczeństwem*, eds. K. Rokiciński, S. Mikołajczak, O. Oszowska, Wyższa Szkoła Bezpieczeństwa, Poznań 2016, p. 327.
[36] S. Tzu, S. Pin, *Sztuka wojny*, 3rd ed, trans. D. Bakalarz, Wydawnictwo Helion, Gliwice 2013, p. 7–10.

higher level than the European art, which stemmed not only from its substantive foundations but also from cultural differences.[37]

Firstly, the Chinese formula for acquiring and processing information evolved as a mass-oriented form, intended for use within large social groups. By design, it was rare for only a single spy to infiltrate a ruler's entourage. Far more frequently, numerous spies were dispatched simultaneously; in turn, they had their own groups of informants. More importantly, the goal was not merely to acquire information, but to forge a genuine emotional bond calculated for many years in advance. Today, these methods are unsurprising; however, at that time, Chinese statecraft significantly surpassed Old Continent-style espionage in its level of complexity and long-term sophistication. Another major difference was operating not just with individual informants, but with groups of informants. In the Chinese social context, this was entirely natural, as the entire society was divided into the most diverse groups (familial, professional, class, religious, business), in such a way that it was impossible to function outside them. Furthermore, every Chinese individual typically belonged to several groups simultaneously, e.g., a family group, a professional one, and several religious ones. Another significant difference was the character of the group, which looked after its own members. Members supported one another (even if to a limited extent), which conditioned the gradual strengthening of bonds, intimacy, and ultimately, trust. In other words, by infiltrating a spy into a group, one gained the ability to exert a more or less limited influence over the whole group. Of course, to ensure that this picture does not appear overly simplistic, it should be noted that each interest group usually pursued its own agenda and, as such, sought to gather information about other groups. Specific individuals within one group (e.g., a familial one) could pursue their own politics calculated to secure a better position within the clan.[38] This system of

[37] J. Lovell, *Wielki mur chiński. Chiny kontra świat 1000 p.n.e.–2000 n.e.*, Muza SA, Warsaw 2007, pp. 55–252.
[38] G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 87–122.

mutual acquisition and protection of information operated across the entire social structure, causing, on the one hand, a chronic lack of trust in all individuals "outside the group", but simultaneously also limited trust in people from one's own circle. Hence the concept of the "multiple faces", where one face is for strangers, another for acquaintances, yet another for friends and family, and the final one is known to no one but its owner.

How, then, does this relate to forecasting the behaviour of other states? In ancient China, forecast activity operated based on multitudes of informants, who also served in disinformation activities and in guiding the decisions of specific states.[39] Secondly, these networks, quite naturally, were focused primarily around decision-makers, disregarding the "voice of the people". Interestingly, this approach persists in modern China to this day.[40] It is therefore worth examining the system of information selection that operated in the Yangtze River valley hundreds of years ago. In Chapter XIII of *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu notes: *The reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.* The author goes on to indicate the difference between the two categories of forecasting mentioned above: *What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.* Sun Tzu distinguishes five types of agents while classifying various "sources of information":[41]

- local agents (individuals inhabiting the enemy's territory, recruited to cooperate);

[39] R. Faligot, *Tajne służby chińskie. Od Mao do igrzysk olimpijskich*, Sonia Draga, Katowice 2009, pp. 20–190.

[40] P. Letian, *Confucius Institute: promoting language, culture and friendliness*, Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006–10/02/content_5521722.htm, 2.10.2006; S. S. C. Tay, *Asia Alone: The Dangerous Post-Crisis Divide from America*, John Wiley and Sons 2010, p. 42; W. Guanqun, *316 Confucius Institutes established worldwide*, Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/culture/2010–07/13/c_ 13398209.htm, 1.07.2010.

[41] S. Tzu, op. cit., pp. 91–97.

- inside agents (the enemy's officials; implicitly, individuals from the administrative personnel, i.e., positioned within the enemy's power structure, with access to sensitive persons and information);
- double agents (converted spies of foreign states);
- expendable agents (individuals transmitting false information intended to mislead the enemy, i.e., serving disinformation purposes while exposed to the risk of elimination);
- surviving agents (spies who lived in the enemy's state and, after a certain time, return with information; implicitly, they were deprived of contact for a prolonged period, which precludes the earlier and safe transmission of information: the equivalent of today's "illegals").[42]

The author of The Art of War termed a coordinated group of such agents the "Divine Skein", which essentially still lacks a faithful equivalent within Western civilisation. For nearly a century, modern intelligence agencies have utilised "networks" created by "illegals" or "agents".[43] The aforementioned "divine skein", however, is a kind of structure that brings together various professions from among the types of informants mentioned above; as such, it more closely resembles an internally complex organisation operating within a specific area, which also includes assets at risk of loss ("expendable agents"). It is not the author's intention to delve into the intricacies of intelligence or espionage work, but merely to illustrate the impact of diametrically different cultural factors on the perspective of creating an information-forecasting machine. The narrow view of reality – characteristic of Europeans – also gave rise, over a surprisingly long period, to espionage activities consistent with that perspective[44].

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[42] A. Kowalski, *Rosyjski sztylet*, Wydawnictwo LTW, Łomianki 2013, pp. 24–30.

[43] Ibidem, pp. 44–54.

[44] M. Górnikiewicz, *Charakterystyka wybranych metod chińskich i japońskich działań psychologicznych: od starożytności po czasy współczesne*, "Przegląd Naukowo-Metodyczny" 2016, Year IX, No. 3(32), Wyższa Szkoła Bezpieczeństwa, Poznań 2016, pp. 401–409.

Simultaneously, adopting a modern lens, the classification described above is no longer as surprising as it was for representatives of the ancient world, since we can distinguish within it:

- informants recruited from among ordinary people, without direct access to sensitive information;
- informants positioned within the enemy's sensitive structures, typically with access to valuable information;
- turned enemy agents;
- illegal agents.

Nevertheless, it is still worth being aware of the differences between the Western and Far Eastern perspectives. One category rarely encountered in modern times is "expendable agents", where their loss was evidently factored in as the price for deceiving the enemy. This resulted from a different perception of the value of human life at that time than is the case today. On the other hand, one can imagine that such a situation might arise during wartime. Moreover, this "expendability" could take various forms, e.g., instead of death, it could simply mean exposing a given agent, or accepting the risk of long-term imprisonment. Notably, according to the training model of the previously mentioned Shinobi, if a multi-year prison sentence were the price for appropriate authentication, it would not be a subject of any deeper contemplation. This also highlights significant differences between the Western and Far Eastern mentalities.[45] Returning to ancient times, however, the perspective adopted by Sun Tzu clearly indicates that the highest officials and military men were perfectly aware of the necessity of possessing a suitably efficient network of informants that would enable the forecasting of other states' behaviour in the international arena. Furthermore, this knowledge was forged and consolidated in the brutal practice of ruthless power struggles between specific states. The reality of war always swiftly verified the reliability of forecast methods, whilst significantly accelerating the development of those that had proven to

[45] A. Kim, *Umysł Ninja*, Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznań 1985; H. Lung, op. cit., pp. 227–233.

be relatively reliable. In other words, the ancient inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom were not only perfectly aware of the benefits derived from accurately predicting changes in the international arena, but also continuously worked on perfecting the methods developed to date.

Antiquity: A Word of Summary

The prognostic systems developed in antiquity functioned within a specific triangle of information sources:

1) spies or administrative structures of an intelligence nature;
2) the communication system operating within a given state;
3) prophecies stemming from specific beliefs and religions.

Depending on the degree of development of a given civilisation, prophecies ceased to serve as a reliable source of information influencing the assessed value of a given forecast, becoming instead an element of a specific ritual framework. Concurrently, aside from the system of acquiring and analysing information, no other methods for forecasting future changes in the international environment were known in the ancient world. This approach remained unchanged for hundreds of years, until the 20th century CE.

2.2. The Middle Ages: Between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia

Europe

Following the fall of Rome, numerous new state entities emerged from the ruins of the former empire, giving rise to subsequent European states. During this initial period of chaos, as borders formed between the domains of various tribes and even clans, information regarding an adversary's plans was worth its weight in gold[46]. It allowed for adequate advance preparation to repel an attack, or for

[46] P. Heather, *Upadek Cesarstwa Rzymskiego*, Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznań 2007; A. Cotterell, *Późne cesarstwo rzymskie*, [in:] *Cywilizacje starożytne*, Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, Łódź 1990, pp. 287–288.

seizing the opportunity to quickly enrich oneself at the expense of a careless "neighbour". At that time, two institutions operated that heavily relied on the legacy of ancient Rome regarding the art of espionage, and consequently, the forecasting of threats: the Catholic Church and the Byzantine Empire. Almost from the onset of the Middle Ages, both entities possessed an efficient diplomatic structure alongside an institutional mechanism for gathering information on threats. During the later evolution of young European states, these two entities became the blueprint for the painstakingly constructed diplomacy and organisations responsible for keeping rulers informed about current events in the international environment.[47]

With the spread of the Christian faith across the European continent, various royal courts relatively quickly began abandoning all magical methods of divination for predicting the future in international relations. While such "fortune-telling" still occurred privately, on the international level it was almost completely supplanted by the nascent diplomatic service, guilds engaged in international trade, and spies.

Understandably, the most significant achievements in this field belonged to transnational organisations that adeptly combined political and economic objectives. Among the most renowned and powerful, it is worth mentioning[48]: the Knights Templar, the Knights Hospitaller, and the Teutonic Order, formally the Order of Brothers of the German House of Saint Mary in Jerusalem. For the relatively young Polish state, having to deal with such an adept, cunning, and formidable adversary as the Teutonic Order made Polish rulers realise the necessity of expanding their own capabilities – on the one hand, for gathering information, and on the other, for deceiving the adversary's intelligence services.[49]

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47 A. Haynes, *The Elizabethan Secret Service*, Pub. Sutton 1992; R. Hutchinson, *Eliza-beth's Spy Master: Francis Walsingham and the Secret War that Saved England*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 2007, pp. 84–121.

48 B. Możejko, *Ród Świnków na pograniczu polsko-krzyżackim w średniowieczu*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 1998.

49 M. Biskup, *Wojny Polski z Zakonem Krzyżackim: 1308–1521*, Wydawnic-

The espionage network of the Teutonic Order was closely tied to its hierarchy, which was headed by the Grand Master. The ruler of the monastic state personally received selected informants and directly ordered the execution of the most critical operations to acquire specific information. The orders he issued were typically directed to his subordinate Commanders, the administrators of designated border territories (commanderies). Subsequently, these tasks were delegated to collaborators drawn from the social classes operating in the area: craftsmen, merchants, knights, and even the clergy. It was the Commanders who were directly responsible for organising intelligence activity in enemy territory. Furthermore, in the event of "losing" a spy, the Grand Master compensated the affected Commander with appropriate financial redress. Interestingly, it was not until the late 14th century that the use of ciphers became more widespread, indicating a rather slow evolution in the methodology of espionage. The encryption methods themselves were not particularly sophisticated; for instance, letter designations were employed: the letters "s","k", and "l" were placed at the beginning of a line to indicate whether the reader should skip the line ("s"), read it from right to left ("k"), or read it normally ("l"). Teutonic intelligence was particularly interested in reaching individuals responsible for shaping the policies of neighbouring countries, primarily Poland and Lithuania. Therefore, recruiting collaborators from among the administrative officials was considered essential. It was primarily this information that was later used to forecast the evolution of the foreign policy of other states. In addition, military data was also collected, including topography, roads, bridges, watering holes, and suitable staging areas for a specific number of men and animals. Efforts were also made to proactively estimate mobilisation capabilities and, consequently, the numerical strength of enemy forces. This type of information was gathered by individuals posing as itinerant merchants, which

two "Mar-press", Gdańsk 1993; P. Jasienica, *Polska Jagiellonów*, Warsaw 1998, pp. 90–117; S.M. Kuczyński, *Wielka Wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411*, Warsaw 1987, pp. 99–100.

helped to avoid arousing additional suspicion. Particularly valuable were operatives placed in the immediate circles of magnates, given their facilitated access to political decision-makers. Consequently, this category of spies included both representatives of the knightly class and wealthy, influential merchants capable of forging strong financial interdependencies.[50] The motivation for both knights and merchants acting in this rather inglorious dual role was primarily material gain, which was easily achievable given that the interests of one's own lineage were prioritised over those of a given monarch.

Byzantium

The Byzantine Empire was a unique phenomenon in the international arena, as it adeptly camouflaged its own weaknesses with effectively presented propaganda of success. Simultaneously, it must be emphasised that, at first, the Byzantine army and its defence systems were indeed impregnable to neighbouring states. The Byzantine rulers had perfected the art of exploiting their knowledge of other states' weaknesses and, following the "divide and rule" principle, pitted one ruler against another. In this way, they maintained their power, remaining on the sidelines of the conflicts they skilfully engineered.[51] The extensive diplomatic structure played a pivotal role in this process of projecting its own power and manipulating the interests of other states to its advantage. The Emperor had at his disposal the "Grand Logothete", an official equivalent to a modern minister of foreign affairs, as well as the *Scrinium Barbarorum* (Bureau of Barbarians), which was responsible for receiving and hosting foreign delegations. Furthermore, the empire possessed an extensive diplomatic service which, on the one hand, helped forge the image of a "mighty Byzantium" at foreign courts, and on the other, gathered invaluable information. Subsequently, owing to their masterful com-

[50] S. Jóźwiak, *Wywiad i kontrwywiad w państwie zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach. Studium nad sposobami pozyskiwania i wykorzystywaniem poufnych informacji w późnym średniowieczu*, Malbork 2004, pp. 27–49, 60–122.

[51] Z. Dobrzyniecki, *Intrygi bizantyjskie*, Bellona, Warszawa 2013; J. A. Evans, *Justynian i imperium bizantyńskie*, trans. B. Godzińska, Warsaw 2008.

mand of the art of diplomacy, this information and their negotiation skills were used to extract benefits from commercial, political, and even religious relations with other state entities.[52] The most frequent motivation was the pursuit of personal gain, which the wealthy and influential Byzantium could easily facilitate.

Following the Roman example, the Byzantine Empire did not neglect its oversight of the administration, successfully expanding a system of domestic espionage that, from a modern perspective, would equate to counterintelligence and special police services. This transformation of information services from purely external to external-internal stemmed both from the experiences of the fallen Roman Empire and from operating in the immediate vicinity of relatively strong state entities that could not be underestimated. According to Persian sources, the number of spies employed by Byzantium between the 4th and 7th centuries could be counted in the thousands. The data provided encompassed the psychological profiles of targeted individuals, as well as information of both a strategic (illustrating state potential) and tactical (relating directly to the battlefield) nature[53]. Byzantium survived a thousand years longer than Rome. It essentially brought about its own downfall; on the one hand, due to an ambiguous system of succession that sparked internal struggles for the throne, and on the other, owing to the growing prominence of frontier commanders who became virtually independent vassals.

Middle East

The Middle East is a region defined by the rise and fall of powerful civilisations, where nomadic tribes encountered centuries-old culture, art, and knowledge. Compared to medieval Europe, which was formed by barbarian tribes upon the ruins of the former Roman Empire, it was the peoples of the Middle East who inherited

[52] R. Bania, *Z dziejów dyplomacji*, [in:] *Dyplomacja*, Wyższa Szkoła Studiów Międzynarodowych w Łodzi, ed. M. Wilk, Łódź 2002.

[53] A. Blumberg, *Byzantine Spies in the Byzantine–Sassanid Wars*, Warfare History Network, http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/military-history/byzantine-spies-in-the-byzantine-sassanid-wars/, 24.11.2015.

the cross-pollination of ethnically and culturally diverse knowledge spanning many generations. As late as the 7th century CE, Arab communities functioned as more or less independent tribes, primarily inhabiting the area of what is today known as the Arabian Peninsula. Due to its more fertile soils, the south was inhabited by Arabs leading a sedentary lifestyle, whereas the desert north was home to nomadic tribes. The very nature of their preferred ways of life fuelled age-old animosities between the inhabitants of the south and the north. Muhammad, relying on the foundation of a new religion, Islam, united the Arabs and transformed a loose assembly of tribes and clans into a new military power. The unification of the entire peninsula took the Prophet a mere ten years (622–632). The subsequent period witnessed the expansion of the Prophet's successors, known as caliphs, between 632 and 661. Consequently, the young state of Islamic followers spread across the remainder of the peninsula, parts of modern-day Turkey, practically the entire territory of present-day Iran, as well as portions of North Africa. Further conquests, continuing until 751, led to the subjugation of the Iberian Peninsula, save for a small northern sliver (Arab raiding parties temporarily reached the centre of modern-day France); to the east, they occupied the territories of modern-day Iraq and Afghanistan. The Arabs gradually absorbed successive Byzantine domains, simultaneously becoming the natural successors to the Empire's far more advanced culture. While between 633 and 651 the Arabs seized Persian domains, from 634 to 709 they took Byzantine Syria, Egypt, Tripolitania, Cyprus, Rhodes, Asia Minor as far as Tarsus, and the Byzantine-held parts of Africa. Subsequently, between 760 and 878, they appropriated Sardinia, the Balearic Islands, Crete, and ultimately even Corsica and Sicily. These successes, given the nature of the Arab forces, may seem astonishing. It was not until the 8th century that the Arabs began not only to suffer defeats but also to lose previously conquered territories. They were ultimately resisted by both the Byzantine Empire and the Frankish state, which, following initial defeats, transitioned to a victorious counter-attack.

European domains were reclaimed (although the Arabs remained on the Iberian Peninsula for a long time), alongside most of the islands in the Mediterranean basin (Cyprus, Crete, Rhodes, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and the Balearics).[54] Nevertheless, this period also saw the birth of Arab-Islamic culture, representing an amalgamation of the heritage of ancient Arab tribal culture, Islam, the splendour of an enlightened Byzantium, and even Persian elements. How, then, was it possible that such extensive conquests occurred during the growth phase of the Arab empire? Southern peoples, renowned for their fondness for various intellectual games, raised highly capable commanders, from whom the finest were selected for the honour of leading Arab armies. Other chieftains remained absolutely devoted to them, based on the principle of blood ties and shared faith. The Bedouins from the northern peninsula, in turn, were famous for their immense endurance, bravery, and mobility. Their mastery of horsemanship allowed them to cover vast distances even at night, whether to escape, regroup, or re-engage the enemy. At the same time, however, many Bedouins had previously served in both Persian and Byzantine armies; thus, they were not only familiar with their combat tactics but also knew many of the soldiers personally. Consequently, they could multiply their own combat effectiveness by exploiting the adversary's well-known vulnerabilities. The hatred harboured by nations that had hitherto lived under the Persian and Byzantine yokes was also of significant consequence. The Muslims offered them a new religion that afforded greater freedom and respect than before, and certainly an opportunity to improve their detested lot. This, in turn, secured strong support from many local communities and evidently facilitated further conquests. As a result, Arab armies possessed good reconnaissance prior to every operation and, moreover, faced no difficulties in recruiting spies in the territories they intended to conquer. Another crucial factor facilitating conquest was the significant weakening of both Persia

[54] M. Morony, W. Kisra, *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, eds. C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, B. Lewis, et al., 1980.

and Byzantium following a devastating war between the two powers merely a few years prior to the Arab invasions. Epidemics (including the plague) which swept across vast expanses of the contemporary world, significantly depopulating numerous villages and cities, also meant that capturing successive towns did not pose as great a challenge as it would have in areas untouched by these fatal diseases.[55] In the later period, the Arab Empire's art of espionage was, much like the culture of the young Islamic empire itself, the result of a marriage between ancient tribal-clan techniques, Byzantine diplomacy, and subtle Persian-style manoeuvring. Extensive use was made of merchants and individuals sympathetic to Islam, who gained hope for a better life through faith in Allah. The financial aspect was also not without significance. This system consolidated and evolved, assuming an increasingly sophisticated and subtle form over time, gently yet inevitably drifting towards decidedly more Byzantine models.

Asia (Japan, Mongolia)

The Mongols created a vast empire which, following the death of Genghis Khan, evolved, enduring and forever altering the face of the world. Regarding this semi-wild and nomadic people, much like the Arab tribes, the question arises as to the essence of their astonishing combat effectiveness. This is particularly salient given that the Mongols did not initially conquer territories depopulated by epidemics, nor empires severely weakened by devastating wars. It appears the answer lies in their masterfully executed intelligence operations, encompassing both reconnaissance and propaganda (including disinformation). The Mongols had not only an efficient war machine but also an exceptionally effective intelligence-gathering system. It was owing to this system that they knew what was transpiring in other states, and were even capable of predicting the trajectory of

[55] P. Ilowski, *Jakie były przyczyny podbojów arabskich w latach 632–732 i dlaczego były tak skuteczne*, bliskiwschod.pl, http://bliskiwschod.pl/2015/10/jakie-byly-przyczyny-podbojow-arabskich-w-latach-632-732-i-dlaczego-byly-tak-skuteczne/, 4.10.2015.

the international situation in regions of interest to them. This allowed them to deploy their forces with optimal effectiveness –forces whose numbers, contrary to popular belief at the time, were naturally limited. At the time Genghis Khan assumed power over the Mongol clans, the number of warriors was approximately one hundred thousand; this, when juxtaposed with the size of the Chinese armies, for instance, was a relatively small figure (although compared to the armies of contemporary Europe, which rarely exceeded several thousand, the Mongols possessed a significant numerical advantage).[56]

Knowledge of intelligence operations constituted, alongside combat and leadership skills, the foundation for survival in the highly conflicted environment of Mongol lineages and clans. Ephemeral alliances and frequent betrayals formed the daily backdrop to the power struggles over various fragments of the Mongolian steppes. In other words, survival was often determined not merely by outstanding intellect and experience, but also by knowledge regarding the situation within individual hordes. Consequently, the ability to utilise this information to anticipate imminent events, as well as to manipulate intelligence to deceive the adversary, was equally crucial. Genghis Khan spent the majority of his life fighting for survival, and subsequently painstakingly building his own position within a politically unstable Mongolian reality consumed by internal disputes. It was then that he learned everything which later proved so invaluable in forging an empire. In 1209, Genghis Khan was joined by the Uyghurs, whose merchant expeditions traversed the entire continent in pursuit of dominating trade routes. It was then that the Mongols acquired an immensely valuable tool for gathering invaluable information about the peoples inhabiting near and distant territories, including China. This unique symbiosis of interests soon became the foundation for successful campaigns, as a result of which the north of the Middle Kingdom acknowledged the suzerainty of the Khan of

[56] S. Kałużyński, *Imperium mongolskie*, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa 1970; D. C. Twitchett, H. Franke, *The Cambridge History of China*, T. 6: *Alien regimes and border states*, Cambridge University Press 1994, pp. 331–349.

the Great Horde (the Jin state). Also of significant importance was the widespread, large-scale recruitment of informants in other states via merchants. This was made possible by having access to a sufficiently large financial capital. In the period immediately preceding an invasion, the recruited agents also sought to bribe the higher command echelons and sow confusion to facilitate the conquest of the target country. The awareness of the advantage conferred by effective reconnaissance meant that the Mongol army also maintained special units dedicated to apprehending spies and potential agents (e.g., itinerant merchants), who were typically eliminated along the marching route without trial. This brutal method significantly curtailed the enemy's intelligence capabilities, often enabling the attacking forces to take the targeted countries by surprise. Genghis Khan also introduced a new military structure and, crucially from the perspective of information flow, a chancellery. In other words, he optimised the circulation of data, enabling the effective management of a rapidly expanding empire. This system proved effective long after the death of Genghis Khan himself.[57]

Japan

Japanese information culture was shaped by two concurrent factors: numerous civil wars and a general lack of internal stability (akin to the internal disputes among Mongol clans), alongside the influence of the Chinese civilisation – vastly more advanced at the time – in the form of the imperial *Moshuh Nanren* espionage networks. It was likely the members of this secret Chinese organisation who initiated the establishment of organisations in Japan that, over time, assumed the form of the Shinobi clans. This might also have stemmed from the fact that following an emperor's death, his rival would purge the *Moshuh Nanren* who had previously served him, fearing that with their immense knowledge and capabilities, they might seize power.

[57] J. Man, *Czyngis-Chan: życie, śmierć i zmartwychwstanie*, Wydawnictwo Amber, Warszawa 2004; P. D. Buell, *Historical Dictionary of the Mongol World Empire*, Lanham, Maryland, and Oxford: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2003, pp. 7–13.

Consequently, upon the death of their emperor, many members of this organisation disappeared or embedded themselves deeply within the structures of Chinese society, or alternatively, sought refuge and a new life in other countries. Given the communication difficulties of that era, Japan appeared ideal. Regardless of the *Moshuh Nanren*'s motives for infiltrating the Land of the Rising Sun (whether for intelligence purposes or escape), they began appearing in this island nation relatively early: between the 5th and 7th centuries CE.[58] The exact date is difficult to ascertain depending on the sources; nevertheless, this timeframe would correspond to late antiquity and the onset of the Early Middle Ages in Europe. In the subsequent period, the newly formed Shinobi clans exhibited a surprising number of similarities to the operational methodology of the *Moshuh Nanren* in ancient China, though, to their credit, the Japanese successors surpassed their masters, in accordance with a rule that dictated adapting to changing conditions rather than engaging in a war of attrition.[59] This approach also survived within the cultural codes of the Japanese, allowing them to adapt to their tragic situation following the Second World War. As we know today, this strategy also proved exceedingly effective earlier, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, transforming Japan into a global technological and economic powerhouse within a few decades.[60] Returning, however, to the Middle Ages and the Shinobi clans, their members trained from childhood in the arts of camouflage, espionage, close combat, and assassination, as well as medicine and methods of persuasion. Consequently, at a certain stage of training, members of individual clans would begin to specialise in a specific profession which they were to master. Not everyone ultimately became an assassin or a spy. The Shinobi clans typically operated in concert with or at the behest of samurai clans, who utilised their services to gather information on an adversary, conduct disinformation operations, or execute an as-

[58] M. Górnikiewicz, *Geneza i ewolucja chińskiej…*, op. cit., pp. 327.
[59] A. Adams, *Ninja niewidzialni zabójcy*, Budo-Sport, Warszawa 1993, pp. 104–132.
[60] K. G. Henshall, *Historia Japonii*, Bellona, Warszawa 2004, pp. 115–145.

sassination that could alter the political and military circumstances. Since they specialised in "dishonourable" methods of combat, the Shinobi were, on the one hand, needed by all warring factions, whilst on the other, they did not command corresponding respect. During the Kamakura period (1192–1333), known as the "golden age of Ninjutsu," the continuously raging civil war not only justified the existence of the clans but also contributed significantly to their fortification and development. The climate favourable to the clans lasted uninterrupted for four hundred years, until the 16th century, when the title of shogun went to Oda Nobunaga.[61] The new shogun was an outspoken opponent of Buddhism, which, among other things, led to the massacre of one hundred thousand civilians (including women and children) on Mount Hiei. Over the next five years, Buddhists were murdered and their temples demolished. In 1581, Oda led a massive army against the clans residing in the central provinces of Iga and Koga, which culminated in the massacre of the latter. The Shinobi were trained to execute special operations, not for regular combat in the open field. Faced with samurai hardened by countless battles and massacres, they simply did not stand a chance. Especially given the overwhelming numerical superiority on the side of the shogun's army. Those who survived sought, above all, to endure. Some ended up in the shogunate's newly formed police force, while others went underground, forming the foundations of the future Yakuza.[62] In a unified Japan, independent and uncontrolled clans

[61] M. Weston, *Oda Nobunaga: The Warrior Who United Half of Japan. Giants of Japan: The Lives of Japan's Greatest Men and Women*, Kodansha International, New York 2002, pp. 140–145.

[62] Yakuza – The term for a member of Japanese organised crime, the origins of which trace back to a card game called hanafuda. The winner was the one who finished the game holding cards where the last digit of the sum was the highest. The hand ya-ku-za meant 8–9-3, which translated to the worst hand in the game of Oicho-Kabu. Today, Yakuza is a general term for Japanese organised crime operating under the guise of openly registered non-governmental organisations: associations. The Yakuza does not engage in common street crime; instead, it maintains peace and order in its controlled territories, creating a conducive atmosphere for conducting its true business, such as gambling, prostitution, narcotics, weapons, financial crimes, cybercrime, etc. It is esti-

proved to be a threat that the new authority could not afford. Nevertheless, knowledge regarding the acquisition and processing of information for the purpose of forecasting threats survived in subsequent generations, particularly since, as previously mentioned, some of the former Shinobi reinforced the internal security apparatus of the time. It may be a paradox and an irony of history in its own right that members of samurai clans, who were opposed to the transformation of Japan's social structure in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. It can therefore be posited that the symbiosis which endured between the Shinobi and the samurai for four centuries was renewed by their descendants another four hundred years later, albeit in an entirely different formula and socio-political reality. However, whether any clan survived in its original form –having adapted to changing conditions and, in accordance with the principle of invisibility, vanishing entirely from the public eye – seems to be merely a somewhat romantic speculation today. Ultimately, it appears that the Japanese masters of information intelligence failed to predict and protect themselves against the threat that brought an end to their existence, transferring the paradigm of the Shinobi clans into the realm of imagination.

2.3. From the Renaissance to the Modern Era

The subsequent several hundred years that elapsed between the Middle Ages and the modern era constituted a period during which intelligence structures intended to forecast changes in the international arena underwent significant expansion, yet the methodology itself remained practically unchanged. It continued to rely on increasingly numerous cohorts of informants situated within various social strata and influence groups, which provided access to up-to-

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mated that the Yakuza may boast up to one hundred thousand members and associates: J. Adelstein, *The Yakuza: Inside Japan's murky criminal underworld*, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/15/asia/yakuza-yamaguchi-gumi-explainer/, 16.12.2015.

date information. Over time, new professions emerged, and the process of interpenetration between individual social classes accelerated in tandem with population growth. Nevertheless, the barriers of the class-based society remained formidable, although alongside the gradual dissemination of education and the rising level of awareness, the erosion of the existing social system also progressed.[63] Rulers and their entourages thought of their own states and populations in the archaic terms of dominions, resulting in successive revolutionary uprisings that heralded change. On the other hand, the very occurrence and dramatic course of the English Civil War, the French and American Revolutions, national uprisings (Polish, Belgian), or the Spring of Nations clearly indicate that the forecasting apparatus of the contemporary decision-makers was highly unreliable.[64] The rise to power of Napoleon, who for a considerable time remained unaccountable in the eyes of contemporary monarchs while rearranging Europe to his own design, was not foreseen. There was also continued reliance on more or less extensive espionage networks, both internal and external. The scale changed, yet the essence of forecasting future threats remained exactly the same.[65] In other words, international forecasting remained stuck at the level of the transition between antiquity and the Middle Ages, with the only difference being the engagement of an increasing number of far more diverse types of spies, as well as the agent networks they recruited. Evolution did not proceed towards the creation of new methods, let

[63] T. Szczurek, *Bezpieczeństwo jako wartość polityczna w poglądach Tomasza Hobbesa*, [in:] *Filozoficzne i społeczne aspekty bezpieczeństwa*, ed. T. Szczurek, Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna, Warszawa 2013, pp. 24–45.

[64] T. Szczurek, *Wojna i pokój w wybranych nurtach europejskiej myśli filozoficznej i społecznej*, [in:] *Natura bezpieczeństwa w perspektywie personalnej i strukturalnej*, ed. K. Drabik, Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2013, pp. 76–89.

[65] S. Węgrzynowicz, *Patrioci i zdrajcy. Społeczeństwo Królestwa Polskiego wobec mikołajowskiej polityki Rosji w latach 1846–1856*, Kraków 2014, p. 34; M. Zgórniak, *Za Waszą i naszą wolność. Polacy w europejskiej Wiośnie Ludów 1848–1849*, *Dzieje Narodu i Państwa Polskiego*, vol. III, z. 48, Warszawa 1987; Jerzy Zdrada, *Historia Polski 1795–1914*, PWN, Warszawa 2007, p. 192; W. Tokarz, *Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1830 i 1831*, Warszawa 1993, pp. 89, pp. 226–232.

alone prognostic models, but merely towards methods of acquiring information, encryption, and disinformation. In summary, a classical and age-old model was relied upon, based on exactly the same foundations:

- knowledge acquired from decision-makers;
- knowledge acquired from the immediate circles of decision-makers;
- knowledge resulting from the juxtaposition of data acquired regarding decision-makers with the actual capabilities and potential of a given state.

Only in the event of an inability to acquire any knowledge about the decision-makers was reliance placed on a logical comparison of the potentials of the diagnosed states, which could, of course, be misleading in many cases due to ignorance of the rulers' intentions. This was undertaken semi-professionally by teams of individuals who were typically also responsible for several other spheres of state activity, a fact which similarly did not contribute positively to the professionalisation of future forecasting. Evidently, numerous errors in forecasts formulated in this manner could stem from a sudden change of mind by decision-makers regarding the direction of their actions, an unforeseeable indisposition (illness, death), or, alternatively, a change in leadership, etc. The classical model was, quite obviously, effective in many instances; nevertheless, there always remained a pool of issues where an incorrect assessment could impact the immediate, and even the more distant, future of the entire region (if not the world).

In truth, it is only in the period preceding the outbreak of the First World War that one can speak of the emergence of forecasting as a science functioning independently of any intelligence activity, wherein the compilation of specific data within a previously adopted model should yield a specific result. However, it remained a field of scientific inquiry rather than a matter of state policy, enjoying only limited trust – and thus limited support –from policymakers. A shift in this approach arrived with the end of the Second World

War, giving rise to professional teams that began operating auspices of various non-governmental organisations.

2.4. During the Two World Wars

The period leading up to the First World War was a time when intelligence organisations began to take shape in their modern form, i.e. what is known as intelligence and counter-intelligence. During the two World Wars, these institutions underwent a genuine baptism of fire, only to find themselves unexpectedly in an entirely new Cold War reality following the end of the struggle against the Nazi machinery of annihilation. The two global conflicts also proved to be an ideal driving force for the development of all technologies, significantly accelerating the civilisational progress of developing societies, and even more so, developed ones. Organisations engaged in the acquisition and protection of information also had to adapt to this dynamically changing reality. However, something else happened as well: namely, against the backdrop of an evolving and increasingly widespread field of study, the discipline of international forecasting began to emerge.[66] This was a significant step forward, as it demonstrated that knowledge regarding potential threats could be acquired not by stealing information from other states, but through the rigorous examination of officially available data. In other words, public and private think tanks[67], composed of ardent proponents of forecasting, began employing "open source intelligence", that is, working with open-source information.[68] Significantly, however, work also began on developing various patterns and models for pro-

[66] R. Faligot, R. Kauffer, *Służby specjalne. Historia wywiadu i kontrwywiadu na świecie*, Iskry, Warszawa 1998, pp. 19–20.

[67] Think-tank – *niezależny, niedziałający dla zysku ośrodek, powołany w celu badania i analizy spraw publicznych*: Słownik SJP, https://sjp.pl/think+tank, 28.02.2018.

[68] B. Stromczyński, P. Waszkiewicz, *Biały wywiad w praktyce pracy organów ścigania na przykładzie wykorzystania serwisów społecznościowych*, "Prokuratura i Prawo" 2014, No. 5, pp. 146–170.

cessing a wide variety of information, usually based on the natural sciences. Thus, following the Second World War, the famous "game theory" was born, which to this day exerts an influence on successive generations of researchers in this intricate field of science.[69] Striving to order the substantive scope presented above, it is worth devoting a few words to the genesis of intelligence and counterintelligence as understood today, particularly in the context of forecasting potential threats in the international space.

The international reality prior to the outbreak of the First World War was a consequence of the preceding centuries. Democracy continued to evolve in European states, functioning in an astonishing, at times uneasy, symbiosis with still-powerful monarchies. The societies of European powers, despite their growing self-awareness, considered this state of affairs not only completely normal but indeed proper. The labour movement was still a sort of novelty with a long road ahead before assuming a definitive shape, a process accelerated by the global war. Before 1914 arrived, however, the world was divided between two colonial powers: France and England. It was within the structures of these two powers that the future intelligence and counterintelligence services had been gradually maturing for centuries. At the turn of the 20th century, London and Paris had the following in their employ:[70]

- foreign intelligence,
- counter intelligence,
- colonial intelligence,
- naval intelligence,
- military intelligence.

The ambitious and recently emergent German Empire, in turn, had at its disposal the Abteilung III b, whereas Austria-Hungary possessed the Evidenzbüro, which focused primarily on the coun-

[69] M. Górnikiewicz, T. Szczurek, *Prognozowanie międzynarodowych stosunków wojskowych na podstawie uwarunkowań społeczno-kulturowych*, [in:] *Determinanty kształtowania bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego*, ed. E. Ślachcińska, Wyższa Szkoła Bankowa, Poznań 2017, pp. 103–109.

[70] R. Faligot, R. Kauffer, op. cit., p. 19.

terintelligence effort; by design, this fundamentally precluded the accurate forecasting of threats from other states. Turkey also possessed an extensive agent network, however, due to a gradual decline in its potential, it did not exhibit particular ambitions during this period. This was similar to Tsarist Russia, which channelled its main effort into controlling its own society through the establishment of the famous "Okhrana". A similar model was in place in China, where the activities of the agent network and secret police were directed primarily against decision-makers and the resistance movement opposing the rule of the Manchu dynasty. Japan, much like Germany, as befits a rising and modern power, took equal care to gradually expand both its intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities. It was not until the First World War that the powers, hitherto focused solely on their own societies, were jolted out of their stagnation, forcing the dynamic expansion of intelligence structures. It was also then, as a result of the increasingly widespread application of technology (including in communications), that forms of intelligence oriented towards intercepting communications were born; furthermore, experimentation with technological innovations began, aiming to harness them to gain access to information regarding an adversary's intentions. The end of the Great War brought about the complete transformation of the existing order and the collapse of two colonial powers. Within four years, the centuries-old order was consigned to history, giving way unexpectedly to a new order devoid of a strong Germany, but instead featuring Bolshevik Russia and Republican China.[71]

Institutions responsible for forecasting changes in such a dynamically variable and increasingly unpredictable international environment gained immense support from the state. This was mainly due to an awareness of the risks posed by a lack of access to this type of information, as well as the advantage that state actors with highly effective intelligence services would enjoy on the future battlefield. During the interwar period, all European states engaged, to a greater

[71] Ibidem, p. 20.

or lesser degree, in the construction of their own intelligence and counterintelligence structures.[72] It was likely also then, amidst such a wide scale of various intelligence operations, that it was observed that certain nationalities possess a greater or lesser predisposition for constructing and operating specific types of services.[73] Another equally interesting discovery was the realisation that, depending on the area of operation, individuals originating from similar cultures have a higher chance of success, although the excellent track record of Polish intelligence officers in the culturally different Middle East may contradict this assumption. Fundamentally, however, the exception should merely prove the rule. This topic, whilst undoubtedly interesting, is not directly related to the evolution of forecasting methodologies in international relations; it may well be explored in another work, and not necessarily by a single author. Returning to the period between the two global conflicts, France and the United Kingdom were burdened by history with an existing legacy that, on the one hand, provided access to centuries of experience, but, for the very same reason, constituted an encumbrance that hindered sufficiently rapid evolution and adaptation to the increasingly dynamic global realities, which were largely conditioned by ongoing technological advancement. Germany, Poland, and Russia, on the other hand, did not carry such burdens.[74]

It was in Poland, among other places, that the principle of bringing together both internal and external services within a single institution reporting to the same decision-making body was adopted. This was a significant departure from the organisational schema employed by the majority of states, and simultaneously evidence of attempts to seek unique, creative solutions. It is worth noting the two forms of acquiring and processing information that were utilised by intelligence institutions at that time. On the one hand, they

72 Ibidem, pp. 134–417.

73 Niemcy, ZSRR – kontrwywiad; Polska – wywiad: *Polski wywiad wojskowy 1918–1945*, eds. P. Kołakowski, A. Pepłoński, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2006, pp. 120–345.

74 R. Faligot, R. Kauffer, op. cit., pp. 15–17.

relied on recruiting informants (just as had been the case a millennium earlier), on the other, however, a painstaking surveillance of the day-to-day activities of military institutions and transport routes was carried out, which ultimately led to the identification of the locations where the target state's troops were concentrated, the main directions of troop movements, and even the size of the units on the move. In other words, efforts were made to develop a forecast of a given state's military activity during both peacetime and war based on a vast amount of data. A similar approach was applied to attempts at predicting the trajectories of the foreign, economic, and even social policies of the examined nationalities. In truth, it is this specific facet of intelligence activity that most closely resembled the forecasting which emerged much later. The sole difference lay in the fact that intelligence continued to gather a portion of its information via classified methods, whereas prognostic institutions relied solely on open-source information, which was generally accessible. Naturally, during the interwar period, most information, even of an everyday nature, was not as easily accessible as it is today; this may have been the reason why forecasting could only begin to mature under appropriate conditions, or, in other words, at a sufficient level of societal informational saturation.

2.5. The Cold War: The Origins of Forecasting

Following the end of the Second World War, organisations began to emerge in many parts of the world with the aim of streamlining the decision-making process at the international level. These were the so-called planning groups.[75] In the United States, such a group was established by George Kennan, and its tasks included: formulating long-term programmes for achieving strategic objectives; anticipating future problems at the federal level; examining all issues of a political-military nature; and providing broadly defined advice on

[75] L. P. Bloomfield, *Planning Foreign Policy: Can it be done?*, „Political Science Quarterly" 1978, Vol. 98, No. 3, pp. 369–391.

currently implemented policies.[76] When discussing American institutions examining international relations and conducting research into innovative solutions, including in the field of forecasting, it is impossible to overlook the renowned RAND Corporation, founded on 14 May 1948. The objective was to establish a non-profit research and development institution whose activities would meet the needs of the military sector's decision-making process.[77] It was precisely at RAND that the famous "game theory" was applied in constructing mathematical models for international forecasting. In 1950, deliberations were initiated on the prisoner's dilemma. Prominent mathematicians working for the RAND Corporation, Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher, attempted to apply the mathematical dimension of game theory in constructing a global nuclear strategy. Around this time, John Nash proposed the Nash equilibrium theory, which posited that two entities engaged in a game with each other assume that the other party undertakes specific actions guided by the parity of rationality (a cost-benefit analysis). In other words, any deviation from the equilibrium strategy is too risky to forfeit the stable benefits derived from maintaining established relations between the players. Unfortunately, the prisoner's dilemma demonstrated that this approach may prove overly idealistic, even in a situation where the players are guided by a similarly understood rationality. This conception of equilibrium theory is all the more likely to fail when individual players apply disparate criteria of rationality in their attempts to optimally predict mutual behaviour.

In 1957, the British Foreign Office inaugurated an organisational unit responsible for planning state policy in a comprehensive sense. In 1964, this special cell reached organisational maturity, focusing its work on forecasting future problems that the British government would have to face. The time horizon for these forecasts was five years at the time. The French could not lag behind this new trend and, in 1973, established their own group which, akin to its British

[76] M. Sułek, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe…*, p. 52.
[77] Ibidem, p. 54.

counterpart, was responsible for policy planning through the anticipation of future problems requiring resolution. This group was named the Centre for Analysis and Forecasting (Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision).[78] Similar attempts to establish corresponding structures in other states were not always met with success (Japan, Australia, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany). In 1969, Canada established the Policy Analysis Group (Department of External Affairs); in 1971, the Dutch authorities initiated the activities of a mere five-person team with the intention of analysing global trends and presenting appropriate proposals. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, international forecasting was also flourishing, but it enjoyed considerably broader government support; as a result, nearly eighty planners were employed in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone (the Foreign Policy Operations Administration section).[79]

Game theory, in its classical iteration, impacted international forecasting for decades to come. With the development of philosophy in security studies, which was ostensibly meant to explain the specific behaviours of states towards one another, realism and liberalism were followed by constructivism.[80] There was a gradual departure from the assumption that human nature is inherently inclined towards realism or liberalism, and that only external factors modify this approach in a particular manner. Proponents of constructivism posited that a person is a product of their culture; in other words, it is the everyday environment of upbringing and functioning within

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78 *Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision: Anne-Laure Chanteloup, L'historien Justin Vaïsse à la tête du Centre d'analyse, de prospective et de stratégie du Quai d'Orsa*, www.allgov.com, 5.03.2013.

79 M. Sułek, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe…*, p. 54.

80 J. S. Lantis, D. Howlett, *Kultura strategiczna*, [in:] *Strategia we współczesnym świecie: wprowadzenie do studiów strategicznych*, eds. J. L. Johnson, K. M. Kartchner, J. S. Larsen, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2009, pp. 92–104; R. Szpyra, K. Trochowska, *Konceptualny model bezpieczeństwa militarnego w perspektywie (neo)realistycznej*, [in:] *Metodologia badań bezpieczeństwa narodowego*: *Bezpieczeństwo 2010*, Vol. II, Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2011, pp. 331–351.

a given social group that shapes future attitudes. Constructivism became a philosophical concept in international relations drawing directly upon cultural anthropology and sociology. This was the direction taken by the prominent forecaster Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, who posited that the "rationalism" determining the decision-making process of individual players in the international arena can differ significantly from one another.[81] In his models referencing game theory, Bueno de Mesquita began applying this variant rationality in an attempt to predict the behaviour of specific subjects under study towards one another. This was a major step forward, although regrettably, it was taken so late (only at the beginning of the 21st century). In his research, Bueno de Mesquita focused on analysing the views and attitudes of political decision-makers, unfortunately narrowing the research area solely to their public statements, as well as articles and studies about them. He subjected individuals from their immediate environment to an equally meticulous analysis, as they naturally influence the decision-making process and, consequently, the final shape of the ultimate decision. The word "unfortunately" was used deliberately to indicate that what was missing was an analysis of the deep layer, namely the mental programming (both individual and cultural) of the decision-makers and their circles. Bueno de Mesquita focused on the readily accessible surface layer, thereby exposing himself to a classical cognitive bias involving the application of a vastly oversimplified assessment of "effects" (the narrative adopted by the authors of the analysed content) rather than "causes" (the codes determining the decisions[82]). Given that the vast majority of decision-makers are politicians, their public statements are also typically tailored for the public, failing to serve as a genuine reflection of the individual's true views. Reality also looks

[81] *Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Predicts Iran's Future*, TED, https://www.ted.com/talks/ bruce_bueno_de_mesquita_predicts_iran_s_future?language=pl, February 2009.

[82] M. Górnikiewicz, *Antropologia kulturowa w prognozowaniu zagrożeń militarnych i niemilitarnych – kontekst historyczny*, "Bezpieczeństwo: Świat – Region – Polska" 2013, No. 1(3), pp. 39–37.

different from the perspective of a candidate for a specific political office than it does when exercising power under specific conditions. In such cases, it may turn out that the intention behind a particular project may differ significantly from reality. In other words, the surface layer constitutes an excellent supplement in the process of studying the decision-maker and their entourage, but it should not form the foundation of such research.[83] This publication and the research conducted for its purposes represent an attempt to tackle the issues presented above, which is discussed more extensively in the subsequent chapters.[84]

[83] M. Górnikiewicz, T. Szczurek, *Prognozowanie międzynarodowych…*, p. 109.
[84] In the section concerning cultural programming, yet without attempting to delve into individual programming, which together comprise comprehensively understood mental programming.

CHAPTER III

Cultural Codes and Brain Function: Between Consciousness and the Lack Thereof in the Decision-Making Process and Threat Forecasting

The human brain is a part of the central nervous system protected by the skull. It is the most complex organ in the human body. It is there that all information arriving from the environment is received and processed, and where all decisions are made.[1] The type of action undertaken and executed by our body depends on the decision-making processes that occur in a fraction of a second within the brain. It can thus be assumed that "switching off" the brain equates to "switching off" the human being.[2] Both the algorithms for receiving and processing stimuli (information) operate independently of our will. The majority of these processes occur outside of consciousness; that is to say, we are unaware of the vast majority of decisions, remaining merely their passive recipients.[3] We operate under the illusion of making independent decisions, whereas the vast majority of them are generated at the subconscious level and subsequently transferred to consciousness. A similar situation applies to the "Eureka effect", wherein consciousness receives a ready-made result constituting the solution to a problem that one had been puzzling over much earlier. During this time, complex cognitive pro-

[1] A. Smith, *Umysł*, Państwowy Zakład Wydawnictw Lekarskich, Warszawa 1989, pp. 18–32.
[2] Ibidem, pp. 292–300.
[3] D. Kahneman, op. cit., pp. 55–70.

cesses were occurring, based on algorithms developed by the brain and the reception of a vast amount of data from the environment (of which we are also entirely unaware), ultimately delivering the final result. In simple terms, every human is the fortunate owner of a highly advanced biological computer that operates independently of its host and determines their functioning in a manner intended to ensure survival and development (naturally, in accordance with the algorithms formulated by the brain).[4] It is somewhat akin to having an autonomous operating system "installed" from birth in the brain (serving as the central computer).

The operational foundations (the equivalent of system software[5]) of this distinct system of independent intelligence have been defined in our genotype. Nevertheless, how this system will gather and process information flowing from the outside[6] depends on stimuli and previously developed algorithms. In other words, for each of us, the internal system will create slightly different algorithms for perception, reaction, thought, and behaviour.[7] Naturally, similarities will emerge within the same social group, which results from the inevitable mutual interaction among its members, as well as reference to an identical cultural layer, that is, habits, behaviours, gestures, facial expressions, tone of voice, preferred colours, dishes, sounds, etc. The Taiwanese differ somewhat in this regard from the inhabitants of individual Chinese provinces. Norwegians perceive their environment differently than modern-day French or Polish people. However, if one were to compare the inhabitants of any country in East Asia, Europe, or South America, it would become apparent that these differences are often highly conspicuous. Each person is

4 D. Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence*, Media Rodzina, Poznań 2012, pp. 37––75.

5 System software performs the fundamental functions necessary for the operation of a computer system. Alongside it, one can also distinguish programming software and application software intended directly for the computer user, e.g., via various types of applications.

6 The equivalent of programming software, and further on, partly application software.

7 G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 15–51.

influenced by two layers of the environment that generate stimuli: the cultural layer and the layer of subjective experiences not classified within the cultural layer. Moreover, we inherit a wide variety of patterns of thought, feeling, reaction, and behaviour from our ancestors.

In light of the above, it is worth examining more closely these algorithms of information processing, the phases of brain function and their roles, as well as the scientific attempts made thus far to classify individual patterns, also referred to as codes.

3.1. Phases of Brain Function: States of Consciousness and Their Functions

Nature has equipped humans with a brain whose functioning still holds many mysteries for science. On the other hand, our knowledge of this marvel of evolutionary engineering is successively expanding. Today, we are not only on the verge of creating a faithful, three-dimensional copy incorporating the minutest details,[8] but also of developing an AI (*Artificial Intelligence*) system comparable to human computational capabilities.[9] Research conducted thus far on brain function has made it possible to identify five phases of operation, also referred to as states of consciousness:[10]

1. Unconsciousness;
2. Deep subconsciousness;

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[8] *BigBrain, the Most Accurate 3D Digital Brain Map*, Benchmark, http://www.benchmark.pl/testy_i_recenzje/bigbrain-cyfrowy-mozg.html, 1.03.2018.

[9] K. Sztandera, *Aby zrobić kopię zapasową ludzkiego mózgu, potrzeba… 2500 dysków twardych*, InnPoland, http://innpoland.pl/115727,aby-zrobic-kopie-zapasowa-ludzkie-go-mozgu-potrzeba-2500-dyskow-twardych, 1.03.2018.

[10] E. Kirmizi-Alsan, Z. Bayraktaroglu, G. Hakan, et al., *Comparative analysis of event-related potentials during Go/NoGo and CPT: Decomposition of electrophysiological markers of response inhibition and sustained attention*, "Brain Research" 2006, 1104 (1), pp. 114–128; M. A. Kisley, Z. M. Cornwell, *Gamma and beta neural activity evoked during a sensory gating paradigm: Effects of auditory, somatosensory and cross-modal stimulation*, "Clinical Neurophysiology" 2006, No. 117 (11), pp. 2549–2563.

3. Light subconsciousness;
4. Consciousness;
5. Superconsciousness.

- Each of the phases is characterised by a different averaged frequency of brain function, quantifiable in hertz (Hz). The least researched phase, functioning more as a theoretical construct, is the superconsciousness. Before each of the aforementioned phases is subjected to a brief characterisation, it is worth devoting a few words to the biomechanics of the brain's functioning itself. During operation, this organ – which consumes more energy than any other part of the human body – exhibits electromagnetic, electrical and electrochemical activity. From conception, the brain generates minute electrical voltages, capable of being recorded via an EEG (electroencephalograph). Presently, six fundamental rhythms of brain activity (generated by brainwaves) are distinguished, which correspond to the aforementioned states of consciousness. These waves are also referred to as alpha, beta, theta, delta, gamma, and epsilon. Currently, two parameters are utilised in examining the ranges indicated above, namely:[11]
- hertz (Hz), corresponding to the frequency measured by the number of cycles per second;
- microvolts (μV), corresponding to the amplitude of fluctuations deflecting from equilibrium.

The highest phase is gamma, which corresponds to a frequency of over 40 Hz (typically between 80 and 100 Hz); during this phase, an image of movement is created within the cells, in order to subsequently transfer this representation to the part responsible for the actual execution of a given action. In other words, it is at this frequency that the organism's motor actions and functions are executed. The next phase, beta (between 13 and 30 Hz with an amplitude of 5–20 μV), corresponds to ordinary, everyday activity, perception,

[11] J. Dąbrowski, *Magnetostymulacja i magnetorelaksacja w teorii i praktyce*, „Barwy Zdrowia" 2011.

and any mental exertion, including logical and analytical reasoning. Generally, in this phase, a person functions at a conscious level, whereas the gamma phase is characteristic of states of heightened activity and extreme psychological states, such as hysteria. Obviously, prolonged functioning in the gamma state is detrimental to the organism. The alpha phase (between 7 and 12 Hz with an average amplitude of 20–200 μV, typically around 50 μV) corresponds to the state of light sleep, or light subconsciousness. This state is characteristic of falling asleep and waking up. It is precisely in this state that a person absorbs any knowledge most rapidly; hence, this state is also exceptionally important for the coding of any patterns. Light dreams may also occur in this state, manifesting as rapid eye movement, known as the *REM*. It must be emphasised, however, that this is not the typical dreaming associated with deep subconsciousness, but merely a state characteristic of lingering between wakefulness and sleep (where residual consciousness is retained). The theta phase (typically between 3.5 and 8 Hz, or 2.5 and 7 Hz) is specific to the aforementioned deep dreaming. In this phase, the not only organises all the data collected during activity in the conscious state (assimilated at the level of light subconsciousness), but also repairs damaged nerve cells. Full regeneration of the body, with vital functions reduced to the absolute minimum, occurs only in the delta state (between 0.5 and 3.5 to 4 Hz). The final phase is epsilon. To date, it remains the least researched, and it is presumed to be a phase occurring prior to clinical death (below 0.5 Hz, where 0 Hz denotes an absence of brain activity).

At this juncture, it should be added that the averaged phases of brain activity illustrate the combined functioning of all parts of this organ; consequently, this means that in reality, certain areas may operate in higher modes, while others operate in significantly lower ones. This phenomenon confirms human capacity to perform a series of complex activities requiring dexterity, coordination, synchronisation, and specific focus while focusing on something entirely different (e.g., a state of reverie, engaging in conversation, etc.). In

summary, while the body and brain execute a specific sequence of actions, our consciousness can be almost entirely focused on something completely different. The best example might be driving a car, but also cycling, running, swimming, or other forms of activity that require the simultaneous coordination of several, or even over a dozen, actions at once.[12]

A human being is an extraordinarily complex organism in both biological and psychological terms. It is akin to a situation where, at birth, we received an exceptionally "technologically" (or even "biotechnologically") advanced device without an instruction manual. Even human memory is merely one element of our internal system that most people are incapable of operating properly. Currently, there are many accessible courses teaching memory techniques, that is, methods enabling appropriately rapid and effective assimilation of information. Unfortunately, for centuries in schools, we have been taught methods that stand in almost absolute contradiction to the memorisation methodology natural to our brain.[13] Furthermore, we are also capable of making much better use of our five basic senses (in reality, humans have a much broader pool of sensors at their disposal, the majority of which function entirely outside consciousness.[14]) For millennia, various forms of meditation have been developed to enhance the ability to perceive external stimuli, which also correspondingly affects the quality of life.[15] Ensuring an adequate amount of physical activity in daily life, as well as a proper diet, is also not without significance, as the selection of specific exercises will determine not only the development of the body but also of

12 M. J. Warij, *Energetyczna koncepcja psychiki i psychiczności*, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Policji, Szczytno 2011, pp. 189–240.

13 T. Buzan, *Pamięć na zawołanie. Metody i techniki pamięciowe*, Wydawnictwo Aha!, Łódź 2006, pp. 17–27.

14 A. Smith, op. cit., pp. 179–203.

15 R. G. Pellegrino, M. J. Politis, *Jak poprawić swoje IQ*, Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznań 2007; M. Horeth, M. Eder, *I ty jesteś mentalistą! Naucz się odczytywać myśli, emocje i zachowania otaczających Cię osób*, Wydawnictwo Helion, Gliwice 2011, pp. 17–165.

the brain.[16] Today, in the era of the information civilisation, we can find much of this information via the Internet or by enrolling in professional workshops. At the same time, however, it is worth remembering that in previous centuries, our ancestors were deprived of such luxury, and thus could not even dream of rapidly familiarising themselves with this "instruction manual" for their own body (including the brain). Regarding the combination of memory techniques and movement, it is worth noting the traditional prohibition against walking during lessons, even though integrating physical movement with learning actually aids the memorisation process. The same applies to stimulating as many senses as possible simultaneously, using colourful drawings, abstraction, and dynamic movement. While these practices are permitted during the early years of primary education, they are gradually eradicated from daily routines in later stages of schooling. Another example is the teaching of reading, which typically stops at the ability to read word by word (often silently syllabifying in one's head), whereas the subsequent stage should involve learning to read multiple words – and eventually entire sentences – simultaneously.[17] Human vision is capable of adapting to such reading methods; however, the lack of educational demand in this area effectively halts the further development of these innate abilities. To illustrate the potential of memory techniques, it suffices to mention that after just a few hours of introductory training in mnemonics, participants can permanently memorise at least a thirty-digit number within minutes (to say nothing of nine-digit phone numbers, PINs, or trivially simple bank account numbers), accurately associate names with faces, and "absorb" textbook content much faster.

There is no magic involved in this, let alone supernatural abilities. The key lies in understanding the aforementioned patterns of brain function. A far more intriguing question might concern the

[16] A. Bocheńska, *Ćwicz, a usprawnisz swój mózg*, ABC Zdrowie, https://portal.abc-zdrowie.pl/cwicz-a-usprawnisz-swoj-mozg, 1.03.2018.

[17] I. Krop, *1000 słów na minutę: podręcznik do samodzielnej nauki szybkiego czytania*, Studio Emka, Warszawa 2002, pp. 9–17.

origins of the algorithms responsible for receiving and processing incoming external data. While attributing this to evolution might appear satisfactory, researchers should then question which external stimuli and processes influenced our memory patterns to give them their contemporary shape. One must not forget that evolution is an endless series of experiments, not all of which are successful. This raises another question: what guides evolution, or rather, what is its objective when experimenting with our bodies (including the brain)?

We are an amalgamation of diverse biological tissues currently functioning in a relatively high degree of symbiosis. Nevertheless, it seems evident that the trajectory of evolution is underpinned by an unknown mechanism (or algorithm) that orchestrates the entire process. The very existence of evolution may also be puzzling, as biological organisms on our planet could just as easily have succumbed and perished due to adverse environmental changes rather than adapting to them. It appears that the fundamental objective accompanying all living organisms from conception is the drive to survive and develop. Yet, the fulfilment of this goal relies on a vast array of factors, including those originating from events experienced by a given species in the past. This approach might explain why our brain conducts the majority of information processing and code creation outside our conscious awareness: simply put, evolution cannot allow the entirely subjective decisions of individual members of a species to thwart this colossal evolutionary experiment that has been unfolding for millennia.[18] At this juncture, one might naturally consider the distinction between the brain and the mind. The author wishes to sincerely apologise for the deliberate overuse of the term "brain", which, with the readers' permission, will continue to be employed throughout this text.[19]

The brain is a biological organ situated and protected within the skull, whereas the mind serves as the software for this organ.

[18] B. Fritzsch, *Of Mice and Genes: Evolution of Vertebrate Brain Development*, "Brain Behav Evol" 1998, No. 52, pp. 207–217.
[19] A. Smith, op. cit., pp. 70–95.

This approach is relatively clear-cut; it unambiguously separates the biomechanical functioning of the brain from cognitive processes, whilst clearly indicating that these two elements cannot function independently. Without the mind (understood as software), the brain would merely be biological tissue responsible for receiving and transmitting nerve impulses throughout the body. The mind simultaneously provides the algorithms used to interpret this flow of impulses, along with the principles governing how information is processed (received, recorded, modified, and rendered "dormant", given that the human brain lacks the capacity to permanently delete information).[20]


Every second of our lives, the body receives a vast amount of information from both external and internal environments. Were we conscious of this sheer volume, the majority of which is entirely unnecessary, our daily functioning would prove exceedingly difficult. One need only imagine having to consciously regulate blood pressure in our veins, arteries, and organs, monitor our respiratory rate, be mindful of the body overheating, and actively initiate the sweating process to dissipate heat and moisture. There are plenty of other examples. The body executes all these processes entirely autonomously, independently of our will. Moreover, our consciousness is practically isolated from exerting any influence over this sphere of physiological function.[21] The fact that the brain receives data indicating the need to adjust blood pressure, oxygenation, hydration, temperature, and so forth, demonstrates that the human body is equipped with significantly more receptors (senses) than the familiar five. All this indicates that our brain regulates many vital functions of which we remain completely unaware. Furthermore, if we could exert any influence over these processes, we would likely do ourselves far more harm than good. This naturally leads to the question of what purpose consciousness actually serves, given that

[20] W. W. Hewitt, *Hipnoza i autohipnoza*, Wydawnictwo Medium, Konstancin-Jeziorna 1997, pp. 96–106.
[21] A. Smith, op. cit., pp. 95–118.

the body functions adequately without its significant involvement. The answer to this question is of fundamental importance for the creation and development of patterns, and consequently, for the survival of future generations.

Before delving into this issue, it is worth noting that the aforementioned patterns can be understood as codes of perception, reaction, thought, behaviour, and decision-making (referencing the definitions provided in the terminological section of this publication.[22]). In turn, an algorithm, is the underlying principle governing the processing of information, which ultimately results in the formation of the aforementioned codes. In other words, while we can influence the formation and consolidation of cultural and acquired codes to some extent, we inherit our algorithms and genetic codes through our genotype and have little to no control over them. As previously mentioned, algorithms constitute part of our internal "system software", to which only the system administrator (our brain) has access rights. Returning, therefore, to the initial question: why do we need consciousness?

Figure 3. The formation process of cultural codes and individual acquired codes



Source: own elaboration.

In attempting to discern the purpose of consciousness, it is useful to ask an *a contrario* question: what can we not accomplish without the involvement of consciousness? Specifically, we cannot learn new activities, such as the previously mentioned tasks of driving a car or riding a bicycle. The body can autonomously react to harmful stimuli by experiencing pain, an astringent or bitter taste, an unpleasant odour, and so forth. Conversely, just because contact with cold

[22] See: Chapter I – *Terminological Definitions: Codes, Mental Programming, Cultural Programming.*


water proves unpleasant (such as an icy shower), it does not mean that such "therapy" will universally be detrimental to our health. In summary, the body can learn to react to specific stimuli through the functioning of the nervous system in tandem with the senses. This process depends entirely on our genotype and the underlying algorithms that govern the construction and operation of our body's various components.

At the same time, it is consciousness that drives us to explore the world, thereby deepening our knowledge of our environment. The cognitive process cannot occur solely through passive observation and analysis of the environment. It necessitates active engagement, establishing a continuous interaction with the environment to facilitate the uninterrupted gathering of information. These data are subsequently processed during passive states.[23] Concurrently, this same consciousness allows us to evaluate and modify our reactions (e.g., to an icy shower, a sauna, bitter-tasting medicine, or a tart scent that clears the airways), thus altering the primary mental record that determines what is beneficial to us and what is not. The fact that humans tend to avoid excessively spicy food likely stems from the experiences of past generations, for whom such food typically proved harmful.[24] This triggered a simple mechanism that generalises the convergent symptoms of potential threats to health or even life. At the same time, the gustatory and olfactory preferences of Europeans and Southeast Asians differ significantly in many instances,[25] indicating that an inclination towards specific aromas or dishes stems solely from the experiences of generations living within a specific environment. The human brain, therefore, stores a record of information comprising both the legacy of past experiences and the new ones it subsequently passes on. The role of consciousness thus appears crucial for the species' survival and development. It enables the active exploration of the environment and, ultimately (depend-

[23] Namely, in the states of light and deep subconsciousness, which are detailed further in this chapter.
[24] A. Smith, op. cit., pp. 18–34.
[25] M. Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 180–223.

ing on brain development and cognitive capacities), the modification of this environment to suit the species' needs.

Figure 4. The impact of the conscious state on establishing interaction with the environment



Source: own elaboration.

Therefore, it is worth examining the individual phases of brain function more closely regarding the process of encoding and creating human mental programming.

1) The state of unconsciousness

The average frequency of brain activity in the unconscious state fluctuates between 0.5 and 3.5–4 Hz (the delta phase).[26] Naturally, these are average values, meaning they may vary slightly between individuals; nevertheless, the specified range applies to the majority of test subjects. In this state, all vital functions are reduced to an absolute minimum, and characteristically, it is precisely then that the body regenerates most rapidly. As with the other states, it occurs an average of four times during a standard sleep cycle (7–8 hours). Consequently, this state plays no role in information processing.

[26] T. Hiltunen, J. Kantola, A. E. Abou, et al., *Infra-slow EEG fluctuations are correlat-ed with resting-state network dynamics in fMRI*, "The Journal of Neuroscience" 2014, No. 34(2), pp. 356–362; P. Walker, *Chambers dictionary of science and technology*, Edinburgh, Chambers 1999, p. 312.

2) The state of deep subconsciousness
The average frequency falls between 3.5/4 and 7/8 Hz (the theta phase), and this state is characterised by dreaming. It is during this state that the analysis, segregation, classification, and consolidation of information take place.[27] This assumption is based on the fact that no cognitive processes occur in the unconscious state, whilst light subconsciousness serves entirely different purposes. Furthermore, the occurrence of dreams (which compensate for impressions, typically gathered over the preceding few days) is accompanied by sensory stimulation in specific areas of the brain while the body remains immobilized. This suggests that the theta state serves to deeply process information initially acquired during higher-frequency states.

3) The state of light subconsciousness
The average frequency of this state is 7/8–13/14 Hz (the alpha phase); during this time, memory processes reach their highest and most durable level of efficiency.[28] It is also worth emphasising that the brain is genetically programmed to memorise all incoming environmental information, even though only a small fraction of these assimilated data points is transmitted to our conscious awareness. Knowing that this state precedes the conscious state, one can assume that memorisation in this case is more efficient than during deep subconsciousness. During daily activity, the state of consciousness and the state of light subconsciousness frequently occur alternately or simultaneously (in different areas of the brain). It is precisely during the conscious state that the brain is most focused on the active and interactive exploration of the environment, a focus that directs the memory processes occurring during light subconsciousness. This effect is subsequently reinforced by the consolidation and classification of information during the previously described state of

[27] M. P. Jensen, T. Adachi, S. Hakimian, *Brain Oscillations, Hypnosis and Hypnotizability*, "The American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis" 2015, No. 57 (3), pp. 230–253.
[28] P. Gerrard, R. Malcolm, *Mechanisms of modafinil: A review of current research*, "Neuropsychiatr Dis Treat" 2007, No. 3, pp. 349–364.

deep subconsciousness. Light subconsciousness is characteristic of the relatively brief periods of falling asleep and waking up, which generally last from a few to a dozen or so minutes[29]. This state is also inherent to hypnosis (the act of inducing a semi-sleep state), wherein the body functions in a mode of limited consciousness.[30]

4) Consciousness

The average frequency specific to this state fluctuates between 13/14 and 28/30 Hz (the beta phase).[31] This is the normal state of waking function, during which we retain full control over what is happening and our own actions (or rather, we harbour a strong internal conviction of control, which is, in essence, an illusion[32]). It is worth reiterating that this provided frequency is an average, meaning that individual areas of the brain may operate at different frequencies simultaneously. Thanks to this, we can consciously deliberate over current problems, converse with a friend, or adjust the radio or navigation system, while our brain and body smoothly enter the "automatic mode" required to drive a vehicle. Naturally, we must first learn to drive proficiently enough for the individual actions to become automatic. It is worth citing an anecdote involving the author's brother. He was once asked what the individual pedals in a car are used for, or more precisely, what the right, middle, and left pedals are used for. As a seasoned sales representative, the brother spends the majority of his life behind the wheel; nevertheless, he was unable to provide a definitive answer in a short time. Eventually, he replied that he simply gets in the car and drives. This example demonstrates the consequences of automating habits, behaviours, or complex sequences of actions, to which driving a car undoubtedly belongs. Un-

29 W. W. Hewitt, op. cit., pp. 9–18.

30 J. Hadley, C. Staudacher, *Hipnoza w psychoterapii*, Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, Sopot 2011, pp. 19–20.

31 M. Rangaswamy, B. Porjesz, D. B. Chorlian, et al., Begleiter, *Beta power in the EEG of alcoholics*, "Biological Psychology" 2002, No. 52 (8), pp. 831–842.

32 T. Griffiths, B. Christian, *Algorytmy. Kiedy mniej myśleć*, Wydawnictwo JK, Łódź 2018, pp. 17–289.

fortunately, an unwanted side effect is reduced concentration and attention, which in particularly unfavourable road conditions can sometimes lead to tragedy. In that case, unfortunately, one may suffer the consequences for the rest of one's life. This is the dark side of the brain's functioning independently of the will, over which we unfortunately have only limited control. The brain, like any "automaton," brings us many benefits, but this can also entail many risks.

5) Superconsciousness

This range of brain activity is thus far the least researched, and it would be no exaggeration to state that it functions more as a theoretical construct, predicated on more or less probable assumptions – typically derived during cause-and-effect reasoning based on observations of other states of consciousness. On the grounds of numerous scientific inquiries and considerations, one may encounter a thesis indicating that the function of this state is linked to the species' collective consciousness, i.e., a form of collective memory that enables the retention of knowledge common to a given type of living organism.[33] The existence of this kind of memory could be indicated by several experiments conducted in the past: the brain of beings belonging to the same species would allegedly transfer a specific type of information crucial for the survival or development of that species into an elusive memory space (any assumptions regarding its nature should be treated with a great deal of caution and categorised merely as speculation). Presently, the most probable explanation would point to the placement of this type of information within the memory of all representatives of a given species; however, the very mode of information transfer remains an enigma, which theoretically could even occur without direct contact. Concurrently, it is always possible that other species possess capabilities for long-distance communication that are biologically unattainable for the

[33] T. J. Anastasio, K. A. Ehrenberger, P. Watson, W. Zhang, *Individual and Collective Memory Consolidation: Analogous Processes on Different Levels*, The MIT Press, Cambridge 2012; S. Beverini, *Wprowadzenie do telepatii: praktyczny przewodnik przekazywania myśli na odległość*, Ravi, Łódź 2003, pp. 7–62.

Homo sapiens species (e.g., by emitting specific acoustic signals carried by water, or, as in the case of the robin, via magnetoreception[34]). On the other hand, numerous experiments in the field of telepathy might suggest that perhaps people in the distant past also possessed other, natural means of communication, which have been lost as a result of evolution.[35] Returning to reality, it is currently difficult to unambiguously indicate the exact scope and functions of this state. At the same time, it is worth bearing in mind that our knowledge of ourselves and the world is sometimes incomplete, and thus, in the author's opinion, there still remain many blank spots to be uncovered in almost every discipline or even field of science. Considering mathematics or physics, for instance, where new discoveries are continuously being made, delving into the quantum level has nevertheless provided a multitude of new challenges. Given that all these achievements and discoveries are limited not only to our four-dimensional space (including time[36]), they are, moreover, also limited to our solar system (and even then, only to a small extent[37]). In other words, as humanity, we are merely at the beginning of our journey, and referring to the Kardashev scale,[38] for instance, one can safely assume that many discoveries still lie ahead of us.

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[34] Magnetoreception: the ability to detect the Earth's magnetic field, which assists such birds as robins in finding their way while soaring over the ocean. A similar sense could potentially also be utilised for the transfer of information irrespective of distance (author's note), with reference to: J. Al.-Khalili, J. McFadden, *Życie na krawędzi: era kwantowej biologii*, Prószyński Media, Warszawa 2016, p. 189.

[35] K. Keuchenius, *Collective memory: scientific approach to telepathy*, UA Magazine, https://www.ua-magazine.com/collective-memory-scientific-aproach-to-telepathy/#.WplAYn_mRzk, 2.03.2018.

[36] M. Kaku, *Hiperprzestrzeń: naukowa podróż przez wszechświaty równoległe, pętle czasowe i dziesiąty wymiar*, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 1997, pp. 29–279.

[37] B. Retherford, *Suprise – Our Solar System's not like the others*, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/billretherford/2018/01/31/surprise-our-solar-systems-not-like-the-others/#545285947175, 2.03.2018.


[38] *Kardashev, Scale type I II III IV V Civilization*, Futurism, https://futurism.com/the-kardashev-scale-type-i-ii-iii-iv-v-civilization/, 2.03.2018.

3.2. Mental Programming (Coding) and Brain Function

Coding and Memory

The human brain resembles a computer, within whose memory all the information we are born with is stored, alongside that which will be "recorded" throughout our lives. The process of actively acquiring information takes place in the conscious state, that is, when an individual interacts with their environment. Conversely, the processing of this information occurs during the average brain activity frequency specific to the state of subconsciousness (both light and deep).[39]

Figure 5. Information processing in the conscious and subconscious states



Source: own elaboration.

In this manner, a knowledge repository is created, and new algorithms are generated for all vital processes, including further cognitive functions serving to process new information acquired both actively and passively from the environment. It is evident that each individual is born with codes regulating normal bodily functions (such as respiration, blood pressure, and internal organ temperature); simultaneously, however, codes are formed as a result of the body functioning within a terrestrial environment (such as regulating balance during stillness and physical activity in relation to numerous factors, including gravity, terrain type, humidity, wind, and temperature[40]). Consequently, even such fundamental codes

[39] *Mózg, fascynujący automat. Magia Nieświadomości*, Sonja Wesolowski, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7QFRZhyIB4, 29.07.2017.
[40] A. Smith, op. cit., pp. 70–118.

are formed entirely independently of consciousness. One need only recall the process of learning to walk in young children, or even in adults following a stroke.[41] At the conscious level, one only knows they wish to walk like those around them; however, the programming (coding) process occurs entirely beyond conscious awareness, let alone volition.

In other words, new algorithms are added to those present at birth, actively expanding functional capabilities that do not require conscious involvement; an example of this is the frequently mentioned skill of driving a car or performing any task that necessitates the almost mechanical repetition of the same sequence of actions.[42] The same applies to specific ways of interpreting information in our direct and indirect surroundings, comprehending reality and events, or judging other people, animals, and objects "at first glance".

Memory itself and its functioning are also the result of evolution, and the memory process consists of three phases:[43]

- sensory memory,
- short-term memory,
- long-term memory.

Naturally, the three aforementioned forms of memorisation pertain to information directly accessible from the conscious level. In other words, this constitutes information that our mind has deemed sufficiently important to warrant uninterrupted access. Therefore, the golden rule of memory processes is their successive repetition, which entails stimulating the brain to update access at the conscious level. Unfortunately, our mind (the software) may also conclude that certain information is not merely superfluous but actively harmful (based on unknown algorithms or codes it has generated itself). Such data may include various traumatic memories which, according to the mind, pose a threat to normal, effective functioning, and

41 M. J. Kacperska, *Udar niedokrwienny, udar krwotoczny – rehabilitacja*, Forum Neu-rologiczne, http://www.forumneurologiczne.pl/artykul/udar-niedokrwienny-udar-krwo-toczny-rehabilitacja/13281, 2.03.2018.

42 M. J. Warij, op. cit., pp. 211–219.

43 A. Smith, op. cit., pp. 169–179.

consequently to life and development. History documents many such cases involving individuals injured in accidents, wounded during combat, or subjected to adverse childhood experiences. In such instances, the mind simply blocks conscious access to these data. However, because information cannot be erased, it remains stored in our memory without the involvement of consciousness.[44] Consequently, this does not preclude the possibility of traumatic scenes resurfacing during sleep (deep subconsciousness) or of incomprehensible reactions to various stimuli (images, sounds) during states of reverie (light subconsciousness).[45] On the other hand, by employing methods that deliberately lower the frequency of brain activity to levels characteristic of subconscious states (light or deep), it is possible to access these memories that are seemingly non-existent to consciousness. This indicates that they were, in fact, never erased.[46]

The brain evolved to prevent interference between the conscious and subconscious states. In other words, this acts as a distinct safeguard mechanism against "unauthorised" interference. At the same time, the ability to at least partially "descend" into lower states while remaining somewhat conscious (e.g., through meditation or hypnosis) permits limited interference.[47] It is currently difficult to determine whether this is an intentional design or an evolutionary imperfection. Regardless of the underlying reasons, this possibility certainly exists, although the potential extent of this interference remains unknown (modifying the codes responsible for specific phobias is quite different from altering the codes governing heart rate or respiration, for example). In one of his books, Richard Bandler cited the example of a young woman who, whilst under hypnosis, altered

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44 M. Gawinecka, I. Łucka, A. Cebella, *Pamięć zdarzeń traumatycznych*, „Via Medica" 2008, vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 65–69.

45 *Klasyfikacja zaburzeń psychicznych i zaburzeń zachowania w ICD-10*, Kraków–Warszawa: Uniwersyteckie Wydawnictwo Medyczne „Vesalius", 1998, pp. 96–97.

46 J. Hadley, C. Staudacher, op. cit., pp. 21–67, 248–279.

47 J. Krawczyk, *Fale mózgowe – na jakich obrotach działa twój mózg?*, Zdrowie, Gazeta.pl, http://zdrowie.gazeta.pl/Zdrowie/56,105912,12572873,Fale_mozgowe na_ jakich_obrotach_dziala_twoj_mozg_.html, 28.09.2012.

her visual perception (the functioning of her sense of sight), enabling her to observe her surroundings in slow motion. Regardless of how firmly that person believed in the authenticity of that sensation, they were in fact able to anticipate the movements of the man who put them through the relevant test by a considerable margin.[48] At the same time, it is worth considering not only the benefits but also the risks associated with this type of interference, which affects a sphere of brain function theoretically intended to remain inaccessible from the conscious level.

3.3. The Applicability of Codes to Forecasting

The overview of research presented above regarding the patterns that determine modes of perception, thinking, behaviour, and even emotional reactions leaves one somewhat unsatisfied. The aforementioned patterns, termed codes by Hofstede and values by other anthropologists, do not fully meet the needs of forecasting that relies on replicating the decision-making process as faithfully to the original as possible. At the very least, this replication must be close enough to ensure that the formulated forecasts possess an adequately high accuracy rate. On the other hand, even the patterns, codes, and values developed thus far enable the construction of forecasts for the near future that, whilst broad, remain verifiable to some extent. This is particularly true when juxtaposed with a separately developed psychological profile of individual decision-makers and those in their entourage who exert a direct influence on the final outcome of a decision (individual codes). How, then, might this work in practice? It is worth noting here that if people raised in a given culture exhibit specific behaviours towards one another, they will most likely exhibit the same behaviours when making decisions regarding relations between societies. It would indeed be peculiar if they acted in accordance with entirely different patterns, codes, or

[48] R. Bandler, *Transformacja: hipnoza dla każdego*, Wydawnictwo Helion, Gliwice 2010.

values, considering that, as Hofstede posited, everyone possesses only one set of "Mental programming". Hence, by analogy, one can identify similarities between these codes and the decision-making process executed by decision-makers representing their respective societies on the international stage. Presented below are interpretations of the codes that draw on the terminology proposed by G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall. The difference lies in the selective understanding adopted for the purposes of this research, which on the one hand incorporates the research findings of the aforementioned scholars, but on the other, utilises them within a cultural context uniquely tailored by the author for forecasting purposes.

High and Low Context

As previously mentioned, Edward T. Hall developed only one dimension with two extreme values: low context and high context. Originally, this dimension characterised modes of interpersonal communication within a given social group. Over time, however, through deductive reasoning, it expanded to immense definitional proportions, becoming synonymous not only with a specific style of human communication but also with a broader worldview. Hall classified Western European, American, and Canadian cultures as low-context cultures, whilst East Asian and Arab societies were categorised as high-context. In light of the interpretation presented below, it is worth reiterating that high-context cultures perceive the world comprehensively, whereas low-context cultures view it solely through the lens of their own observations and experiences, which frequently leads to errors in the perception and interpretation of observed phenomena.[49]

The value defined as high or low context (which, in the author's personal conviction, would require the development of significantly more detailed research tools and a more precise specification of this value in relation to the actual message content) could manifest itself in the seemingly vague drafting of various documents defining foreign

[49] E. T. Hall, *Poza kulturą*, PWN, Warszawa 1984, pp. 125–146.

policy, as well as in media appearances. By employing these tools and juxtaposing them with other values, it would be possible to extract concrete information from this seemingly opaque content. Concurrently, high-context societies will likely perceive both their immediate and distant environment as a single, interconnected whole. Thus, they will plan their own actions by anticipating not only immediate (short-term) consequences but also distant (long-term) ones. Conversely, low-context societies are unlikely to consider the far-reaching consequences of their decisions, focusing solely on those effects that may impact them positively or negatively in the short term. In other words, low-context societies residing in Europe will not be overly concerned with events in Asia or South America. High-context societies (such as the Japanese), on the other hand, may consider the impact of long-term investment in technological development not only in Asia but prospectively also in Europe or even Africa.

Application of the code for international forecasting: For the purposes of this research, the author has adopted an understanding of High/Low Context as a specific perspective on perceiving reality:

- **High Context: comprehensively (on the scale of at least an entire region, and presently, the world);**
- **Low Context: selectively, that is, restricted solely to one's immediate international environment.**

In conjunction with Long-Term and Short-Term Orientation and the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's actions, high context can lead to the formulation of accurate forecasts, whereas low context, despite a Long-Term Orientation, can lead to erroneous conclusions in the international decision-making process. In characterising this code, the author has not factored in interpersonal communication styles, but solely the aforementioned perspective; this has consequently led to assigning specific values to the societies (cultural spheres) under examination in a manner that frequently differs from Hall's assignments.

High and Low Power Distance

The High/Low Power Distance concept can be interpreted as viewing states as a kind of jigsaw puzzle of international interdependencies, in which individual societies occupy a certain position or function within specific groups. At the same time, this adopted worldview determines how a state shapes its foreign policy, either expecting support from weaker states on a partnership basis, or demanding blind obedience. Concurrently, a state with High Power Distance will perceive nations allied with other strong states merely as components of the global or regional security architecture and as tools for achieving the international objectives of those very powers. In accordance with such perception, a given state will shape its international policy by, for instance, avoiding conflict with such a "cluster of states" led by a specific power, assuming (perhaps mistakenly) that the power will defend these states as its "assets". From the perspective of a power with Low Power Distance, however, the situation may appear entirely different. Employing its own perception, it might even assume that an attack on a weaker "ally" of a power with High Power Distance will not be interpreted as an indirect attack on that power itself.

Application of the code for international forecasting: In light of the above, the author has determined that Power Distance defines the perspective adopted by certain societies towards others, based on their mutual position within the international structure. This serves as a natural reflection of interpersonal relations applied to the level of interstate relations.

Individualism and Collectivism

Individualism can easily be translated into a state's tendency to act independently on the international stage, whereas Collectivism translates into a drive to operate within a group of states. A similar dynamic applies to the perception of alliances; for individualistic societies, these will take the form of cooperation agreements based

on partnership, aimed at achieving a specific goal (even a long-term one). Collectivistic societies, on the other hand, will likely strive to create pacts and configurations composed of international entities that are ostensibly meant to operate and function jointly, consolidating over time and strengthening mutual relations.

Applying the code for international forecasting: Individualism/Collectivism can be used to determine a given society's propensity for independent or collective action in the international arena. Regarding Collectivism, this does not denote a temporary inclination arising from immediate needs (e.g., forming an alliance to achieve a common goal), but rather a persistent tendency to establish lasting cooperation with other states, alongside a drive to evolve such collaboration towards the creation of joint organisational structures.

NATO exemplifies an organisation existing primarily to ensure the security of its members, whereas the European Union is a decidedly more collectivistic entity, similar to the former Warsaw Pact or contemporary ASEAN. What renders a given formula of cooperation collectivistic is not solely its duration, but also its evolution towards progressively curtailing individual autonomy in favour of a joint organisation. Depending on the influence of other cultural values (such as masculinity), some states will be content merely participating in building the organisation, whilst others will additionally seek to assume a leading role within it (e.g., the Russians, the Chinese).

Masculinity and Femininity

An interesting code is masculinity and femininity, where masculine societies can be interpreted as competitive towards others, and thus prone to exhibiting aggressive behaviour and relentlessly pursuing their own goals, even at the expense of other societies. Cultures with a preponderance of feminine traits, on the other hand, should be recognised for their preference for peaceful solutions, resorting to violence only in the last resort, whilst continuously striving to build

and develop a peaceful and stable international environment. If one were to compare the United States, Russia, China, Canada, Sweden, or Norway, these traits would become abundantly clear.

Applying the code for international forecasting: In light of the above, for the purposes of international forecasting, the author has adopted an understanding of masculinity as a value reflecting a propensity for leadership, competition, and force-based solutions. Femininity, in turn, is a value that prioritises non-violent solutions and peaceful coexistence geared towards achieving mutual benefits.

Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty Avoidance signifies steering clear of any risky situations, a tendency that can be easily observed in the foreign policy of individual societies, even over the past decade. Whilst some societies prefer to avoid unnecessary risk and gradually build their position (achieve their goals), there are also those that, conversely, express a readiness to undertake risky actions, provided they can achieve their objectives more quickly and easily (even at the risk of failure).

Applying the code for international forecasting:

With reference to international forecasting, the author has assigned the following meaning to this code:

- **high Uncertainty Avoidance: a drive to enter uncertain situations, provided the risk incurred can yield tangible benefits;**
- **low Uncertainty Avoidance: avoiding risky situations; a tendency towards the slow but stable achievement of established goals.**

Long-Term and Short-Term Orientation

These are two extreme values that are quite clearly visible in the domestic and foreign policies of individual societies. Some set themselves ambitious, almost generational goals and consistently pursue them step by step. There are also societies that likewise possess ambi-

tious plans, yet are only capable of realistically planning with a perspective of merely a few, or at most a dozen or so, years. China is an example of a state with an exceptionally long-term perspective. Plans adopted for implementation in the Middle Kingdom frequently span several decades, and some (such as the transition from a pictorial to an alphabetic writing system) even several centuries. Naturally, in the case of such far-reaching plans, only the immediate stages are detailed, while the remainder of the plan takes the form of objectives to be executed within a more or less fluid timeframe. Over time, however, these objectives accrue detail and substantive content, which are subsequently implemented successively. However, because the Chinese are also a high-context society, regardless of the objectives being executed step by step, a media narrative is constructed around them that diminishes certain elements of the executed plan whilst exaggerating others, rendering the media message not entirely truthful. Ultimately, however, the plan is always implemented, even if delayed. At the other end of the spectrum are the societies of African states, which unfortunately are emerging from the vicious circle of the "Third World" much more slowly than Asian states (even though they started from a similar level several decades ago). Naturally, this is not the result of merely a single value, but of the totality of patterns, historical legacies, traditions, and the differing policies of the states of the wealthy North towards specific regions of the world. On the other hand, had African societies been raised in a culture of work and the continuous growth of national income, many of them would undoubtedly be functioning in a different economic reality today.

Applying the code to international forecasting: Long-Term Orientation signifies the capacity for long-term future planning, the realistic setting of goals for implementation (even for subsequent generations), and consequently, the ability to accurately anticipate the consequences of one's actions. Analogously, Short-Term Orientation constitutes the negation of the aforementioned value. It is in this sense that it has been adapted for international forecasting.

3.4. Conclusions

For the individual cultural codes developed by G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall, an authorial, narrowed (profiled), and modified interpretation compared to the original was adopted; this was dictated by the intention to use the established codes (their definitional scope), if only to a limited extent, within the process of cultural forecasting. Concurrently, **an unambiguous understanding of a "code" was adopted as a pattern determining human functioning (including the decision-making process), and of a "code value" as a unit of measurement for a given code**. The interpretation of the individual codes was presented in subsection 3.3 in bold print beneath the characterisation dedicated to each discussed code. In summary, **the direct application of the patterns, values, and codes developed by the aforementioned scholars proved highly limited due to excessively elaborate definitions (specific to the individual codes). Only following the application of the aforementioned narrowing interpretation did it prove possible to use the above-listed codes in forecasting threats to national and international security.** Thus, the hypothesis assigned to the first specific problem **was verified positively**, as the conducted research indicated that the previously developed interpretation of cultural codes can be partially applied. Nevertheless, owing to the different research direction adopted by the author, it was necessary to propose an authorial interpretation allowing for the complementary application of the adopted scope of understanding of codes in the further research process regarding the effectiveness of cultural forecasting in anticipating threats to national and international security.

CHAPTER IV

The Decision-Making Process in the Realm of National and International Security: Individual Versus Cultural Patterns

This chapter is dedicated to research that has not previously been the subject of interest for academic circles associated with the social sciences. The author's objective was to determine the approximate scope of the influence of cultural codes (with values established during previous research) on the decision-making process over a period of at least one hundred years. Given the limitations due to the impossibility of meticulously examining all decisions regarding the foreign policy of the selected societies over such a long period, only those fragments of the history of the examined societies deemed most important by the author were selected.[1] The study utilised the results obtained by Geert Hofstede, Edward T. Hall, and Michael H. Bond in a narrowed formula, allowing for a broad approximation of any potential correlation occurring between Cultural codes and Individual codes in the Decision-making process. Such a broad treatment of the research subject was intended to demonstrate the prevailing relationship of dependency within the mutually intertwining foreign policies of the examined societies. For the purposes of the research, an interpretation of cultural codes profiled by the au-

[1] Those of strategic importance for the existence and trajectory of development of the examined society, typically associated with the drive to achieve goals arising directly from the national interests specific to that society.

thor was employed,[2] enabling the execution of the aforementioned study in relation to the realities of international relations concerning both regional and global security.

The societies subjected to examination included:

- United Kingdom,
- France,
- Germany,
- Russia,
- Poland,
- China,
- Japan,
- India,
- Libya,
- Egypt.

4.1. The Influence Of Cultural Codes on the Decision-Making Process of the Examined Societies

Each subsection is dedicated to one of the ten examined societies and contains information regarding the values of cultural codes (according to Hofstede, Bond, and Hall), a historical description, and an analysis (presented in tabular form) of the correspondence between ten key decisions (selected from the aforementioned historical section) and the cultural codes profiled by the author.[3]

United Kingdom

The table below indicates that British decision-makers do not attach particular importance to the position a given state occupies within the international hierarchy. On the one hand, this means they treat all other states equally, irrespective of their potential. On the other, they are strongly focused solely on achieving the subjective goals of their

[2] See: Chapter III.
[3] See: ibidem.

own state, treating any alliances and coalitions as being formed for the sake of ad hoc objectives that they are unable to achieve independently (or where the cost of achieving these goals is too high). From this, it follows that they do not perceive reality comprehensively and in the long term; therefore, they are incapable of both planning and anticipating the consequences of their actions over a perspective of several decades. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that their policy will always be marked by a limited perspective (restricted to a specific place and time), and thus, to some extent, determined by specific factors without accounting for the broader (global) context.

Table 6. Cultural Code Values: United Kingdom

High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
Low	3.5	IND:9	MAS:7	3.5	5

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

An example of this is the collapse of the British Empire's maritime power, which for several centuries relied solely on a predatory economic policy towards much weaker colonies (without long-term investment in their development, which would have created increasingly robust interdependencies with the Crown that were difficult to sever). In other words, the awareness and potential of the colonists gradually increased, while London contented itself with imposing new burdens and gave no thought to investing in its own capabilities to maintain absolute control over the dependent territories. Given the colonists' growing dissatisfaction with their treatment by British authorities, conflict was merely a matter of time: precisely until the colonies' potential grew to a level that enabled them to challenge the Crown.[4] The fall of London's maritime and colonial supremacy was not the result of a surprising historical twist or an accumulation of numerous unfavourable factors for the Crown, but rather the natural

[4] N. Ferguson, *Empire, The rise and demise of the British world order and the lessons for global power*, Basic Books, 2004, pp. 245–304.

consequence of pursuing this particular policy towards territories exploited for centuries. The numerous independence uprisings that had previously occurred in Ireland and Scotland were also not the product of "strange coincidences", but rather the consequence of the same policy.[5] The difference was that, due to their geographical proximity, it was much easier to control those territories while far more effectively manipulating internal disputes. The colonies, however, were located at such a distance from the centre of British power that the colonists themselves could gradually increase their strength without excessive interference from London. Turning to contemporary times, the same codes can also explain Brexit,[6] which will certainly not be economically viable over the next few decades, leaving the United Kingdom increasingly sidelined in the regional (European) and, eventually, global economy. The author believes that Brexit (if it indeed comes to fruition) should not last longer than two decades, after which the United Kingdom will begin to seek readmission into the European community of nations.

Examining the codes, the British are simultaneously prepared to pursue an active, and indeed aggressive, policy towards other states while remaining averse to taking any risks. This trait might have also influenced the Crown's policy towards the colonies, where there was perhaps a fear of introducing any major changes, resulting in a contentment with the existing state of mutual economic relations. In other words, based on the above results, it can be assumed that the British favour a cautious, balanced policy towards other states. Their orientation appears to be medium-term, meaning they have the capacity to effectively plan their objectives over a timeframe of at least

[5] K. Block, J. Shaw, *Subjects Without an Empire: The Irish in the Early Modern Caribbean*, Past & Present 2011, pp. 33–60; H. McD. Beckles, *A „riotous and unruly lot": Irish Indentured Servants and Freemen in the English West Indies, 1644–1713*, William & Mary Quarterly 1990, pp. 503–545; J. P. Rodriguez, *The historical encyclopedia of world slavery*, 1. A–K. ABC-CLIO, 1997, pp. 368–380.

[6] *Brytyjczycy zdecydowali. Wielka Brytania wychodzi z Unii Europejskiej*, "Wprost", https://www.wprost.pl/swiat/10012293/Referendum-ws-Brexitu-Ponad-17-mln-wyborcow-za-wyjsciem-Wielkiej-Brytanii-z-UE.html, 24.06.2017.

ten years. By contrast, European states with a Short-Term Orientation are typically capable of effectively pursuing their goals over a period of up to five years. At least, this is the conclusion drawn from observations of the policies of individual states to date, which will be discussed in detail below.

Given that the strategically vital decisions made on behalf of the United Kingdom over the last hundred years have never been solely the result of an individual's decision-making codes, but rather the resultant combination of the codes of multiple individuals raised within British culture, it is reasonable to assume that decisions made and executed collectively in this manner provided a certain reflection of cultural codes. London's main concern at the beginning of the 20th century was maintaining and expanding overseas markets for its goods, the production of which was steadily increasing due to the accelerating Industrial Revolution.[7] The United Kingdom's efforts thus concentrated on economic expansion in Africa, Asia, and Oceania.[8] In other words, in countries where it was still feasible to conduct a near-colonial, exploitative policy. For obvious reasons, North America, Australia, and even South America were not considered regions of interest in this regard; this is because they required substantially more political and financial outlays and efforts than the far poorer and less developed regions comprising the economic periphery of the world at the time. Concurrently, this example demonstrates that decision-makers in London failed to learn any lessons from past experiences, such as the founding of the United States. In the 20th century, a new player emerged, eager for its own overseas territories: the Second Reich.[9] While English decision-makers were able to reach an agreement with their French partners regarding colonial spheres of influence, they were entirely unable to reach an understanding with their German counterparts. With reference to cul-

[7] D. McLean, *Finance and „Informal Empire" before the First World War*, Economic History Review 1976, pp. 291–305.
[8] B. Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism*, Cambridge University Press, Cam-bridge 2004, pp. 1–44.
[9] H.-U. Wehler, *The German Empire 1871–1918*, 1985, pp. 146–157.

tural codes, it can be assumed that the English were inclined towards forceful solutions provided they constituted an optimal outcome and, at the same time, did not involve excessively high risk. Therefore, unlike German decision-makers, the English avoided entering into conflict situations. This conciliatory approach, in turn, encouraged the Germans to adopt increasingly aggressive policies, as they interpreted British mildness as a sign of weakness to be ruthlessly exploited. In other words, had London's policy been more resolute at the time, history might have taken a slightly different course (or the Great War would have broken out later). The interactions between individual states, triggered by the influence of these codes, were also significant. Since each state will be discussed separately, this section (devoted to the English decision-making process) will merely include subtle digressions regarding other nations, without delving too deeply into the essence of these marginally presented relations.

A crucial decision was the conclusion of the *Entente Cordiale* (French: "cordial agreement") with France in 1904, which Russia also joined in 1907.[10] Reaching an understanding with its historic rival in Paris was the only logical recourse for London, given its inability to reach an agreement with an increasingly aggressive Germany. To make matters worse, Prussia had established cooperation with Austria-Hungary and Italy.[11] It should be emphasised once again that the objective of London's policy was to mitigate the risk of war breaking out by establishing a balance of power, which was supposed to preclude any potential conflict that would be excessively risky for all parties.[12] This cautious and conservative approach, as history has since shown, proved misguided, yet simultaneously aligned with the cultural codes of the English. The formation of the economically far superior Triple Entente essentially backed Berlin into a corner, bringing the situation to a knife-

[10] C. J. Lowe, M. L. Dockrill, *The Mirage of Power*, vol. 1, British Foreign Policy 1902–14, 1972, pp. 1–28.
[11] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918*, Oxford University Press 1971, pp. 325–568.
[12] M. E. Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica? British Foreign Policy* 1789–1914, Routledge, 2014, pp. 88–95.

edge. Germany was compelled to launch an attack while it still had any prospect of snatching its own slice of the overseas pie. Otherwise, it would have had to concede, fully aware that over the years, the combined potential of Great Britain, France, and Russia would inevitably grow, increasingly marginalising the capabilities of Berlin and its allies. At least, this was how it appeared to all the parties involved at the time. This illustrates the collision of two distinct perspectives on the same situation, which in London's view was meant to keep a "chaotic and aggressive" Berlin in check, with no one in London even contemplating an attack on Germany. Conversely, it was precisely this excessive pressuring of the Second Reich that became the direct catalyst for the outbreak of war. It should follow from these same codes that even in the event of a conflict, the United Kingdom would wage war cautiously, refraining from overexploiting its own resources, and striving instead to secure a positional and, eventually, a strategic advantage, rather than annihilating the adversary. History has demonstrated that this is exactly what occurred. The result was devastating trench warfare.[13] Looking at the United Kingdom's involvement during the subsequent Second World War, this approach remained largely unchanged, relying more on defence than on conducting proactive or offensive operations until it received substantial support and the economic and military potential of Germany was gradually eroded. Returning, however, to the period of the Great War, it is also worth noting the social changes occurring on the European continent at the time.

At the beginning of 1914, alongside the rise of nationalist sentiment and the propaganda promoted in the contemporary media directed against opposing blocs of states, society increasingly identified with the state it inhabited. Citizens felt not only a sense of belonging but also pride in the growing power of their own states, as well as resentment or even hatred towards opposing nations.[14]

[13] P. S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe*, Routledge, London 2001, pp. 185–186.

[14] J. P. Newman, *Nationalism*, [in:] *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/nationalism, 23.02.2017.

In other words, public sentiment exerted an increasing influence on the policy direction of European states, causing the impact of cultural codes shared by a given community to grow relative to the individual codes of a narrow group of decision-makers (monarchs and their immediate inner circle). The First World War ceased to be merely a clash of ruling dynasties and became a genuine international conflict.[15] Interestingly, the initial clashes during the new war initiated in 1914 did not take place in Europe, but rather on the colonial periphery of the contemporary world: in Africa and the Pacific. Within a matter of mere months, the forces of the Triple Entente (predominantly British and French) seized control of territories previously held by the Germans.[16] Only later did Europe become the main theatre of military operations, where the United Kingdom provided substantial support to France, fearing that if Paris fell, the balance of power would be definitively shattered. Indeed, until 1917, when the United States entered the war, it was primarily the British and French forces that resisted the forces of the Triple Alliance on the Western Front.

The conclusion of the war and its political consequences are significant. The United Kingdom was primarily interested in achieving two objectives:

- maintaining the balance of power in Europe, preventing the destruction of Germany, while simultaneously severely restricting the possibility of a rapid reconstruction of the German sphere of influence;
- assuming control, alongside France, of the overseas territories that had intrinsically been the primary source of the conflict.

London's logic, in the light of cultural codes –particularly the Short-Term Orientation –appears highly transparent. On the one hand, new states emerged which, in the United Kingdom's view, precluded the reconstruction of the German empire, while concurrently

[15] T. Aronson, *Zwaśnieni monarchowie: tryumf i tragedia europejskich monarchii w latach 1910–1918*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 1998, p. 114, 118.
[16] J. Pajewski, *Historia powszechna 1871–1918*, PWN, Warszawa 1978, p. 385.

not ruling out the possibility of rebuilding a relatively strong Germany in the more distant future. Ultimately, this occurred much sooner, partly as a result of a complacent approach towards the socio-economic changes taking place in post-war Germany.[17] The complete disregard for the victory of the communist revolution in Russia was also crucial; this was initially interpreted as a favourable circumstance that would limit the prospects for rebuilding the power of the Russian Empire.[18] Equally important was the takeover of a substantial portion of former German colonies, which, from the British perspective, were deemed essential for rapid economic development. In this instance, the accelerating socio-cultural changes were completely ignored, despite the fact that they were causing both the status of the former colonies and the Crown's influence to undergo a slow but inevitable decline. In other words, London ended the First World War convinced that it had secured an almost absolute victory and a guarantee of peace and prosperity for at least the next few decades. It took just twenty years to painfully demonstrate the fragility and short-sightedness of these overly optimistic assumptions. A reluctance to interfere excessively in the affairs of other states and a complacency derived from achieving immediate gains were among the principal factors shaping the British perspective on international affairs after the First World War. To a certain extent, the interwar period also abounded in instances that corroborated the pre-existing assumptions regarding the cultural codes of the English.

This primarily concerned the lenient approach towards Germany, which, following the lost war, paid significantly lower sums than originally agreed.[19] For example, in 1924, instead of 1 billion marks, Germany repaid a mere 200 million, receiving the remaining 800 million in the form of a US loan. As a result of Washington's gener-

[17] R. J. Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*, The Penguin Press, New York 2003, pp. 155–441.
[18] N. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, Oxford University Press 1984, pp. 455––456.
[19] S. Marks, *The Myths of Reparations*, „Central European History" 1978, No. 11 (3).

ous policy, between 1924 and 1930, Berlin repaid 11 billion marks while simultaneously securing 25 billion– the funds obtained from Germany flowed to England and France, which in turn repaid the loans they had contracted from the United States during the war. Consequently, Washington facilitated a monetary circulation that enabled Germany to rapidly rebuild its position, or – to put it bluntly – financed this reconstruction. Ultimately, the American creditors were never fully repaid by any of the parties. Within just a few years of the armistice, the balance of power between Germany and France began to gradually level out, eventually tilting in Berlin's favour. All of this occurred with the more or less official acquiescence (and even backing) of Great Britain, which was thereby implementing its policy of maintaining a balance of power on the European continent. It was also erroneously still assuming that, bereft of overseas territories, Germany would never manage to regain its pre-First World War economic potential. In this light, London's lack of reaction to the progressive rearmament of Germany in the 1930s and the emergence of the Third Reich is hardly surprising.[20]

Following the invasion of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union, the Second World War began. The "Phoney War" waged by London and Paris is, regrettably, yet another[21] bleak example of the operation of codes determining, on the one hand, extreme caution, and on the other, short-sightedness in planning and foreseeing the consequences of one's own actions (or lack thereof) on the international stage. At the same time, however, intensive naval operations were underway. It was not until after Hitler's successful invasion of France that the British side began to take significant action. By then, decision-makers in London must have clearly realised that the balance of power had been unequivocally disrupted, thereby placing the United Kingdom in jeopardy. The ultimate victors of the last world war were two states: the United States and the Soviet Union.

[20] A. Marwick, *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War*, W. W. Norton & Co Inc. 1970.

[21] J. Karski, *Wielkie mocarstwa wobec Polski: 1919–1945. Od Wersalu do Jałty*, PIW, Warszawa 1992, pp. 316–317.

The United Kingdom ultimately lost its great power status.[22] A new era known as the Cold War began, during which English decision-makers became heavily involved in constructing a pan-European international structure designed to guarantee the United Kingdom's security and, in due course, an adequately high economic potential.[23] This might have been considered a manifestation of long-term planning, had Brexit not occurred in the meantime, demonstrating that London's objectives were not only short-term but also devoid of any broader context and perspective.[24]

In conclusion, one might lean towards the thesis that the British Empire was the product of favourable circumstances, such as its island geography and the ensuing possession of a well-developed fleet and maritime traditions. The opportunity was seized to "colonise" civilisationally or technologically less developed nations by imposing authority, establishing an economic and military structure, and subsequently exploiting them ruthlessly without any long-term strategy for the occupied territories. As circumstances began to alter, the "Empire on which the sun never sets" started to gradually shrink until it became just one of the European states; over time, the United Kingdom's position will likely undergo further devaluation. An exception could arise if, through a confluence of international forces, London proves sufficiently indispensable to warrant safeguarding its robust position. For the same reason, one may assume that the United Kingdom will return to the concept of the European community as soon as the symptoms of a deteriorating economic, and consequently social, situation become increasingly apparent.

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22 A. Sked, Ch. Cook, *Post-War Britain: A Political History*, The Penguin Press, 1979.

23 H. Kissinger, *Dyplomacja*, Philip Wilson, Warsaw 1996, pp. 461–515.

24 *Brytyjczycy zdecydowali. Wielka Brytania wychodzi z Unii Europejskiej*, "Wprost", https://www.wprost.pl/swiat/10012293/Referendum-ws-Brexitu-Ponad-17-mln-wyborcow-za-wyjsciem-Wielkiej-Brytanii-z-UE.html, 24 June 2017.

Table 7. The British decision-making process determined by specific cultural code values

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	LUA	STO	LC
A policy aimed at the exploitation of regions that were highly underdeveloped at the time, yet without investing in the development of overseas colonies or consolidating its own position in these parts of the world.		x	x		x	x
A policy of resolving disputes through negotiation and avoiding conflicts with other powerful states.	x		x		x	x
The balance of power policy aimed at offsetting Germany's aggressive policy prior to the First World War.	x		x		x	x
A cautious approach to warfare during the First World War.	x		x		x	x
A short-term perspective regarding the objectives adopted for implementation after the end of the First World War: a positive and conciliatory attitude towards a Germany rebuilding its power and imperial aspirations.	x		x		x	x
Non-involvement in the European conflict following the Third Reich's invasion of Poland, despite an official declaration of war.	x		x		x	x
Full-scale entry into the war only took place after Hitler's invasion of France, the collapse of the policy of balance of power, and the emergence of a direct threat to the United Kingdom.	x		x		x	x
Active participation in constructing the structures of the European community after the Second World War, driven by immediate interests resulting from the pursuit of security and a strong economic position.	x		x		x	x
During the Cold War, rivalry with Paris for supremacy in Europe and working with Washington to maximise profits at the expense of the communal benefits.	x		x		x	x
Brexit	x		x		x	x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning the United Kingdom's international relations: 53%.

France

The research results of G. Hofstede and his team indicate that the cultural values of the French differ significantly from those of the English. First, the French are characterised by a relatively high Pow-

er Distance and a predominance of feminine traits over masculine ones (naturally, in relation to G. Hofstede's definition of this value). Simultaneously, they ought to demonstrate an extremely high level of Uncertainty Avoidance in their actions, which, coupled with the aforementioned drive to avoid confrontation, calls the veracity of these findings into question in the light of France's conflict-ridden history. Interestingly, the French level of Short-Term and Long-Term Orientation is comparable to that adopted for the English, which may suggest that they will be similarly incapable of planning or foreseeing the consequences of their actions in the longer term. Conversely, a high level of Individualism suggests that, much like the British, the inhabitants of the country on the Seine rely more on themselves than on cooperative efforts with other states. Indeed, the only element that might suggest a patronising approach, and thus the imposition of demands on weaker states, is a correspondingly high Power Distance. On the other hand, the preponderance of feminine traits may nevertheless suggest a pursuit of compromise and peaceful coexistence. Given that codes evolve continuously and must have undergone innumerable modifications over the course of several centuries, examining the period of the last hundred years should permit a fairly general, albeit approximate, verification of these codes.

Table 8. Cultural code values: France

Cultural codes: France					
High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
Low/High	7	IND:7	MAS: 4	9	6

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

It would be no great exaggeration to assume that the history of France was somewhat more varied than that of Great Britain. Both countries possessed numerous colonies and had waged more or less devastating wars against each other for centuries. How-

ever, it was France that was swept by the all-consuming force of the Great French Revolution, which accelerated subsequent social changes throughout Europe.[25] Although the revolution collapsed, extinguished by one of its own sons (which Napoleon Bonaparte undoubtedly was[26]), its ideas survived and continued to evolve thanks to the contemporary development of the press.[27] It is worth mentioning this to note that changes in the cultural codes of the French occurred somewhat more dynamically over the last two centuries than among the English, Welsh, or Scots. Paris's policy prior to the First World War shared similar premises with London's policy: to preserve a strong international position by maintaining overseas territories that guaranteed markets and, thereby, further economic development.[28] Similarly, in the face of mounting pressure from a strengthening Second Reich, which was eyeing the territories controlled by the English and the French, an alliance between these two competing powers was easy to foresee.[29] One might note another element here: the potential impact of a high Power Distance on the automatic recognition of London as an equal partner, in contrast to other states (such as a reborn Poland, which was treated somewhat patronisingly and rather as a pawn in Paris's strategic game designed to maintain influence in this part of Europe).[30] Furthermore, French foreign policy relied, on the one hand, on a global balance of power

[25] W. Markov, A. Soboul, *Wielka Rewolucja Francuzów*, Wydawnictwo Ossolineum, Warszawa 1984, pp. 97–102.

[26] P. Gueniffey, *Bonaparte: 1769–1802*, Harvard UP 2015, pp. 137–159; D. King, *Wiedeń 1814: Jak pogromcy Napoleona, bawiąc się, ustalali nowy kształt Europy*, Dom Wydawniczy "Rebis", Poznań 2009, p. 134.

[27] B. Łagowski, *O rewolucji – źle i dobrze*, "Newsweek", http://www.newsweek.pl/eu-ropa/o-rewolucji---zle-i-dobrze,45926,1,1.html, 18.09.2009; M. Bradley, *Scientific Education for a New Society: The Ecole Polytechnique 1795–1830*, "History of Education" 1976, pp. 11–24.

[28] T. Zeldin, *France*, 1848–1945 (1977), vol. 2, pp. 983–1040.

[29] E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1890–1914*, Stanford University Press 1976, pp. 377–482.

[30] J. Blatt, *The French Defeat of 1940*, Berghahn Books, Oxford 1998; R. A. Doughty, *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940*, Stackpole Books 2014, pp. 1–27.

to guarantee relative peace (similar to London), but on the other hand, it also sought to counterbalance any potential British influence on the continent.[31] The principal rationale for concluding an alliance with London, and subsequently with Moscow, were the "irrational" actions of the Second Reich, which threatened international stability; no one had any desire to fight Germany or to surrender overseas territories. This approach clearly reveals the potential influence of feminine values oriented towards maintaining peace and international cooperation, alongside individualism manifesting in safeguarding primarily one's own interests. After the war, within French society – which had been affected by the war to a much greater extent than the British – nationalist and communist sentiments began to swell, provoked by post-war socio-economic hardships.[32] The evolution of national identity also accelerated. The 1919 elections were won by the nationalist National Bloc, which was also the reason for the subsequent provision of aid to Poland during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1921. In 1923, to coerce German industrialists into paying reparations, Paris took the decision to occupy the Ruhr basin. However, faced with fierce opposition from the United Kingdom and the United States, it was soon forced to withdraw from this costly "project".[33] It is true that the shift in Paris's policy also resulted from the opposition left winning the elections; nevertheless, the primary motive was the desire to maintain correct relations with foreign partners, rather than an internal reluctance to recover the owed reparations more swiftly. This example demonstrates that Paris was unwilling to place its own welfare on a knife-edge by confronting other equally powerful or more powerful states. When the political right returned to power in 1926, no one in the French capital entertained

31 E. Weber, *The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s*, W. W. Norton & Company 1996, p. 125; M. Thomas (1996). *Britain, France and Appeasement: Anglo-French Relations in the Popular Front Era*, Berg 1996, p. 137.

32 P. O. Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace After World War I: America, Britain And the Stabilization of Europe, 1919–1932*, Cambridge 2006, p. 50.

33 J. Baszkiewicz, *Historia Francji*, Wydawnictwo Ossolineum, Warszawa 2004, pp. 530–548.

thoughts of returning to the project of occupying part of German territory. The situation was further improved by the increasing economic stabilisation since 1928, as well as the near-total elimination of unemployment following the commencement of the construction of the Maginot Line. Simultaneously, it must be noted that the country actively financing the reconstruction of Europe was the United States, which Paris explicitly took into account when making crucial international decisions. In such an approach, one can find the influence of the codes of high Power Distance, the avoidance of excessive risk, as well as medium-term thinking. Unfortunately, the global crisis of 1929–1935 destabilised France, which prompted society to revert to both extreme right-wing and left-wing sentiments.[34] This resulted in frequent changes of government, exacerbating the internal crisis, and even attempts at staging a putsch. Paris also refrained from any intervention in Spain, where civil war erupted in 1936. The French policy of mitigating international crises through agreements and concessions resulted in the waiver of reparations from a strengthening Germany in 1932, as well as in the consent to the rearmament of its western neighbour in 1935.[35] Following Germany's invasion of Poland, Paris did indeed declare war, but obviously had no intention of committing itself seriously.[36] The cold shower came with the end of the German invasion of France in 1940.[37] It can be concluded that practically throughout the 20th century, the French eschewed violence in mutual relations with other states, confining themselves only to relative rivalry over overseas territories, whilst fighting on the continent only when backed against a wall. The outcome of such an approach was allowing the emergence and rise to

[34] C. Fohlen, *France 1920–1970*, [in:] *The Fontana Economic History of Europe*, ed. C. M. Cipolla, Vol. 6, Part 1, Contemporary Economies, part 1, 1976, pp. 72–127.
[35] J. Jackson, *Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy 1934–1938*, 1988, pp. 172, 215, 278–287; D. Johnson, *Léon Blum and the Popular Front*, History, 1970, pp. 199–206.
[36] R. A. Doughty, op. cit., pp. 25–29.
[37] Ibidem, pp. 339–342.

power of the Third Reich, as well as the ascent of General Franco's authoritarian regime to power in neighbouring Spain. One might ask whether history could have unfolded differently had Paris demonstrated more resolve and aggression in its policy, particularly towards its unruly neighbours? Referring to cultural codes, it may be assumed that these would be purely theoretical digressions, given the incompatibility of the aforementioned attitude with the cultural programming of the French.

It is therefore worth examining the decisions made in the post-war arena. Interestingly, while the French demonstrated an almost astonishing mildness towards other states on the European continent (especially powerful ones), they acted quite differently towards their colonies. Following the war, in successive overseas territories controlled by Paris, the population began to openly express its dissatisfaction, and even resort to overt defiance against France. In this case, Paris responded with force, attempting to suppress any signs of rebellion.[38] One can discern in this approach the influence of a high Power Distance, where colonial populations were treated as inferior societies, and any manifestations of discontent were viewed as a threat to the order and stability that Paris had so painstakingly sought to maintain. This divergent perspective and the classification of societies according to different norms likely translated into the uncompromising and relentless policy of the French towards the inhabitants of their overseas territories. From 1958, when General de Gaulle came to power, the international situation began to stabilise gradually. In the face of public pressure and global changes, independence was granted to the majority of the colonies, although significant economic and political influence was retained in some of them.[39] Moreover, seeking to bolster France's position in Europe, de Gaulle sought to counterbalance Washington's influence on the continent. According to the French president, one of the founda-

[38] M. Windrow, *The French Indochina War 1946–54*, Osprey Publishing 2013, Osprey Military, No. 322.

[39] J. Fenby, *The General: Charles de Gaulle and The France He Saved*, Simon & Schuster 2011, pp. 417–612.

tions of the US's strong position was NATO, in which Washington had played a leading role from the outset. In 1966, France withdrew from the military structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and began to cooperate more closely with Germany. At the same time, Paris also sought to limit London's influence, including by obstructing the United Kingdom's accession to the European Economic Community. This approach reveals the impact of the codes of power distance, individualism, medium-term orientation, and even femininity. The latter value pertained to the attempt to forge a new formula for the balance of power in Europe while simultaneously avoiding any open conflicts. Hence the French president's attempts to foster closer relations with the nations of Eastern Europe (such as his visit to Poland in 1967), which, however, ultimately also contributed to de Gaulle's loss of popularity and his resignation from office in 1969.[40] France also engaged in building the European community while somewhat more discreetly striving to maintain a relative balance of power between London, Paris, and Berlin. In a later period, these French efforts also extended to states successively admitted to the EU, which typically represented not only their own interests but also those of their sponsoring major powers (including the United States). The most strongly influencing codes at that time were high power distance, individualism, femininity, high uncertainty avoidance, and medium-term orientation.

Table 9. The French decision-making process determined by specific cultural code values

Decision content	PD	FEM	IND	HUA	MTO	LC
A policy aimed at the ruthless exploitation of regions that were highly underdeveloped at the time, still without investing in development or consolidating its own position in these parts of the world. Reliance on immediate profit.	x		x	x		x
Pursuing a balance of power policy without interfering in the internal affairs of other European states; avoiding open conflicts.	x	x	x	x	x	x

40 Ibidem, pp. 612–620.

Decision content	PD	FEM	IND	HUA	MTO	LC
A balance of power policy aimed at offsetting the aggressive policy of the Second Reich.	x	x	x	x		x
Conducting predominantly defensive operations against the invasion of the Second Reich, with the exception of the forceful seizure, alongside the United Kingdom, of German overseas territories at the outbreak of the war.	x	x	x	x	x	x
A brief occupation of the Ruhr basin and subsequent withdrawal in the face of opposition from the United Kingdom and the United States.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The construction of the Maginot Line as an unrealistic, yet colossal and forward-looking military project geared towards defence rather than offensive operations.		x	x	x	x	x
A cautious approach to warfare during the Second World War, particularly towards the Polish ally, to whom France provided no genuine assistance, restricting itself merely to insignificant gestures (the Phoney War).	x	x	x	x	x	x
An attempt to forcefully maintain control over the colonies following the end of the war. Granting independence, due to the numerous difficulties, while retaining economic and political influence.	x		x	x	x	x
Withdrawal from the military structures of NATO in 1966 as a demonstration of its own independence and strength, while remaining a member of the Alliance. In 1995, Paris partially returned to the North Atlantic structures, and in 2009 it once again became a full member of the alliance.			x		x	x
Participation in building the structures of the European community, driven by immediate interests resulting from the pursuit of security, and eventually a strong economic position.	x	x	x	x	x	x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning France's international relations: 87%.

Germany

According to the following values presented on G. Hofstede's website, Germany, like the English, maintains a certain detachment regarding the rank of states on the international stage; simultaneously, their actions are determined by a relatively high level of individualism (the value for the English was determined at 9), a convergent level of masculinity, and a relatively high level of uncertainty avoidance hovering at the level of relative prudence and caution when

making critical decisions. However, long-term orientation and an averaged level of high context stand out distinctly. Consequently, the values of the Germans diverge significantly from British and French values, as Germany's actions in the international arena ought to be characterised by far-reaching prudence, the capacity for effective and long-term planning, and consequently, the ability to objectively anticipate the consequences of its own and others' actions.

Table 10. Cultural code values: Germany

Cultural codes: Germany					
High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
Low/High	3.5	IND:7	MAS:7	6.5	8

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

From a human perspective, the comprehensible opening of borders to refugees from war-torn Syria was, of course, not only a pro-humanitarian move but also a logically sound economic one.[41] However, the utter unpreparedness for the potential influx of all foreigners from North Africa and the Middle East, and moreover, an uncontrolled influx, unfortunately contradicts this latter value. The sheer scale of this "migration of nations" caught Berlin off guard for many subsequent months, and German authorities struggled significantly for a long time before devising procedures to cope with this immense crisis. This is merely one example from recent history, and it is worth recalling in this context that Germany instigated two world wars, on each occasion being entirely unprepared for them both economically and militarily.[42] From the outset, the logistical base was too narrow in relation to the ambitious designs of German

[41] M. Fabisiak, *Dlaczego Niemcy zaprosili uchodźców do Europy...*, wp.pl, https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/dlaczego-niemcy-zaprosili-uchodzcow-do-europy-pomagaja-ofiarom-wojny-i-nie-tylko-6027693645431425a, 10.09.2015.

[42] G. D. Feldman, *The Political and Social Foundations of Germany's Economic Mobilization 1914–1916*, Armed Forces & Society, III, 1976, pp. 121–145.

leaders. Naturally, in the case of the First World War, delaying the conflict worked to the detriment of the Second Reich, which would have been increasingly outpaced economically (and thus militarily) by the United Kingdom and France, both possessing vast colonial resources. Instigating the war was a somewhat dramatic and risky gambit, offering the only chance of seizing its own slice of the colonial pie.[43] This might have succeeded were it not for the fact that the German colonies were entirely unprepared for an attack by the Anglo-French fleet, and the military operations on the continent changed nothing beyond generating colossal costs in both economic and social terms.[44]

In the case of the Third Reich and the Second World War, the decision to invade Poland appears to have been somewhat premature, as it brought the German borders closer to the Soviet Union; this exposed Germany to a potential attack and accelerated the necessity of launching its own strike.[45] For the same reason, the attack on France, though successful, was nevertheless too early and precluded the effective administration of the country's territory, where a vigorous resistance movement soon developed. n fact, the only thing that could have genuinely saved the Third Reich from collapse would have been the development of hitherto unknown armament technologies capable of providing Hitler with a substantial advantage over his adversaries. Meanwhile, the surface area of the Reich expanded to dimensions that made effective administration impossible, causing an economy additionally burdened by incessant warfare to overheat ever more rapidly. Thus, the actions undertaken were reasoned from a short-term perspective (a few years), whereas it is difficult to attribute any rationality to them in a long-term perspective (measured in decades). On the other hand, long-term orientation may only have

43 R. Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War 1914–1918*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, pp. 141–142.

44 R. Paschall, *The defeat of imperial Germany 1917–1918*, Da Capo Press, 1994, pp. 193–221.

45 Cz. Grzelak, H. Stańczyk, *Kampania polska 1939 roku. Początek II wojny światowej*, Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, Warszawa 2006.

evolved after the war, which could be corroborated by the earlier studies of Hofstede and Bond, which indicated an orientation for Germans that was, at best, medium-term. It should always be borne in mind that the results presented by both aforementioned scholars are highly general and averaged in nature, and were conducted with the aim of examining cultural codes determining the relationships functioning in workplaces, rather than in the international arena. Conversely, they also provide a certain point of reference in any research devoted to attempting to map the subconscious codes determining the decision-making process of individuals raised within an identical cultural and social environment.

Returning to the decisions made by German decision-makers over the course of the past century, it is also worth noting that in the years preceding the 20th century (1880–1900), Berlin began to invest in building a colonial base, following the example of France and Great Britain.[46] This was necessitated by a dynamically developing industry and the need for both a raw materials base and new markets. Undoubtedly, such a policy at the time can be considered long-term. Furthermore, in accordance with Berlin's initial assumption, the First World War was intended to be a lightning war, and its unsuccessful progression for Germany meant that it soon assumed the highly disadvantageous form of trench warfare.[47] On the other hand, had the Germans indeed succeeded in swiftly conquering France at the time, it probably would have changed little despite their colonial possessions, as, firstly, these were not adequately defended, and moreover, the Second Reich lacked a fleet capable of competing with the fleets of the Triple Entente states. Therefore, utilising the economic base during the ongoing hostilities was out of the question. Once the victory over France had been secured, it was clear that the United Kingdom, together with Russia, would not capitulate, but would instead step up its efforts to defeat Germany,

[46] J. A. Moses, P. M. Kennedy, *Germany in the Pacific and Far East 1870––1*914, University of Queensland Press, 1977.
[47] R. Chickering, op. cit., pp. 141–142.

which, without adequate resources and lacking sufficiently advanced military technology, had no chance of winning. In other words, the war might have lasted longer, but Berlin's chances of victory were not particularly high.

In the aftermath of the Great War, Germany lost not only its colonies and territories in Europe (primarily to states that had regained their independence after a long period) but also its identity. The Weimar Republic was a unique social experiment that decisively broke with any form of monarchy.[48] Compounded by the economic crisis and the popularity of both extreme right-wing and left-wing ideologies, this constituted a veritable explosive mixture, culminating in the empowerment of populists. These individuals soon seized power, ushering in the Third Reich.[49] German decision-makers skilfully exploited old divisions between European capitals, the discord between them and Washington, and the changed situation in the East brought about by the newly established Soviet Union. Weaknesses were ruthlessly exploited to break free from reparations, and subsequently, by securing substantial foreign funding (primarily from the United States), to relatively quickly rebuild economic, and eventually military, potential.[50] In this decision-making process, high context rather than low context, alongside individualism and masculinity, is clearly evident. Another feature was high uncertainty avoidance, manifesting in caution, assessing the environment, and avoiding the provocation of dangerous situations as long as there was an internal lack of perceived readiness for conflict. Indeed, the greatest flaw of German decision-makers throughout the 20th century was this peculiar tendency to prematurely miscalculate their own capabilities. Usually, last-resort solutions were adopted prematurely. It is one thing to play a game of seeking out weaknesses, exerting pressure, and attempting to extract the maximum possible advantage

48 T. S. Brown, *Weimar Radicals: Nazis and Communists Between Authenticity and Performance*, Berghahn Books 2009, pp. 149–153.

49 R. J. Evans, op. cit., pp. 247–283.

50 S. Marks, *The Myths of Reparations*, "Central European History" 1978, No. 11 (3), pp. 231–255.

with minimal investment of one's own; it is quite another to become genuinely embroiled in a severe crisis or even war. The Germans repeatedly failed to discern this subtle distinction and crossed the line, which initially yielded benefits but over time always ended the same way: with the collapse of an inadequately prepared Reich (both the Second and the Third).

It is also worth noting that numerous decisions from that period were dictated by circumstances rather than original intent. Initially, Hitler intended to forge an alliance with Poland, thereby expanding the Anti-Comintern Axis (Berlin–Rome–Tokyo) to include Warsaw. In that event, not only would the Reich have been separated from the Soviet Union by a territorial barrier in the form of a future ally, but Poland would also have constituted an element additionally bolstering Germany's potential.[51] Berlin was also exceptionally capable of exploiting the conservative and conciliatory policies of other European powers, seamlessly seizing control of Austria and subsequently the entirety of Czechoslovakia. These successes probably somewhat dazzled the German decision-makers, who resolved to issue territorial demands against Poland. This was a mistake, as the Poles constitute a culturally highly specific nation within Europe, characterised by a particular attachment to their own land, property of all kinds, and the country as a whole (especially in times of peril). In Hitler's view, Warsaw, by refusing any concessions, had insulted the rising German empire in a manner that threatened its painstakingly constructed image of strength, before which other nations yielded without a fight. In other words, Poland's unyielding stance posed a threat to German foreign policy, and in the event of Berlin backing down, could have triggered a chain reaction in the recently acquired territories. In that scenario, states such as France and Great Britain might have realised that Germany was weaker than it appeared, and could have begun to press more forcefully for the return of the seized territories. Such a resolute refusal from Warsaw moti-

[51] P. Zychowicz, *Pakt Ribbentrop–Beck*, „Uważam Rze", http://www.uwazamrze.pl/ artykul/803704/pakt-ribbentrop-beck, 23.02.2018.

vated Germany to execute its first major military operation, and simultaneously to test new tactics and modern equipment in practice. Indeed, had Hitler stopped at that point and contented himself with maintaining a facade (the "Phoney War") with London and Paris, history might have unfolded quite differently. The invasion of France was, in truth, the beginning of the end, where the aforementioned tendency to miscalculate one's own capabilities, coupled with the lack of a long-term orientation, caused the myth of the Thousand-Year Reich to collapse like a house of cards over the next few years. The cultural codes remained, however, even though Germany was partitioned into two countries situated in different spheres of influence. This was a profound shock to the German society, as the country they knew was not only placed under a form of occupation but indeed ceased to exist. West Germany was a different country from the preceding German statehoods. Even after the reunification of the FRG and the GDR, these were now two distinct societies that had to learn to live together anew.[52]

From the outset, the FRG participated in the creation of the European community, which eventually evolved into the European Union. The objective of the German authorities was the abolition of the policy of isolationism, which resulted in joining the Council of Europe in 1950, and subsequently NATO in 1955. West Germany also became a member of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), and later the European Economic Community and Euratom (1957).[53] From the beginning, the FRG, and later a reunified Germany, was an active member of European community structures contributing significantly to the common budget. They also advocated the admission of new member states. Expanding the European economic organism to include further states not only bolstered the

[52] *Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944–1993*, eds. K. H. Jarausch, V. Gransow, Berghahn, New York–Oxford 1994, ch. 8.

[53] *Od źródeł do Traktatu Rzymskiego: Parlament Wspólnoty*, [in:] L. Bardi, P. Ignazi, *Parlament Europejski*, trans. P. Dyrda, Oficyna Wydawnicza „Impuls", Kraków 2005, p. 12.

peaceful coexistence of nations (mutual interdependencies reduced the risk of conflict) but also generated tangible economic benefits for all parties. Thus, Berlin's foreign policy, calculated to gradually enlarge the Union, expanded not only its security zone but also its sphere of influence. Meanwhile, the new member states were able to develop economically much more rapidly than under normal circumstances, progressively raising the standard of living of their own societies. After a certain time and upon reaching a satisfactory level of development, they could themselves begin to invest in the economies of newly admitted, yet still poorer states. This is how the European system of mutual benefit came into being and began to evolve, with the oldest member states making the greatest contribution but also reaping the greatest benefits. Here too, as in previous centuries, the interests of individual states clashed, particularly those of London, Paris, Berlin, and invariably Washington. This time, however, they could be resolved peacefully or, alternatively, economically. The dissolution of the USSR and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact opened up new, unprecedented possibilities for Germany and the European community. Unfortunately, as it transpired in the first and second decades of the 21st century, Berlin encountered the policy of Putin's Russia, which remains difficult for it to comprehend, and whose actions did not fit within the categories of Western European (economic) rationality.[54] This, of course, stemmed from cultural differences, since for the Russians themselves, Putin's policy is not only supremely logical, but indeed necessary. The cultural codes determining the decision-making process of the Russians are presented in the subsequent subchapter.

[54] A. Politkovskaya, *Rosja Putina*, Studio Emka, Warszawa 2012; P. Bell, M. Górnikiewicz, T. Szczurek, *Mass Media in the Russian PSYOP in Poland and the Balic States*, Lambert Academy Publishing 2017; M. Górnikiewicz, T. Szczurek, *Mass Media and Social Media in a hybrid war as illustrated by the conflict in Ukraine of 2014–2015*, [in:] *Information security as a part of national security in Eastern Europe*, Kharkiv 2016, pp. 24–41.

Table 11. The German decision-making process determined by specific cultural code values

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	LTO	LC
A policy of investing in the development of the colonial base and the industry of the Second Reich.		x	x	x	x	x
A policy of triggering minor crises in order to destabilise the existing balance of power and territorially expand its own colonies.		x	x		x	x
Instigating the First World War, intended to enable the Second Reich to achieve the status of a colonial power, particularly in relation to France, whose colonial possessions would then be priceless for Berlin.		x	x			x
Miscalculating the capabilities of its own economic and military base prior to the First World War.		x	x			x
A policy of gradually dismantling successive barriers and restrictions in rebuilding Germany's position following the First World War.			x		x	x
Building an image of a powerful Germany and acquiring new territories without a fight by intimidating the international community.		x	x		x	x
Instigating the Second World War in the pursuit of building its own "colonial" base to condition economic development, but this time primarily in Eastern Europe and Western Asia as a result of the war.		x	x			x
Miscalculating the capabilities of its own economic and military base prior to the Second World War.		x	x			x
Active participation in building and developing the European community, primarily as an economic project in which Berlin would play a leading role.		x	x	x	x	x
Inviting and admitting millions of refugees from Africa and the Middle East without prior, rigorous calculation and preparation for the magnitude of this social phenomenon.		x	x			x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning Germany's international relations: 60%.

Russia

The values that appear to most significantly determine Russian foreign policy are high power distance, higher-than-average collectivism coupled with femininity, as well as an extremely high level of uncertainty avoidance and a long-term orientation combined with

a low context. These values would suggest that Russian decision-makers view the world through the prism of hierarchy and blocs of states centred around stronger nations (high power distance coupled with collectivism), whilst simultaneously striving for global stability and a balance of power, thereby avoiding dangerous crisis situations and conflicts. Furthermore, their actions are characterised by long-term planning and the anticipation of the consequences of global changes.

Table 12. Cultural code values: Russia

Cultural codes: Russia					
High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
Low	9	COL:6	FEM:6	9	8

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

Unfortunately, this latter value is distorted by low context, restricting them, much like the Germans, solely to their own region of the world, and treating the rest of the globe with a certain detachment, which in turn translates into errors in geopolitical calculations. In light of the above, it can be assumed that the Russians are a nation more inclined towards peaceful coexistence than waging wars against other nations. Unfortunately, the history of Russia, including its most recent history spanning the first and second decades of the 21st century, appears to contradict these values entirely. But is this truly the case? Firstly, the value of collectivism is only slightly above average, as is that of femininity, which does not indicate a desire to avoid conflicts at all costs. Secondly, war may be treated as an element of a game played with other states, which, simultaneously, are not considered equal to one another in the eyes of Moscow's decision-makers. In other words, this resembles the French approach to conflicts with European states and the societies inhabiting their former colonies. While the French demonstrated a highly conciliatory approach towards European nations, the use

of brutal violence against colonial communities was deemed not only permissible but absolutely necessary to restore law and order in a given region (in accordance with the value of femininity). All these values must always be read and interpreted collectively, bearing in mind the broadest possible context of the situation in which specific decisions were made and subsequently implemented.

Looking, in turn, at all the wars waged by the Russians, one cannot escape the impression that in past centuries Moscow has never attacked states of equal or superior potential. The decision was always made to attack only those states considered (rightly or wrongly) to be weaker, and thus positioned lower in the hierarchy of states (at least from Moscow's perspective). Instances of conflict with states of equal or greater power have always stemmed from the necessity to defend their own territory. The entire 20th and 21st centuries constitute a history of crises and conflicts initiated by Moscow solely against entities deemed weaker or those that found themselves in a highly disadvantageous military situation (relatively defensive actions during the First World War; the unsuccessful aggression against Poland in 1919–1921, repeated in 1939 only once certainty was gained that Poland would no longer be able to defend itself, being occupied with the war against the advancing army of the Third Reich from the west[55]; the failed aggression against Finland[56], which has since remained outside Moscow's military interest; the Cold War, manifesting itself merely in the support of various local conflicts in different parts of the world; and, in the 21st century, the attack on Georgia and the annexation of Crimea alongside the developing Ukrainian crisis[57]).

[55] H. Zieliński, *Historia Polski 1914–1939*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1985; Cz. Grzelak, H. Stańczyk, *Kampania polska 1939 roku*, op. cit., pp. 5, 385.

[56] M. Zgórniak, *Wojna zimowa 1939–1940*, [in:] *Bałtowie. Przeszłość i teraźniejszość. Materiały z sesji naukowej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe WSP, Kraków 1993, pp. 138–153.

[57] M. Matusiak, *Gruzja: Wojna 2008 przedmiotem walki politycznej*, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2013–04–17/gruzja-wojna-2008-roku-przedmiotem-walki-politycznej,

The Russians selected their targets very cautiously, thoroughly calculating their own and others' capabilities beforehand, and ultimately, as history has shown, in the face of a miscalculation, they chose not to repeat a mistake once made (as exemplified by Finland and Poland, where Moscow delayed its promised support to Germany until it was certain of achieving success). All this simultaneously demonstrates clearly that the world during the Cold War was an exceptionally stable and safe place, as the Russians would not have decided to risk everything by issuing a nuclear challenge to the United States. This is also the reason why they will not attack either the Baltic states or Poland for as long as they remain convinced, on the one hand, that these countries form part of the NATO and EU bloc, and, on the other, that they can achieve a genuine success. With the development of Poland's defensive capabilities and the support provided by its allies, these countries have, from the perspective of Moscow's decision-makers, found themselves beyond any sphere of realistic consideration. This does not, however, preclude a continued war of nerves and the conduct of highly advanced psychological operations aimed at probing and exploiting any weak points within the alliance.

In light of the above, it is worth examining more closely the strategically important decisions of Russian decision-makers with international implications. The First World War began not on the initiative of Moscow, but of Germany. In response, despite Russia being unprepared for a conflict on such a scale (it would be more accurate to say that none of the belligerent states were), the increasingly popular ideology of Pan-Slavism, propagated by the contemporary media, was utilised[58]. Naturally, Germany was proclaimed the enemy of the Slavs, which allowed the tsarist regime to garner

17.04.2013; A. M. Dyner, *Aneksja Krymu: korzyści i koszty Rosji*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/biuletyn/nr-66–1178, 22.05.2014.

[58] Z. Stojcev, *Teoretycy i entuzjaści ruchu pansłowiańskiego w medycynie*, „Journal of Oncology. Nowotwory" 2012, No. 62(6). pp. 477–479.

broad public support for future military operations[59]. It was precisely then, as part of anti-German propaganda, that, among other things, the name of Petersburg was changed to Petrograd. The only group not sharing this tsarist-public enthusiasm were the Social Democrats, who openly opposed any alliance with the tsar. The war quickly began to bring immense losses: several hundred thousand soldiers and a drastic increase in food prices. As a result, outbreaks of social discontent began to occur, and the population of the empire itself became highly susceptible to various extreme ideologies[60]. The Russian army was poorly commanded, which was initially the main cause of the defeats and failures suffered[61]. The situation by no means improved when Tsar Nicholas II, entirely unprepared for the role of commander-in-chief, assumed command. The longer the war lasted, the more apparent the supply shortages became, resulting from the inefficiency of both industry and transport[62]. The opposition, in the form of Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, Kadets, and former allies (conservatives and Kadets), openly declared itself against the tsar, gaining increasingly broad public support[63]. At the turn of 1915 and 1916, the tsarist army was merely retreating before the German forces. Furthermore, rebellion against the tsarist regime was growing within the country, whose government consisted of parvenus (the tsarina, alongside Rasputin, had brought about the removal of the more effective ministers, replacing them with entirely incompetent individuals loyal only to themselves[64]). The initial strikes of 1917

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59 M. Górnikiewicz, *Ocena stopnia zastosowania wiedzy uzyskanej w trakcie czynności rozpoznawczych w procesie planowania wojskowych operacji psychologicznych (kod: III.1.2.1.0)*, [in:] idem, *Rozpoznanie kulturowe w procesie planowania wojskowych operacji psychologicznych (code: III.1.2.0)*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw 2013.

60 P. Chmielewski, M. Wilk, *Zarys dziejów ZSRR: 1917–1977*, Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódź 1985, pp. 52–68.

61 S. Courtois, N. Werth, J. L. Panne et al., *Czarna Księga Komunizmu*: *zbrodnie, terror, prześladowania*, Prószyński i S-ka, Warsaw 1999, pp. 60–72.

62 Ibidem, p. 60.

63 P. Chmielewski, M. Wilk, op. cit., pp. 50–60.

64 Praca zbiorowa, *Słownik historii XX wieku*, Kraków 1993, p. 335.

were suppressed very firmly, which, however, did not deter people from gathering and expressing their discontent in a temporarily peaceful manner. It was only the spread of rumours concerning an impending famine, the panic buying of bread, and supply shortages caused by a severe winter that prompted the residents of the capital, agitated by members of the opposition, to protest against the monarchy in increasing numbers and with greater openness. Police officers and police stations began to be attacked. The authorities lost control over a portion of the working-class districts of Petrograd. The military was deployed and, in certain locations, opened fire on the crowds. Soon, however, the soldiers, unwilling to shoot their compatriots, began to defect to the side of the protesters[65].

This was the beginning of the fall of the tsarist regime, which is worth juxtaposing with the codes cited in the introduction. One may tentatively assume that the actions of the protesters were in contradiction with power distance and the predominance of femininity, but also with a long-term orientation, and even more so with a high level of uncertainty avoidance. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that people were functioning under the conviction that they would soon starve to death as a result of the government's ineptitude and the tsar's inability to conduct the war. The monarch himself, in the person of Nicholas II, never enjoyed particular esteem within Russian society, and the course of the First World War, which was highly detrimental to Russia and the entire society, caused the tsar's authority to collapse completely. In other words, the value of power distance was transferred to the agitators and opposition fighters. Furthermore, a crowd rarely behaves rationally in crisis situations, being guided by the intellect of an emotional child rather than that of a level-headed adult[66]. This is also significant for the operation of the codes, which have more in common with making logical decisions within a given culture than with acting under the influence of

[65] R. Pipes, *Rewolucja rosyjska*, PWN, Warsaw 1994, pp. 434–438.
[66] L. Wojtasik, *Psychologia propagandy politycznej*, PWN, Warsaw 1986, pp. 302–343.

emotion. In other words, the collapse of the tsar's authority resulted in his role being assumed by revolutionary leaders. Subsequently, the people of the capital followed their instructions almost blindly, striving to ensure their own survival, as these people's internal sense of security had previously been severely undermined. It is probable that had the tsar enjoyed the authority of a strong, or even ruthless figure, guaranteeing at least relative security and peace, the revolution would have been nipped in the bud, failing to gain broader public support. Unfortunately for Russia, Tsar Nicholas II proved to be an exceedingly weak man, and he had to face one of the greatest challenges in history: the First World War. With its conclusion, the existing monarchist system collapsed, to be replaced by the nascent Soviet empire. The new leaders, brutal and ruthless, proved to be the right leaders for difficult times – disregarding the casualties among their own and other nations, they posed a serious threat to the rest of the contemporary world. Nevertheless, the cultural codes accompanying Russian foreign policy prior to the First World War continued to influence the new decision-makers.

Moscow's intention was to spread the revolution, partly in order to theoretically preclude future wars instigated by narrow groups of individuals in power[67]. It is probable that the majority of Moscow's leaders believed in this ideological drivel and were convinced that the terrible deeds they were committing served a greater good in some unspecified future. Consequently, the influence of the codes of both collectivism and long-term orientation is evident here. Power distance was significant, dictating that relations with other powers be managed with respect, whilst completely disregarding weaker states. Hence the war with Poland in the years 1919–1921 (despite the fact that during the revolution the Poles had been viewed favourably by communist leaders, as they were fighting the same tsarist regime). The subsequent strike in 1939 was also launched with a considerable delay, and only once Moscow was certain that Poland would not recover. Joining the war on the side of the Allies was

67 P. Chmielewski, M. Wilk, op. cit., pp. 64–67.

a consequence of the German attack, against which Russia might not have been able to defend itself alone. The later negotiations with the Allies concerning the future shape of Europe were also a derivative of the ability to effectively exploit weaknesses and conduct a psychological game of appearances, with no genuine intention of implementing one action or another. Stalin's decision-making process was a product of both Russian and Georgian codes; nevertheless, in the conduct of foreign policy, he relied on the opinions of specific individuals from his inner circle.[68]

As established at the outset, the aim of this analysis is not to examine the psychological profiles of individual leaders with strong personalities, but rather to determine the extent to which general codes determined their decision-making process. In this instance, it appears to be to a fairly significant extent, virtually with the exception of the predominance of feminine traits, as Stalin strove to establish a bloc of states under his own administration and to spread the revolution (a predominance of collective traits), generally operating on the basis of long-term strategies and a broader, rather than a narrower, context. While in his private life he was not an example of a man who practised power distance towards high-ranking individuals, he strictly adhered to it in international relations, interpreting international reality through the prism of the spheres of influence of great powers and interstate alliances. It is worth emphasising that he never agreed to provide China, which continuously sought it, with the technology for manufacturing advanced weaponry, knowing that it would only be a matter of time before Beijing turned against Moscow. This mistake was made by his successor, Khrushchev, leading to a crisis in the previously impeccable Moscow–Beijing relations. Therefore, Stalin was partly subject to the influence of Russian cultural codes, partly to Georgian ones, as well as to individual codes. However, he strictly avoided open warfare with entities possessing an equal or even sufficiently strong potential. As a result, the Ko-

[68] S. S. Montefiore, *Stalin. Dwór czerwonego cara*, Wydawnictwo Magnum 2004.

rean War occurred, but not a direct clash between the USSR and NATO.

Following Stalin's death, Moscow's policy was confined to supporting, and even creating, communist movements in various parts of the world, whilst still avoiding open conflict with the West[69]. In fact, the only war in which Russia became fully involved was Afghanistan.[70] The collapse of the Soviet Union was largely caused by Moscow's lenient stance towards the national independence movement in Poland (which triggered a domino effect in the remaining countries of the Soviet bloc). As a result, the Russians lost their own identity. This was hardly surprising, given that their national identity had begun to take shape shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, and subsequently merged with communist ideology. It was not until Putin's rise to power that the Russians were able to redefine themselves, simultaneously adopting much of the foreign policy legacy of the former Soviet empire. The result was the wars in Chechnya, that is, still within the territorial boundaries of Russia.[71] Subsequent military operations in the first and second decades of the 21st century extended beyond the borders of the Federation. However, much like before, they were always characterised by waging war against significantly weaker adversaries, which paradoxically was intended to provide Moscow with a greater sense of security by pushing the threat away from its borders: the creation of so-called

[69] J. Itzigsohn, *Developing Poverty: The State, Labor Market Deregulation, and the Informal Economy in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic*. University Park: Penn State University Press, Pennsylvania 2000, pp. 41–42; H. Farid, *Mass Killings and Capitalist Expansion, 1965–1966*, [in:] *The Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Reader*, ed. Kuan-Hsing Chen, Chua Beng Huat, Routledge, London 2007, pp. 207–222; Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975*, University of North Carolina Press 2000, p. 135; O. Sarin, L. Dvoretsky, *Alien Wars: The Soviet Union's Aggressions Against the World, 1919 to 198*9, Presidio Press 1996, pp. 93–4.

[70] W. Roszkowski, *Półwiecze. Historia polityczna świata po 1945 roku*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2005, p. 299.

[71] A. Babczenko, *Dziesięć kawałków o wojnie. Rosjanin w Czeczenii*, Warsaw 2009; K. Kurczab-Redlich, *Wowa, Wołodia, Władimir: tajemnice Rosji Putina*, Wydawnictwo W.A.B., Warsaw 2016.

buffer zones (states dependent or partially dependent on Russian influence). Traces of the influence of all the codes can be found in this approach.

Table 13. The Russian decision-making process determined by specific cultural code values

Decision content	PD	FEM	COL	HUA	LTO	LC
A cautious and conservative approach to the preparation and conduct of military operations during the First World War (an unwanted war).	x	x	x	x	x	x
A lack of a sufficiently firm response to strikes and rebellions, as well as to opposition circles, prior to the outbreak of the First World War.		x	x	x		x
The drive to spread the revolution by force, but by attacking states considered weaker or situated in a worse socio-economic position: with the aim of establishing a union republic and creating a network of interdependent and cooperating states.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The drive to subordinate weaker socialist and communist states through the creation of so-called union republics.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The invasion of Poland in 1939 alongside the Third Reich, with a considerable delay and at a time when there was no longer any doubt that Poland would be unable to defend itself: the ultimate aim was the establishment of a union republic.	x		x	x	x	x
Negotiations with the United States and Great Britain concerning the new shape of the world, in which many countries found themselves under Moscow's influence, not entirely in accordance with the original vision of the Western allies: the beginning of the Cold War.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The Cold War as a clash of two powers manifesting itself in the avoidance of open conflict, and the waging of mutual skirmishes on the territories of other states.	x	x	x	x	x	x
A lack of a firm response to the national independence movement in Poland, which became the catalyst for the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.		x	x	x		x
Armed intervention in rebellious Chechnya, whose secession could have led to a crisis in the Caucasus region and, consequently, a significant weakening of Russia's international position.	x			x	x	x
The attack on Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and support for the conflict in eastern Ukraine: the aim was to maintain buffer zones composed of dependent or interdependent states.	x	x	x	x	x	x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning Russia's international relations: 89%.

Poland

By virtue of his Polish nationality, the author is most familiar with his own social group. On the other hand, for this very same reason, it is most difficult to maintain the objectivity necessary from a scientific perspective. Hence, at the outset, the author wishes to sincerely apologise for any potential interpretive errors, whilst simultaneously endeavouring to maintain as objective a stance as possible towards Polish cultural codes, despite an obvious sentiment towards his own nationality. Relying on the research findings of the aforementioned anthropologists, who by no means parade any Polish heritage, proved somewhat helpful. Nevertheless, the procedure for processing the obtained results also creates a certain scope for even unconscious bias, which the author has nonetheless endeavoured to eliminate to the best of his ability. The above caveat was necessary, however, bearing in mind research integrity and fairness towards all potential readers of this monograph.

This will probably sound somewhat grandiose, but the Poles are a nation that evidently stands out against the backdrop of other social groups inhabiting the European continent. History has shown that they are ready for great deeds and immense sacrifices, often guided not by pragmatism, but by an internal need for a specific course of action. Usually, this is based on their own religious, ethical, or simply moral code. On the other hand, throughout history, many Poles have been guided by their own particular interests, placing their own welfare above the common good. At the same time, these very same Poles were prepared to demonstrate a readiness for sacrifice that was almost incomprehensible just moments prior (even to themselves), if their homeland or other national interests were threatened. During the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the Poles built a regional empire, which they subsequently lost as a result

of a series of ill-considered decisions[72]. Polish soldiers were capable of attacking a significantly more numerous adversary and frequently achieving surprising successes[73]. On the other hand, some Polish decision-makers, confident in their own capabilities, entirely neglected preparations for the challenges posed by the dynamically changing political reality of the 18th century, whilst simultaneously allowing themselves to be manipulated by foreign interest groups A particularly telling example here is the so-called Swedish Deluge of the 17th century, when the Swedish king seized practically the whole of Poland without a fight. The nobility (10% of the population) simply reached an agreement with the new monarch and, in exchange for promises of various benefits, agreed to transfer power to him[74]. Furthermore, no one wished to die facing the Swedish military might, which at that time was renowned for its high effectiveness. At the same time, a relatively short period of Swedish rule was sufficient for the majority of this very same nobility, by then completely disregarding their own losses, to successfully rise up against the occupier and drive them out of the homeland. Likewise, the famous partitions of Poland were, on the one hand, the result of military weakness, but also of internal discord among Polish decision-making centres (some of which had reached an agreement with the partitioning powers). This time, however, the advantage on the side of the invaders was so substantial that subsequent attempts at resistance, undertaken by merely a smaller portion of society, proved futile[75]. As the rule of the partitioning powers consolidated, pro-independence tendencies, rather than waning, grew stronger, which found its expression in the

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72 M. Morys-Twarowski, *Polskie imperium*, Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak 2016.

73 *Rozkwit i upadek I Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. R. Butterwick, Warsaw 2010, pp. 21–35; A. Zajączkowski, *Szlachta polska. Kultura i struktura*, „Semper", Warsaw 1993, pp. 10–45.

74 Z. Wójcik, *Międzynarodowe położenie Rzeczypospolitej*, [in:] *Polska XVII wieku: państwo, społeczeństwo, kultura*, ed. J. Tazbir, Warsaw 1974, pp. 54–55.

75 T. Cegielski, Ł. Kądziela, *Rozbiory Polski 1772–1793–1795*, Warsaw 1990; B. Szyndler, *Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794*, Wydawnictwo Ancher, Warsaw 1994, pp. 24–32.

active regaining of independence against the backdrop of the dynamic geopolitical transformations following the First World War[76].

During the interwar period, the Poles once again devoted much valuable effort to internal disputes, and considerably less to the genuine development of defensive capabilities. It must be stated unequivocally that the armed forces were rebuilt and developed; however, this effort could have been significantly more effective had it not been for the numerous conflicts between decision-making centres, which at the time coalesced around specific political factions[77]. Concurrently, various branches of industry were developed, transport infrastructure was expanded, and new cities were built, such as the port of Gdynia, which was highly modern for its time. Poland succumbed to the Nazi onslaught indirectly through its own doing. On the one hand, mobilisation encompassed only a small fraction of the available reservists; on the other, the plan entailed retreating and launching a counter-attack the moment French relief arrived, which never materialised. This was also the reason for the Wehrmacht's rapid territorial successes. Unfortunately, the moment the Soviets attacked from the other side, and the French did not make the slightest move, it became clear that this 'intricate' defence plan had proverbially misfired. Polish commanders genuinely did not assume that Moscow could attack so ruthlessly. Mindful of the experiences of the years 1919–1921, they should have prepared for the eventuality of any problems with French assistance. In summary, this 'outstanding' defence plan assumed the honourable behaviour of all players, which obviously was entirely at odds with harsh international reality. For the sake of clarity, it should be added that had Poland been in France's position, Polish decision-makers, disregarding any short-term calculation of losses and gains, would have honoured their pledges and commitments. Even if they had been made merely verbally, not to mention in written form. This is another character-

[76] *Kronika powstań polskich 1794–1944*, Kronika, Warsaw 1994, pp. 333, 338.
[77] B. Winiarski, *Między dwiema wojnami*, [in:] *Polityka gospodarcza*, ed. 3, PWN, Warsaw 2006, pp. 115–119.

istic of the Poles, namely an innate romanticism that determines a morality somewhat detached from harsh geopolitical realities.

It is worth citing here the words of Viscount Palmerston, Henry John Temple, who stated: *Great Britain has no eternal allies, nor eternal enemies; only Great Britain's interests and the duty to protect them are eternal*[78]. The Poles are a living contradiction of such an approach, and both allies and enemies are treated very seriously, regardless of short-term interests. At least, this has been the case thus far, if one carefully examines both prominent individuals and the moves made by Polish decision-makers in the international arena. The Poles have virtually always, and at all costs, endeavoured to keep their word and act honourably in their own eyes, which frequently meant acting non-pragmatically. On the other hand, this is precisely why the Poles can make an ideal ally. One might raise the argument at this point that the Poles did, after all, agree to join the Warsaw Pact, and subsequently contributed significantly to its downfall. Such an approach would be an overinterpretation for several reasons. Firstly, the formula of the Polish People's Republic was imposed on the Poles from above during the meeting of the Allies[79]. Secondly, neither the Western Allies nor the Poles supporting these very Allies (let alone ordinary people) were aware of how this 'free Poland' would function in reality. The vast majority of society was exhausted by the long and dramatically devastating war, which culminated in the recovery of their own country, complete with the Polish emblem, banners, and language. To the average Pole of that period, it seemed that Poland would be tied to Moscow in some way, yet it had essentially reappeared on the map as an independent state. Only with time did it become apparent that this 'tie to Moscow' was exceedingly strong, and indeed completely paralysing and subjugating[80]. A smaller portion of society, disagreeing with such a state of

78 J. Ridley, *Lord Palmerston*, Constable 1970.

79 A. Wąsowski, *Teheran-Jałta: Nowy porządek świata*, v. 1: *1944–1945*, New Media Concept, Warsaw 2009, pp. 15–17.

80 P. Osęka, *Jak powstawał PRL, pradzieje polski ludowej*, „Focus", http://www.fo-cus.pl/artykul/jak-powstawal-prl-pradzieje-polski-ludowej, 20.06.2017.

affairs, undertook what was essentially a suicidal struggle; the majority, however, desired a return to some semblance of normality. It was only after several decades of communist rule and a deteriorating economic situation that the Polish nation rose up in opposition, striving to overthrow an increasingly despised and alien regime. This is another national characteristic, very often motivated by emotional attitudes, which drives dynamic changes towards any authorities and powers that have lost the respect, and consequently the obedience, of society. The same mechanism also operated earlier during the partitions, although each time it was brutally suppressed. This did not, however, prevent this tendency, which is particular to the Polish nation, from resurfacing in subsequent generations. For this reason, the Poles constitute a particularly unrewarding nation for any occupation, in whatever form it might take (even a pseudo-independent one). Shifting the focus back to the codes in relation to the research of G. Hofstede, M. Bond, and E. Hall, the Poles are characterised by the following values:

Table 14. Cultural code values: Poland

Cultural codes: Poland					
High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
Low	7	ND:6	MAS:6.5	9	4

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

From the above, it would follow that Polish decision-makers perceive the world as a hierarchically organised structure of stronger and weaker entities (relative to one another) and treat stronger states with respect. An exception may be a situation where they find themselves in the opposing camp to a given power; in such instances, they may exhibit outright contempt and disregard. In the event of close cooperation with a given power, they should be a faithful and devoted ally, even exhibiting a tendency towards a certain overzealousness in following the foreign policy path charted by that state.

The predominance of individualism indicates that the Poles have no internal need to belong to various organisations or alliances; rather, such membership should stem from specific geopolitical conditions (e.g., to ensure their own security, more rapid economic development, or a more advantageous geopolitical positioning). At the same time, it is worth noting that the value of individualism is not particularly high, deviating by merely one point from the average, which may indicate an ability to function efficiently within diverse forms of international cooperation (simultaneously, the activity demonstrated by Poland in the European forum might belie this value, though it is also worth noting that Polish decision-makers have never intended to leave European structures, and Warsaw's policy is partially coupled with the policies of other Central and Eastern European states, which points to an ability to navigate between diverse spheres of influence and interests in the international arena[81]). A slight predominance of masculinity translates into a higher-than-average inclination towards competitiveness, as well as aggressive attitudes, including the resolution of problems by force. At the same time, given that this factor does not possess a particularly high value, this inclination should, in practice, be exercised sparingly, depending on the geopolitical situation. An extremely high level of uncertainty avoidance, on the other hand, would indicate an apprehension towards entering into any risky situations, which, however, entirely contradicts the history of the Poles thus far. Such a high level should significantly restrict the inclination towards any forms of open protest or rebellion against a power capable of threatening the Poles (including an occupying power). In fact, it is difficult to find any substantiation for this value within the Polish decision-making pro-

[81] K. Sikora, *Jarosław Kaczyński na miesięcznicy zapowiedział wyjście z Unii? Mamy komentarz PiS*, wp.pl, https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/jaroslaw-kaczynski-na-miesiecznicy-zapowiedzial-wyjscie-z-unii-mamy-komentarz-pis-6164992236222081a, 11.09.2017; *Premier Morawiecki: Nie ma tematu Polexitu. Polska pozostanie częścią UE*, TVP.info, http://www.tvp.info/35798278/premier-morawiecki-nie-ma-tematu-pole-xitu-polska-pozostanie-czescia-ue, 29 January 2018.

cess in the international arena, perhaps with the sole exception of subordination to a state acknowledged by Polish decision-makers as a leader.

A short-term orientation combined with a high context may simply be the result of a protracted period of functioning as a peripheral state, and previously being under foreign occupation. Consequently, the only period during which the values of long-term orientation or high context could have taken shape is the relatively brief epoch in Polish history of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, which for just under two centuries was a genuine regional empire[82]. It is worth emphasising the term 'regional', as the scope of Polish decision-makers' interests was always confined to their immediate neighbourhood. Therefore, precisely such values for these two codes should come as no surprise, and unfortunately, in history thus far, one can find more than enough examples confirming their influence on the decision-making process (as discussed below).

Looking more closely at the history of Poland, it is worth referring back to the 19th century, during which several uprisings took place. All these insurrections were characterised, on the one hand, by a refusal to accept the occupation, and, on the other, by the lack of a broader perspective and a realistic plan for achieving their intended goal, namely the recovery of independence. In other words, while the outbreak of a given uprising might have been well-conceived, its subsequent course was largely left to chance, or rather to dynamically unfolding circumstances. It is worth emphasising that had the insurgents engaged in pragmatic calculation prior to deciding to challenge the powerful military machine of the occupiers, they would likely have chosen to bide their time, building up their capabilities and waiting for an opportune moment. In Polish history, however, this was not the case; one could say that following a generational hiatus, one uprising succeeded another (the November Uprising of 1830–1831; the Greater Poland Uprisings of 1846

[82] M. Morys-Twarowski, op. cit.; A. Zajączkowski, op. cit., pp. 10–87; *Rozkwit i upadek I Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. R. Butterwick, Warsaw 2010, pp. 212.

and 1848; the Kraków Uprising of 1846; the January Uprising of 1863–1864[83]). Another event preceding the First World War and corroborating the thesis regarding the revolutionary nature of the Poles may be their participation in the Revolution of 1905, which, within the territory of the Russian Partition, engulfed Polish cities such as Warsaw, Łódź, Ostrowiec, and Radomsko[84]. A significant change involved the transformation of the existing absolute monarchy into a constitutional one, with the possibility of registering and operating political parties, and thereby holding elections to legislative bodies and forming executive bodies from among them. In 1912, the Provisional Commission of Confederated Independence Parties was established within the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Partition, followed by the creation of its Military Department, to which the Polish Military Treasury and the Riflemen's Association 'Strzelec' were subordinated. Thus emerged the nucleus of the future Polish armed forces, which took an active part in the First World War and, subsequently, in defining the borders of a Poland reborn after 123 years of subjugation[85].

Viewed from the perspective of cultural codes, all these actions were fairly well thought out in a relatively short-term horizon, whereas new plans were created and new goals set as the situation evolved. There was a drive for Poland to regain its independence, yet it is difficult to speak here of the formulation, as early as 1912, of a detailed contingency plan concerning the recovery of independence under the assumption of various scenarios for the development and conclusion of the First World War. It resembled rather ongoing adaptation to circumstances, which effectively confirms both short-term orientation and low context. Nor is it easy to speak of broader and deeper alliances; rather, these were temporary cov-

83 R. Korbal, *Polskie powstania narodowe*, Bellona, Warsaw 2016.

84 A. Massalski, *Rewolucja lat 1905–1907. Kielce w przededniu I wojny światowej (1907–1914)*, [in:] Z. Guldon, A. Massalski, *Historia Kielc do 1945 roku*, Kielce 2000, p. 272.

85 W. Potkański, *Terroryzm na usługach ugrupowań lewicowych i anarchistycznych w Królestwie Polskim do 1914 roku*, Wydawnictwo DiG, Warsaw 2014.

enants concluded to achieve a specific, usually time-limited goal, which in turn confirms a clear predominance of individualism. The attempts made throughout both the 19th and 20th centuries to regain independence by force are a good example of the predominance of masculinity. The only value that finds no reflection whatsoever in the decision-making process during the period of the partitions and participation in the Great War is extremely high uncertainty avoidance. It would be more accurate to say that the exact opposite was true.

The interwar period was unfortunately a time of incessant conflict between various political factions, cut short by the execution of the May Coup in 1926 and the assumption of near-total power by the faction gathered around the person of Marshal Józef Piłsudski (milieus originating from the Legions, that is, individuals directly and militarily involved in regaining independence)[86]. The rule of the so-called Sanation has been described in many sources as authoritarian. Interestingly, the political stabilisation imposed by force had a positive impact on gradual economic growth[87]. Following the death of Marshal J. Piłsudski in 1935, German and Russian decision-makers quickly became aware of the government's internal weakness and sought in various ways to exploit these vulnerabilities in the international arena. Among other things, a clever German maneuver that drew the Polish authorities of the day into accepting the annexation of part of Czechoslovakia's territory (Poland acquired Zaolzie, covering an area of 800 km^2) caused Poland to begin being perceived in Western Europe as an aggressor on a par with Germany[88]. Furthermore, following the Marshal's death, far-right factions launched a campaign against the Jewish population and those of the Orthodox faith inhabiting a large part of Poland at the time. The Polish Socialist Party (PPS), from which the late Marshal J. Piłsudski

86 A. Chojnowski, *Piłsudczycy u władzy. Dzieje Bezpartyjnego Bloku Współpracy z Rządem*, Wrocław–Warsaw–Gdańsk–Łódź: Ossolineum 1986, p. 10.
87 B. Winiarski, *Między dwiema wojnami*, op. cit.
88 I. Lukeš, E. Goldstein, *The Munich crisis, 1938: prelude to World War II*, Routledge 1999, p. 48.

had originated, stood up in defence of the Jews. Unfortunately, all of this caused Poland's image in the foreign media to be portrayed in a rather grim light, often much worse than was actually the case. Once again, the codes of masculinity, low context, and short-term orientation came into play, influencing the inability to foresee the consequences of the actions undertaken. The Third Reich, increasingly aware of the weakness of Poland's centres of power and, at the same time, its rather unfavourable reputation in Paris and London, put forward territorial claims in 1938 involving the incorporation of the Free City of Gdańsk into the Reich, as well as the construction of an extraterritorial motorway and railway line connecting East Prussia with Germany[89]. Polish decision-makers rightly recognised that this was not only an assault on Polish sovereignty, but also a test of strength designed to show whether further territorial claims could be put forward in the future. This situation could probably have been handled in a number of ways, demonstrating strength while avoiding any public insult to Berlin, which at that time was beginning to rely on the psychological effect of intimidating other nations and thereby gaining new territories without a fight. Polish decision-makers said a very firm 'no', which corresponds entirely with the majority of the codes, yet once again it did not align at all with the code of high uncertainty avoidance[90]. Consequently, Germany terminated the previously concluded non-aggression pact and shortly thereafter attacked Poland. The subsequent strike from the east by the Soviet Union brought an end to the existence of an independent Poland for the next several decades, as the post-war Polish People's Republic was not only devoid of independence, but even its internal sovereignty was severely restricted, not to mention its foreign policy, which had to align entirely with that of the Warsaw Pact, or more precisely,

89 H. Batowski, *Agonia pokoju i początek wojny*, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań 1984, pp. 210–212.

90 Excerpts from the speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Beck, in the Sejm on 5 May 1939, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sepbDGP964A, 3.03.2018.

Moscow[91]. One can only speak of independently conducted foreign affairs after 1989, when the Polish People's Republic ceased to exist, and was replaced by the Third Republic as a continuator of the pro-independence tradition of the Second Republic, reborn after the First World War[92].

The priority of the Polish government was, naturally, accession to both NATO structures and the European Union, which guaranteed independence in the event of a resurgence of Russian imperialism[93]. Poland, of course, became a member state of both the aforementioned organisations, tightening military cooperation primarily with the United States, and socio-economic cooperation with the remaining EU member states. At this point, attention should be drawn to the numerous animosities and frictions emerging within the EU forum, which resulted from the intersection of the interests of multiple states, as well as those of the United States, which remained highly active on the European stage. Poland, being a country highly invested militarily in maintaining the best possible relations with Washington, sometimes found itself caught between these two forces, typically demonstrating greater favour towards the American side. The situation remained relatively stable, however, until the end of the first decade of the 21st century, when Putin's Federation, in addition to resolving internal conflicts by force (Chechnya), opted in 2008 for aggressive behaviour towards neighbouring states, namely Georgia[94].

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91 N. S. Lebiediewa, *Inwazja Armii Czerwonej. IV rozbiór Pols*ki, [in:] *Białe plamy – Czarne plamy. Sprawy trudne w relacjach polsko-rosyjskich (1918––2008)*, eds. A. D. Rotfeld, A. W. Torkunow, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2010, pp. 264–295.

92 L. K. Gilejko, *Polska transformacja. Próba bilansu i nowa perspektywa*, "Res Humana" 2009, nr 3, pp. 17–21.

93 Official Journals of the European Union: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pl; Official NATO website: https://www.nato.int/, 5.03.2018.

94 M. Matusiak, *Gruzja: Wojna 2008 przedmiotem walki politycznej*, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2013-04-17/gruzja-wojna-2008-roku-przedmiotem-walki-politycznej, 17.04.2013.

This stemmed from Moscow's concept of establishing buffer zones consisting of at least partially neutral states surrounding the Russian borders. In the face of plans for NATO expansion, decision-makers in Moscow concluded that Russia's interests were being threatened. The opposition of the Ukrainian population to the abandonment of the country's efforts to join the European community led to the outbreak of a revolution that swept away the pro-Russian government, once again calling Moscow's buffer zone policy into question. On the other hand, it is worth remembering that both Georgia and Ukraine are independent countries, and their societies have the right to decide their own fate. Nevertheless, owing to Moscow's perspective, this led to the forcible annexation of Crimea by Russia and the unleashing of a devastating conflict in the east of that country.[95] All this resulted in the victory of a centre-right political faction in Poland, which broke with the EU–American balance in foreign policy, tipping the scales significantly further towards Washington. This is hardly surprising given such a dramatic increase in the threat level in Europe and the fact that the potential of NATO, as an alliance capable of guaranteeing security, relies primarily on the power of the United States. Nevertheless, such an approach was bound to provoke numerous animosities in relations with some EU countries, as the new government in Warsaw opted for a vision of the Union as a collection of entirely independent entities united solely by common interest, which stood in contradiction to federalist tendencies. The situation was also greatly complicated by the so-called refugee crisis, during which, once again, as had happened many times in history, the Polish authorities said a firm 'no' to plans for the mandatory acceptance of refugees by all member states[96]. To make matters worse, the exceptional activity of the (Pol-

[95] A. M. Dyner, *Aneksja Krymu: korzyści i koszty Rosji*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/biuletyn/nr-66-1178, 22.05.2014.

[96] A. Bartkiewicz, *Beata Szydło: Polska nie przyjmie uchodźców*, „Rzeczpospolita", http://www.rp.pl/Rzad-PiS/170519184-Beata-Szydlo-Polska-nie-przyjmie-uchodz-cow.html, 3.03.2017.

ish) opposition within the European forum, aimed at presenting the government in Warsaw in the worst possible light, caused foreign media to begin painting a negative picture of Poland.[97] Interestingly, both the favourable economic situation and the new government's initiatives accelerated economic growth, yielding surprisingly good results[98]. For all these reasons, Poland's situation may superficially evoke parallels with that of the Second Polish Republic. The difference, however, is that the potential military threat originates solely from the East; moreover, Poland is in a strong alliance with what remains the sole superpower, which throughout its history thus far has never shied away from the use of armed force. Furthermore, a highly extensive investment programme aimed at bolstering defence capabilities has also been initiated, which similarly departs from the scenario that unfolded prior to the war during the Second Republic era.[99]

The value that found almost no reflection whatsoever in the decision-making process was the level of uncertainty avoidance. It also appears that the short-term orientation has been extended, given the entirely pragmatic reliance on an alliance with the greatest power in the face of a threat, even sacrificing good relations with other states, alliances with which had, however, proven ineffective in crisis situations. Even contrary to prior agreements. This constitutes a significant change, indicating a rise in the pragmatism factor, which had been conspicuously absent from the earlier decision-making process. From an objective scholarly standpoint, it is not the author's role to judge the ethical or moral validity of such a decision-making

97 G. Wszołek, *Platforma Obywatelska chce nałożenia sankcji na Polskę*, Niezależna, http://m.niezalezna.pl/208769-platforma-obywatelska-chce-nalozenia-sankcji-na-polske, 16.11.2017.

98 *Wzrost płac w Polsce może jeszcze zaskoczyć*, tvn24bis, http://tvn24bis.pl/z-kraju,74/wzrost-pkb-polski-2017-i-2018-prognozy-oecd,794002.html, 28.11.2017.

99 K. Walterska, *Miliardy do wydania na armię. Co przyniesie rok 2018 polskiej zbrojeniówce*, wnp, http://www.wnp.pl/przemysl-obronny/miliardy-do-wydania-na-armie-co-przyniesie-rok-2018-polskiej-zbrojeniowce,313856_1_0_0.html, 30.12.2017.

formula, but merely to provide a reliable comparison with the preceding process. One can also still note a distinctly higher level of both masculinity and individualism, where functioning within any international organisations is treated as a means of achieving specific objectives, rather than building future, increasingly integrated interstate communities. In fact, the code of high power distance only began to manifest itself strongly once independence had been regained and appropriate respect was accorded by the United States. While prior to 2013, mutual relations between Warsaw and Washington were maintained within a certain balance relative to Brussels, after 2014, and particularly after 2016, these relations were understandably strengthened. Therefore, in light of the above, it is worth proceeding to a summary of the decision-making process in relation to the individual cultural codes.

Table 15. The Polish decision-making process determined by specific values of cultural codes

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	STO	LC
19th-century uprisings: the November Uprising, the January Uprising, the Greater Poland Uprisings, the Kraków Uprising, and the participation of Poles in the 1905 Revolution in Polish territories.		x	x		x	x
The formation of national liberation forces in 1912––1914 and participation in the 1914–1918 armed struggles aimed at the liberation of Poland.		x	x		x	x
Internal struggles between various political factions immediately following the recovery of independence (1918–1926).		x	x		x	x
The May Coup of 1926, intended to restore political, and consequently economic, stability.		x	x		x	x
The rule of the Sanation following the death of Marshal J. Piłsudski, internal factional struggles within the ruling circles, susceptibility to various influences, and more or less official consent for policies and actions directed against minorities.		x	x		x	x
Support for the Third Reich's territorial claims against Czechoslovakia and the annexation of Zaolzie region.	x	x	x		x	x

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	STO	LC
A firm refusal of the Third Reich's demands to assume control over the Free City of Gdańsk and of the plan to construct an extraterritorial motorway, instead of employing diplomatic stalling tactics despite the awareness of inadequate military readiness to independently repel potential aggression.	x	x	x		x	x
The post-1989 drive to join NATO and the European Union as swiftly as possible as guarantors of security and, secondarily, to ensure rapid economic development.	x	x	x	x		x
Prior to the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, a policy designed to maintain a geopolitical balance between the interests of individual EU countries and the United States.	x	x	x	x		x
Following the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, a shift in focus towards fostering the best possible relations with Washington, even at the expense of relations with Brussels.	x	x	x	x		x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning Poland's international relations: 75%.

Japan

The Japanese are a distinct nation, standing out from other nations and ethnic groups in East and Southeast Asia. They differ both in terms of physical appearance (for the inhabitants of this region of the world, recognising a Japanese person poses no difficulties) and their cultural mental programming.

Table 16. Cultural code values: Japan

Cultural codes: Japan					
High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
High	5	5	MAS:9.5	9	9

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

To those with even a superficial interest in the history and culture of Japan, the above results may appear somewhat abstract, to put it

mildly. They indicate that power distance is moderate, and significantly lower than in many European countries. Individualism and collectivism are on an equal footing, with neither value predominating. Conversely, the levels of masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation are extremely high. While one can certainly agree entirely with the latter three values, the first two suggest that the Japanese maintain an internal distance from their superiors, not affording them excessive respect merely on account of their social position. Furthermore, they imply an equal propensity for individualistic and collectivistic behaviours; in other words, the tendency to work for the benefit of a group, team, or nation does not at all prevail over private interests. Moreover, such a high level of masculinity would suggest that the Japanese will almost always be inclined to opt for rivalry with other nations and exhibit aggressive behaviour in international relations. There remains nothing else but to take a closer look at the recent history of Japan and the strategically important political decisions that have accompanied it.

In 1868, the so-called Meiji period began. It was also during this time that the capital, Edo, was renamed modern-day Tokyo[100]. Profound changes to the functioning of the state were initiated, resulting from a large-scale campaign to modernise the country, modelled on Western European nations and the United States[101]. Among other things, the remnants of the feudal system, which had naturally been undergoing gradual weakening over the preceding decades, were finally abolished. Shortly thereafter, a modern cabinet system was established, whilst simultaneously reserving life-long rule for the emperor, whose power was centralised[102]. The structure of the country's territorial division was also altered, and considerable effort was invested in accelerating economic development, which was intended to secure adequate resources in the future for building strong, modern armed forces. Japan began to transform from an underdeveloped

[100] A. Gordon, *Nowożytna historia Japonii*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 2010, p. 69.
[101] Ibidem, pp. 138–144.
[102] Ibidem, pp. 117–183.

agrarian country into one with dynamically developing industries (such as shipbuilding, machinery, etc.). As early as 1873, an army based on universal conscription and Western models was established[103]. In the context of Power Distance, however, an interesting point may be the introduction of a new division of society, which was, in reality, still similar to the feudal system, into[104]:

- the aristocracy (former *daimyo* and *kuge*),
- the nobility (former samurai and *bakufu*),
- the commoners (townspeople, peasants, and the so-called 'non-humans').

This division was not as surprising at the time as it might be perceived today, since the aristocracy, the nobility, townspeople, peasants, merchants, etc., also functioned within the highly industrialised and democratising states of the affluent West. Capital increasingly determined one's standing in society rather than a title, although in a Japan that until very recently had been entirely feudal, titles still retained immense significance. In other words, the division introduced was an exceptionally bold attempt to match the exclusive club of the most powerful nations, also in terms of social structure and hierarchy. The consequence of such far-reaching changes was resistance from the samurai and internal divisions within the government. Attempts at rebellion by the warrior class were suppressed by force, while at the same time, increasingly numerous demands for the democratisation of public life emerged[105]. The outcome was the enactment of a constitution in 1889, which transformed Japan into a modern constitutional monarchy[106]. From the above, one may draw the conclusion that the Japanese, having conducted an in-depth analysis of the international reality of the day, were prepared to make any sacrifice in order to achieve a specific goal, no matter how daunting, that would ensure their survival and continued de-

103 Ibidem, pp. 110–112.
104 Ibidem, pp. 101–144.
105 M. Ravina, *Ostatni samuraj*, Wydawnictwo Amber, Warsaw 2004, pp. 20–191.
106 A. Gordon, op. cit., pp. 179–183.

velopment. The transformation of Japan over the space of merely a few decades from a feudal state into one modelled on European countries (a process that had taken the societies of Europe several centuries) constituted an immense challenge. It may inspire genuine admiration that such a complex operation culminated in absolute success, which likely stemmed from the extraordinary capacity of the Japanese to self-organise any process, however complicated. As they built up their own power, the Japanese began to strive for a revision of their relations with other states, which had been based on unequal treaties and agreements. They also succeeded in achieving this goal, including the acquisition of disputed territories from Russia[107].

The conflict over Korea led to armed clashes with China in 1894–1895, resulting in the latter's defeat and the cession to Tokyo of territories including the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Pescadores[108]. As Moscow subsequently began to press for the return of the Liaodong Peninsula, a war ensued in which, this time, Russia suffered defeat[109]. This was a highly significant, watershed moment. It was one thing to defeat the weak Chinese army, and quite another to defeat the Tsarist army. The world had to acknowledge that Japan had indeed become a regional power to be reckoned with. From the perspective of the cultural codes, however, it was significant that the Japanese did not shy away from combat and were prepared to resort to violence simply to achieve their objectives. Moscow was compelled to recognise the independence of Korea along with Japan's special position in the region, cede a portion of Sakhalin, and, furthermore, transfer the rights to the South Manchuria Railway. An interesting point of note might be the highly positive relations between Tokyo and Polish pro-independence circles. For instance, in 1904, Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski visited Japan. Later, fol-

[107] J. Tubielewicz, *Historia Japonii*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1984, pp. 375–376.
[108] Ibidem, pp. 372–375.
[109] Ibidem, pp. 375–376.

lowing Poland's recovery of independence, relations between Tokyo and Warsaw remained very good[110]. During the Nazi occupation, Japan, despite remaining in a formal alliance with Hitler, provided material support to the Polish independence underground. For all the pragmatism characterising Japanese diplomacy of that period, one cannot deny the genuine closeness of these mutual relations, based on mutual respect and understanding.

In 1912, Emperor Taisho ascended to the throne, ushering in the next period in the history of Imperial Japan[111]. As industrialisation increased, so too did the awareness of the Japanese people, which contributed to a growing interest in the philosophical trends and ideologies fashionable around the world. Various left-wing, centrist, and right-wing organisations began to emerge in the public sphere. Representatives of the military, influential businessmen, and pragmatic politicians gradually began to take over power from the aristocracy. As the Great War was drawing to a close in Europe, in 1918 a government formed from the ruling political party came to power in Japan for the first time. At the same time, elections were not yet fully democratic due to a restricted franchise, which meant that the choice of authorities was still determined by political forces. Only two major, prominent parties remained on the political stage: the Seiyūkai and the Kenseikai[112].

During the war, Tokyo capitalised on its significant military and technological advantage, and having seized poorly defended German possessions in Shandong (1914), the Japanese imposed the so-called Twenty-One Demands on the Chinese, the majority of which were met (1915)[113]. Thus, Beijing conceded to Japanese claims over Shandong, southern Manchuria, and even Inner Mongolia. Fur-

110 Ł. Czarnecki, *Co Roman Dmowski i Józef Piłsudski robili w Tokio?*, "Focus", http://www.focus.pl/artykul/co-roman-dmowski-i-jozef-pilsudski-robili-w-tokio, 30.08.2014.
111 K. G. Henshall, *Historia Japonii*, Bellona, Warsaw 2004, pp. 132–134.
112 L. Frédéric, *Japan Encyclopedia*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 510.
113 K. G. Henshall, op. cit., p. 132.

thermore, under the Treaty of Versailles concluding the Great War, Japan, treated as one of the five victorious powers, was granted the Marshall Islands, the Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands as mandate territories[114]. In the post-war period, Japan, along with the Entente, participated in an expedition aimed at establishing a state in eastern Siberia that would serve as a buffer zone separating the rest of Asia from the communists. This expedition ended in failure. Between 1921 and 1922, alongside other major powers and European states, Japanese decision-makers concluded an agreement at the so-called Washington Conference recognising the rights (on the basis of mutual respect) of all powers to their Pacific possessions; respecting the territorial integrity of China, subject to adherence to the so-called 'Open Door' policy (granting the powers the right to further economic exploitation of China with a promise not to attempt a forcible annexation of the country); and limiting naval armaments[115]. Japan ultimately relinquished its rights to the possessions in Shandong, which, in light of the provisions of the Washington Conference, could be considered a negotiating success. In 1925, relations with the USSR were also normalised[116].

The First World War proved to be an additional blessing for Japan, leading to an increase in the export of Japanese products and accelerating industrial development: both light and heavy (shipbuilding, metallurgy). Unfortunately, a few years after the war, the return of European companies led to a recession, which in turn resulted in protests and outbreaks of social discontent. The Japanese hailing from the so-called commoner class demanded the democratisation of public life and greater influence over their country's politics. In 1925, universal suffrage was introduced for all men over the age of 25. In 1926, the so-called Showa period began, lasting until 1989 and divided into three sub-periods: nationalism and

114 Class C mandate territories: *typically colonial areas – with no immediate prospect of independence*.

115 Washington Conference 1921–1922, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, https://www.britannica. com/event/Washington-Conference-1921-1922, 3.03.2018.

116 *League of Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 34, pp. 32–53.

war (1926–1945), occupation (1945–1952), and the post-war era (1952–1989). The late 1930s unfolded in an atmosphere of mounting nationalist sentiment, further fuelled by the economic crisis of 1929–1933. Voices from far-right circles emerged, arguing that this was the result of an overly overt assimilation of Western cultural elements, which naturally entailed the introduction of Western-style free-market mechanisms. Soon, however, this aversion to Western economic institutions broadened to encompass the democratisation of public life, and ultimately, various cultural models that had been implemented for decades within a Japan that remained highly traditional. The populist slogans of right-wing factions gained public approval, including the drive to strengthen the emperor's authority and eliminate the court entourage that had hitherto wielded actual power (politicians and influential businessmen). Nationalist organisations progressed from words to deeds, orchestrating numerous assassinations of selected decision-makers associated with the existing power structure. In the course of these activities, over a dozen high-ranking politicians and military officials died at the hands of assassins, while the socio-political situation across the country grew increasingly tense. Slogans such as 'Asia for Asians' also emerged, modelled on the German NSDAP, along with the attribution to Japan, as the strongest in the region, of a historical mission to establish peace throughout the whole of Asia, and ultimately to contribute to global peace[117].

Despite the internal power struggle between advocates of peace (viewed as a policy guaranteeing smaller yet stable gains in the international arena) and proponents of aggression (including the seizure of complete control over Manchuria and the entirety of Mongolia, considered strategically vital areas for maintaining Japan's great-power status), in 1928 Japan became a party to the treaty on the renunciation of war (the Kellogg-Briand Pact), and subsequently,

[117] R. Lamont-Brown, *Kempeitai, Japońska Tajna Policja*, Bellona, Warsaw 2004, p. 21–34.

in 1930, to the treaty on the reduction of naval forces[118]. Behind these seemingly incomprehensible actions lay pure pragmatism and a long-term orientation, which dictated the adequate consolidation of one's own position prior to engaging in any military venture that might end in defeat. However, the Japanese public, relentlessly agitated by right-wing nationalist circles that remained sidelined from power, failed to comprehend this policy designed to span decades. Consequently, proponents of the use of force came to power, as a result of which military operations in Manchuria were initiated as early as 1931; there, in 1932, despite fierce opposition from China and the League of Nations, the puppet state of Manchukuo, entirely dependent on Tokyo, was established. The Japanese gained access both to the raw materials vital for further development and to additional living space (during that period, the Japanese were beginning to experience the problem of overpopulation increasingly acutely). Given the sustained opposition of the League of Nations and its backing of China's stance, Japan withdrew from the organisation in 1933[119]. In 1936, the process of Japan's militarisation accelerated, and the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed with the Third Reich[120]. In 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred near Beijing, leading to open warfare for control over China[121]. To this day, various accounts circulate among historians, including the theory that Soviet intelligence services were responsible for orchestrating the incident; for them, a civil war in China could serve as a catalyst for weakening the Empire on the one hand, and facilitating the seizure of power by the Chinese communists on the other. Regardless of these speculations, the Japanese army had prepared well for the conflict and, in accordance with the principles of blitzkrieg, had seized control of

118 G. B. Tindall, D. E. Shi, *Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych*, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2002, p. 1072–1076.
119 K. G. Henshall, op. cit., p. 137.
120 E. Presseisen, *Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–1941*. Springer 2013, p. 237.
121 J. Fenby, *Chiny, upadek i narodziny wielkiej potęgi*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2009, pp. 334–362.

the major cities and the then-crucial railway lines by the end of 1938, enabling the rapid transfer of troops and materiel. In the occupied territories, the occupiers employed mass terror, while continuing to contend with the Chinese army and guerrilla forces[122]. The latter, in keeping with the centuries-old tradition of Chinese secret societies, were not only well-organised but also quite effective, despite the machinery of absolute terror gathering momentum with each passing year. The Japanese Kwantung Army also suffered numerous defeats in its clashes with Soviet armed forces, which resulted in it becoming bogged down in an increasingly debilitating conflict, with only limited human resources at its disposal. While Japanese decision-makers had prepared their homeland and army to conduct a blitzkrieg, they were unable to prepare the country and its society for the prolonged war effort resulting from the protracted and exceptionally costly control over territories that were far too vast for the occupier's actual capabilities. In other words, the burden of such large-scale operations was, in the long term, unsustainable for Japan, both militarily and economically.

At that point, following initial defeats in clashes with Soviet and Chinese forces (which were continuously replenished by inexhaustible reserves), Japanese decision-makers resolved not to continue the debilitating struggle, but rather to secure the necessary raw materials and materiel base elsewhere. The overheated Japanese war machine was simply beginning to run short of essential raw materials (including oil and iron), and even manpower reserves. It became clear that further engagement in continental expansion would, in time, become an unsustainable burden. In light of the above, a decision was made to maintain the territorial gains achieved thus far (the eastern, urbanised coast of China) and to redirect the course of expansion from the east towards the south, into Southeast Asia. Thus was born the grand-sounding concept of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, encompassing the nations inhabiting this region of Asia. As Japanese society began to experience the

122 Ibidem, pp. 378–390.

first shortages resulting from the overburdening of the economy in 1940, it was decided to centralise power even further. Furthermore, a systematic indoctrination of the public was to be carried out, intended not only to mobilise the people to endure future economic hardships and make sacrifices for the homeland, but also to prevent any potential social unrest. Political parties were dissolved, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was established. By extending its expansion into Southeast Asia, particularly to the Philippines and Guam, Japan encroached upon the American sphere of influence. This was met with clear opposition from Washington, alongside increasingly generous American support for the Chinese army on the mainland. The next step was the occupation of French Indochina and the conclusion of the so-called Tripartite Pact, dividing the world into German-Italian and Japanese spheres of influence[123]. Consequently, the United States imposed an embargo on oil supplies and broke off other commercial negotiations. Tokyo then concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, which proved mutually highly beneficial[124]. Stalin was able to redeploy some of his divisions from Asia to Eastern Europe, while the Japanese, in turn, could utilise their forces hitherto tied down in occupied China.

In December 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, thereby declaring war on the United States[125]. This also allowed Japan, in accordance with the blitzkrieg doctrine, to exploit the shock caused by this sudden strike to relatively easily seize control of Siam, the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, parts of New Guinea, and Burma. Japanese decision-makers, in executing such an audacious manoeuvre, presumably believed that Washington would return to the negotiating table and perhaps agree to recognise Japan's right to some of these territorial gains. At this stage of the war, however, the Empire's paramount objective was to provide its struggling economy

123 B. Wołoszański, *Tajna wojna Stalina*, Colori, Warsaw 1999, pp. 263–300.
124 A. Bevin, *Jak Hitler mógł wygrać wojnę*, Wydawnictwo Amber, Warsaw 2008, p. 105.
125 A. Jaskuła, *Pearl Harbor 7 grudnia 1941*, "Morza, Statki i Okręty" 2001, No. 6, p. 41.

with an influx of essential raw materials, in which the new acquisitions abounded. As we now know, events unfolded quite differently, for the profoundly outraged American decision-makers had not the slightest intention of sitting down to peace talks and resolved to retaliate in kind. As a result, from the victorious Battle of Midway (1942) onwards, they gradually wrested successive, previously seized territories from Japanese control, simultaneously restricting access to raw materials[126]. From 1944 onwards, direct air raids on the Japanese home islands began[127]. The proverbial nail in the coffin for the Empire of the Rising Sun was the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in Asia, which had throughout this time maintained forty combat-ready divisions in Siberia. The Japanese economic base relied on Manchuria and Korea, where a large proportion of essential raw materials was extracted, and where electricity, steel, and nearly half of all fuel were produced. The Soviet offensive came as a great surprise to Tokyo. The Russians began to rapidly overrun the vast territories hitherto occupied by the Japanese. This devastating blow dealt by Stalin on the one hand, and the dramatic demonstration of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the other, prompted the decision to surrender unconditionally[128]. It became clear that further fighting could even result in the extermination of the entire nation and the ultimate erasure of Japan from the world map. It was presumably this very prospect that rendered it a risk Japanese decision-makers could not take. It was one thing for the Japanese to lay down their lives for their homeland, and quite another to consent to the annihilation of the entire nation. In 1945, Japan, reduced to its four main islands, found itself under occupation for the first time in its history. In the view of Tokyo's decision-makers, this was the price they had to pay for the survival of the entire nation, harbouring a quiet hope that in the fu-

126 R. Lamont-Brown, op. cit., p. 12.

127 E. P. Hoyt, *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict*, Arrow Books, London 1987, pp. 277–388.

128 E. Bartlett Kerr, *Flames Over Tokyo: The U.S. Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945*, Donald I. Fine Inc., New York 1991, pp. 290–292.

ture they would succeed not only in regaining independence but also in rebuilding their former power. In fact, the decision to surrender unconditionally was not only deeply considered, but perhaps the most far-reaching decision taken since 1937. It was also the price exacted for the decidedly premature decision to engage in a war which, owing to its scale, could not be won. From today's perspective, one might assume that a policy of small steps and limited conflicts, accompanied by a systematically augmented and developed economic and military potential, would have been far more effective.

The occupation ended in 1952, and during this period the Americans prudently relied on the Japanese, who flawlessly executed Washington's directives[129]. The existing political, social, and economic systems were completely dismantled, abolishing the country's militarisation in favour of reactivating numerous political parties (including left-wing ones). A complete democratisation of social life ensued, a free-market economy was introduced, and the armed forces were abolished, to be replaced by institutions tasked with maintaining internal security. Consequently, armed forces were reconstituted under the name of the Japan Self-Defence Forces, focused solely on border defence. The Japanese not only submissively accepted all these changes but indeed demonstrated a corresponding zeal in implementing these objectives. This resembled a situation in which they had fully acknowledged Washington's supremacy. This was an example of the evident influence of high power distance, which stood in complete contradiction to G. Hofstede's research findings. This state of affairs persisted until 1989 and was characterised by pouring all efforts into gradual economic growth and the development of modern technologies[130]. From the 1970s onwards, the Japanese initiated an investment process in the countries of Southeast Asia, and from the 1980s they became more active internationally in strengthening relations with other states (especially those economically vital to Tokyo's foreign policy).

129 K. G. Henshall, op. cit., pp. 161–225.
130 Ibidem, p. 189.

From 1989, the Heisei period began, which coincided with an economic crisis[131]. Nevertheless, despite various transient and usually minor crises in relations with Washington and other Western states, Tokyo continues the line of remaining in close relations with the Americans, with trade disputes having been the sole axis of past crises. It was only the growth of Beijing's activity and imperial ambitions in the East and Southeast Asian region in the 21st century that awakened right-wing (and even nationalist) sentiments among the Japanese and initiated a debate on transforming the Self-Defence Forces into regular armed forces[132]. It is worth adding that the level of technological advancement and the potential of the so-called self-defence forces fully correspond to a modern army. This would therefore merely be a change of label, whereas in the mental sphere of the nation it would mean that Japan could gradually transition from strictly defensive actions to offensive ones regarding forecasted threats.

Table 17. The Japanese decision-making process determined by specific cultural code values

Decision content	H/PD	MAS	IND/ COL	HUA	LTO	HC
The meticulously planned and implemented transformation of agrarian-feudal Japan into an industrial, technological, and military power. The plan was executed within a few decades at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.		x		x	x	x
The gradual utilisation of its growing power in relations with other states in order to revise disadvantageous international agreements, followed by a seamless transition to securing various territorial and economic concessions.		x		x	x	x
The meticulously planned and executed military operation against China (1894–1895), and subsequently Russia (1905), while simultaneously maintaining and developing positive relations with potential revolutionary centres within European powers, including the Poles.		x		x	x	x

131 Ibidem, p. 207.

132 A. Gersz, *Wybory w Japonii. Zwyciężyła Partia Liberalno-Demokratyczna. Będą zmiany w konstytucji?*, "Polska The Times", http://www.polskatimes.pl/fakty/swiat/a/ wybory-w-japonii-zwyciezyla-partia-liberalnodemokratyczna-beda-zmiany-w-konstytucji, 12606460/, 23 October 2017.

Decision content	H/PD	MAS	IND/ COL	HUA	LTO	HC
The gradual democratisation of public life in order to defuse mounting social tensions, thereby averting potential crises that could weaken Japan's growing potential: the capacity for adaptation and sacrifice in order to sustain the pursuit of overarching goals. The ability to appropriately catalogue its own needs and objectives in relation to its capabilities.		x		x	x	x
Capitalising on the First World War and the temporary suspension of activity by European powers in East Asia in order to seize German possessions and extort numerous territorial concessions from a weaker China, the majority of which were subsequently retained and ‚legitimised' in the eyes of international public opinion, particularly within the forum of the major powers.		x		x	x	x
Exploiting the weakness of the League of Nations and the absence of any state possessing genuine capabilities to militarily oppose Japan, and establishing by force the puppet state of Manchukuo, dependent on Tokyo, in the territory of Manchuria. The initiation of a militarisation process preparing the Japanese economy and society to seize control over the entirety of East, Central, and Southeast Asia.		x		x	x	x
The premature commencement of military operations on the mainland and the occupation of China, reliant on the use of mass terror, without an adequately developed military and economic potential. The Japanese war machine was prepared to conduct highly effective military operations only in short-term conflicts and across a relatively territorially limited area.		x			x	
The decision to surrender unconditionally in 1945 and complete submission to the directives of the occupation authorities until the end of the occupation in 1952, and during the 1952–1989 period, systematic adherence to Washington's directives while simultaneously concentrating almost the entirety of societal effort on the country's economic and technological development. During this period, Washington supported Japan's economic growth, effectively reciprocating the allied loyalty demonstrated by Tokyo in the international arena.				x	x	x
The initiation of an investment process in Southeast Asia in the 1970s with the intention of creating a base for the development of its own economy, while simultaneously strengthening mutual economic relations with the remaining countries of the region.		x		x	x	x

Decision content	H/PD	MAS	IND/ COL	HUA	LTO	HC
Following 1989, the continuation of the policy of close cooperation with Washington and remaining one of the closest allies of the United States in the region, aimed at further, continuous economic growth and the development of its own potential. Following the growth of Beijing's power and claims, Japan markedly strengthened its cooperation with its Western allies.		x		x	x	x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning Japan's international relations: 61%.

China

The Chinese, as a social group inhabiting the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and numerous countries worldwide as part of the minority communities established there, have evolved as a nation over thousands of years (it is generally accepted that the Chinese state is five millennia old). Consequently, Chinese society comprises diverse ethnic, national, linguistic, and religious groups. Prior to the communists assuming power, the inhabitants of individual provinces communicated in their own distinct dialects, which significantly hindered intra-state communication[133]. It was not until the rule of the CCP that considerable effort was invested in standardising both the written and spoken language across the entirety of China. It is worth noting that Mao Zedong himself, while leading the communist movement and residing in various parts of China prior to coming to power, frequently relied on the assistance of interpreters. The above introduction appears necessary in order to emphasise the difficulty of investigating the cultural values, common to all Chinese people, that have determined the decision-making process in the international arena over the past century. Without referring to the observations and research findings of numerous other scholars of Chinese culture, the following analysis, in accordance with its underlying assumptions, draws solely upon the research findings of G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall.

133 M. Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 53–68.

Table 18. Cultural code values: China

Cultural codes: China					
High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
High	8	COL:8	MAS:7	3	9

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

In accordance with the aforementioned values, Chinese decision-makers perceive the international reality comprehensively. They are capable of planning and predicting the consequences of their own actions and omissions in the long term. Consequently, they are not overly hasty in pursuing their own goals and are disinclined to take risks, provided that the achievement of their established objectives is merely a matter of time. The events that unfolded in the late 18th century, when China was forcibly compelled to continue unequal economic relations with the powers of the time, would suggest that either this orientation was not quite so long-term in the past, or that this value is simply inaccurate[134]. Indeed, even in the 16th century, European states could entertain no hope of coercing Beijing into making any decisions. Two hundred years later, the balance of power had shifted so far in favour of the powers of the day that the Chinese simply dropped out of the ranks of the great powers. The question therefore arises: what exactly happened that Chinese decision-makers allowed such a glaring disparity to emerge? In order to understand the context of this situation, it is worth looking back as far as the years 1405–1433. At that time, port infrastructure was developed, and the largest merchant fleet of its day was built under the command of the renowned Admiral Zheng He[135]. The Chinese expedition had two objectives: to consolidate and supplement knowledge of the world, and, through a certain demonstration of

134 J. Lovell, op. cit., pp. 282–315.

135 G. Menzies, *1434 – rok, w którym wspaniała chińska flota pożeglowała do Włoch i zapoczątkowała renesans*, Wydawnictwo Amber, Warsaw 2009, pp. 15–40.

naval power, to maintain China's primacy over neighbouring states. In practice, the states of contemporary Southeast Asia confirmed the leading role and suzerainty of the imperial court; however, this was not accompanied by any tangible benefits in the form of tributes of significant value, let alone territorial acquisitions. From a European perspective, such an undertaking might appear to be a waste of both the funds expended on such a costly expedition, and of time. From a Chinese perspective, however, it was significant insofar as it 'systematised' China's international environment, unambiguously defining the centre of this inter-state structure. Furthermore, the level of prosperity and civilisational advancement of China at the time meant that any tributes, or even territories, from much weaker states simply did not hold significant value. This perspective might resemble contemporary relations between Beijing and Mogadishu, where it is difficult to imagine that, with all due respect to the Somali authorities, they could offer anything of value beyond recognising the supremacy of the aforementioned capital. Admiral Zheng He's expeditions explored, among other places, the southern coast of India, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the eastern coast of Africa in the vicinity of Mogadishu. As a result, the imperial court gained the certainty, firstly, that no power in the world was capable of threatening the Chinese empire, and secondly, that the rest of the world did not hold sufficient value to justify the colossal effort of exploiting foreign resources. In this context, it is worth noting further values, namely masculinity (at a relatively high level) and a high degree of collectivism. The influence of these values is evident in the example of the expedition, where the imperial court allowed for the possibility of a harmonious coexistence of a conglomerate of diverse states, provided it was under the leadership (even if only formal) of the emperor[136]. An interesting point, however, in the context of long-term orientation and high context, might be the low level of uncertainty avoidance, which predisposes to risk-taking. This is evident within the society, where for centuries

136 J. Lovell, op. cit., pp. 150–172.

all manner of gambling games have been popular, offering small but nonetheless real chances of a return many times the initial stake[137]. It would be no exaggeration to state that gambling is virtually ingrained in Chinese culture, frequently leading to interpersonal tragedies. Returning to the realm of international relations, however, this inclination to enter into uncertain situations, coupled with the ability to accurately forecast the development of events in the international arena, results in risk-taking, albeit of a calculated nature. This signifies that Chinese decision-makers are prepared to take risky decisions that could accelerate the achievement of their objectives; however, in the event of failure, a potential setback will not so much thwart the attainment of the given premises as merely postpone their realisation. In other words, the Chinese systematically pursue a once-defined objective regardless of failures, but during the execution of a long-term plan, they are prepared to take minor steps that might enable them to leapfrog several stages. At the same time, the central points of the plan are continuously executed until the goal is achieved. High power distance translates into perceiving inter-state relations through the prism of structures centred around stronger states. In other words, it is not individual states that count, but associations of states. Even major powers that do not concentrate on building coalitions around themselves can always rely on a specific circle of allies, who, from Beijing's perspective, will be perceived as part of that given power's sphere of influence.

There remains, therefore, nothing else but to analyse the decision-making process implemented by the Chinese authorities over the course of the past and current centuries. In 1898, the so-called Boxer Rebellion broke out, and following its collapse, numerous further rebellions swept across China, which, rather than waning, grew in strength, drawing in an ever-increasing number of people[138]. Equally significant, as in many other countries worldwide, was the

[137] M. Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 120–128.

[138] D. Fierla, *Powstanie Bokserów 1899–1901*, z serii: *Wielkie Bitwy Historii*, T. 4, Oficyna Wydawnicza "Alma-Press", Warsaw 2007.

spread of anti-feudal ideologies, the objective of which was the democratisation of social life and the assumption of power by the people. The embassies of the despised major powers, which had exploited China for centuries, were guarded by foreign troops, while the wrath of the people was directed primarily against the ruling Manchu dynasty, which the majority of the Chinese regarded as alien. In 1907 alone, four uprisings occurred, followed a year later by two rebellions directed against the ruling dynasty. In 1911, an uprising erupted which escalated into the so-called Chinese Revolution. On 29 December, the establishment of the Republic of China was proclaimed, and on 12 February 1912, an edict dethroning the Qing (Manchu) dynasty was issued[139]. The country soon plunged into a civil war between the proponents of democracy, led by Doctor Sun Yat-sen, and the supporters of dictatorship, rallied around General Yuan Shikai[140]. Following the outbreak of the First World War, the Japanese entered the fray, exploiting China's weakness and internal conflict to secure numerous concessions and new territories (the so-called Twenty-One Demands)[141]. As a result of prolonged internal chaos and civil war, real power over a portion of China's territory was seized by local warlords commanding their own armed forces, thus becoming significant players in the struggle for power between the Kuomintang, founded by Sun Yat-sen, and the imperial forces (supporters of the dictatorship had restored the monarchy in the territories under their control). It was then, in 1915, that Dr Sun appealed to the Second International for support in establishing a socialist state in China[142]. Not only was China divided into diverse, warring factions, but it also became the target of intense influence

139 R. Mitter, *Gorzka rewolucja*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw 2008, pp. 46–52.

140 Ernest Young, *Politics in the Aftermath of Revolution*, [in:] *The Cambridge History of China: Republican China 1912–1949*, Part 1, ed. J. K. Fairbank, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1983, p. 228.

141 K. G. Henshall, op. cit., pp. 132.

142 Gao J. Zheng, *Historical dictionary of modern China (1800–1949)*, Scarecrow Press 2009, p. 251.

from Tokyo and Washington. London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin were preoccupied with the war in Europe. The south of China was controlled by Kuomintang forces, while the north was ruled by several generals. Various factions also operated within the Kuomintang itself, directly affecting the spheres of influence in the south of the country (between 1912 and 1927, three different governments functioned there)[143].

Dr Sun sought support from Western powers, and even Japan. Ultimately, he turned to the Soviet Union, which acceded to the request, while simultaneously stipulating that the communist system was not suitable for China, and renouncing its claims to Outer Mongolia. At the same time, however, the Chinese Communist Party, established on Moscow's initiative, had been operating since 1921, and the Kuomintang entered into collaboration with it in 1924[144]. It was then that, thanks to Soviet support, the National Revolutionary Army was established, and the party structure was remodelled along Bolshevik lines, allowing the existing Kuomintang to be consolidated into a unified, centralised structure. Despite the death of the party leader, Dr Sun, in 1925, the process of centralising power along communist lines continued, including the expansion of military structures. In November 1926, the so-called Northern Expedition commenced, directed against the generals ruling that part of the country. Chiang Kai-shek, who assumed command of the army and the party in 1927, occupied a strategically important part of the Yangtze River valley, and subsequently declared war on the communists and their allies, breaking off cooperation with the CCP (the beginning of the so-called Second Revolutionary Civil War of 1927–1937)[145].

The communists initiated unsuccessful uprisings, after which they relocated to the south and east of the country and established the so-called 'red bases' there. As a result of an offensive by Kuomintang forces, the communists were forced to relocate to even more

143 W. C. Kirby, *State and economy in republican China: a handbook for scholars*, Volume 1, Harvard Publishing 2000, p. 59,
144 R. Faligot, op. cit., pp. 22–33.
145 J. Fenby, op. cit., pp. 318–321.

distant territories in Yan'an[146]. It was not until Japan's attack on China and the occupation of vast areas of the country (1937–1945) that a renewed alliance was concluded between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party[147]. Despite a brief peace in 1945, the Kuomintang soon attacked communist forces, achieving temporary successes until a victorious counter-offensive in 1947, which culminated in the capture of Beijing by the Chinese People's Liberation Army in 1949 (the so-called Third Revolutionary Civil War of 1946–1949)[148]. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek and the remnants of the nationalist party, numbering approximately one million people, crossed over to nearby Taiwan, continuing the existence of the Republic of China. In Beijing, Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China[149].

From that moment on, foreign policy based on Chinese cultural codes can be analysed along two tracks: the Chinese and the Taiwanese. In the mutual relations between the two entities, the most interesting aspect has been, and remains, the approach to the nature of diplomatic relations. Namely, after the People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China in the UN in 1971, the vast majority of countries worldwide established official diplomatic relations with Beijing and severed them with Taipei[150]. Nevertheless, the Republic of China continued to exist and maintained its representative offices in the majority of states, with the minor distinction that its former embassies and consulates were renamed as offices for cultural, educational, and/or economic cooperation. For understandable reasons, the Chinese sought to influence the authorities of individual states to restrict the activities of Taiwanese representative offices. In other words, an intriguing situation emerged wherein, on the one hand,

146 J. Chang, J. Halliday, *Mao*, Wydawnictwo Albatros, Warsaw 2007, pp. 112–120, 177–272.
147 Ibidem, pp. 275–284.
148 Ibidem, pp. 284–334.
149 J. Fenby, op. cit., pp. 455–481.
150 O. Pearson, *Albania in the Twentieth Century*, [in:] *A History*, Vol. III, St. Martin's Press, New York 2006, p. 628.

China formally ignores the existence of informal Taiwanese representation, while in practice, it endeavours through various methods to curtail all of its activities. This objective is served by Beijing's policy of formally regarding Taiwan as a province that is experiencing a protracted issue with recognising Beijing's sovereignty. Furthermore, the authorities of the PRC have officially declared that any attempts by Taiwan to 'break away' by declaring independence will result in an armed intervention aimed at defending 'territorial integrity'. The new authorities in Taipei (DPP), in turn, make no official declarations, but systematically erase all traces of ties with China, including the memory of Chiang Kai-shek. To add to the intrigue, it should be noted that both countries maintain informal diplomatic relations at the central level, which, among other things, became the catalyst for the gradual development of mutual economic relations following the initiation of the Four Modernisations programme in mainland China. This peculiar dualism of recognition and non-recognition of Taiwan simultaneously aligns with the specific nature of Chinese culture, wherein everything may possess multiple shades and meanings, depending on the current situation or context. In other words, the pursuit of a mutually dual policy of recognition serves as a prime example of the Chinese approach to international affairs, which is by no means an exception, but rather a characteristic feature of China's culture.

A further example of absolutely high context and long-term orientation is Beijing's involvement in the Korean War. According to various data, the Chinese dispatched from several hundred thousand to over a million 'volunteers'. As a result, no one could officially accuse the Chinese authorities of involvement in the conflict, yet simultaneously the parties involved were fully aware of it. Furthermore, the primary objective was to exert pressure on Stalin to agree to share military technologies with Beijing at the price of further fuelling the Korean conflict. The moment Moscow resolutely refused any deliveries, Mao lost further interest in the war. An identical scenario subsequently repeated itself in relations with Taiwan,

where Beijing would initiate a conflict in the Strait, seeking to secure specific concessions from Moscow, most frequently in the form of the know-how for certain technologies. Until the end of his life, Stalin did not provide Mao with anything beyond small arms technology[151]. Khrushchev proved to be considerably weaker, which Mao immediately sensed and exploited at every available opportunity. As a result of these efforts, China acquired not only the technology for producing nuclear weapons, but also for heavy and light weaponry, including space technologies for building rockets and satellites. This also demonstrates how profoundly considered Beijing's actions were, utilising war not as a means for immediate gains, but as an element of pressure to acquire indispensable know-how. In the case of every crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Washington would address Moscow with accusations of unnecessarily raising the level of tension in the region, while Moscow, not wishing to lose face, pretended that it still retained influence over the Chinese. In reality, this influence was steadily diminishing, and Beijing calibrated the tension until a brief Sino-Soviet war broke out[152]. Beijing was not overly concerned by this, understanding that this time it had slightly crossed the boundary of tolerance, while simultaneously gaining invaluable knowledge as to how far it could go in the future. The clashes on the Sino-Russian border were, in effect, highly limited and decidedly more demonstrative in nature. The true motive was the desire to weaken the USSR's position among the other socialist states, thereby elevating the PRC to the role of a new leader. This manoeuvre ultimately ended in failure, but it secured a better negotiating position for China in the future. Territorial disputes waged with neighbouring states, such as India and Vietnam, were, on the one hand, a means of testing a potential adversary, while on the other, they were actually directed at Western powers and the USSR, constituting a kind of show of force. Beijing was prepared to sacrifice a large portion of

151 J. Chang, J. Halliday, op. cit., pp. 337–378.

152 Ł. A. Kariakin, W. I. Moisjejew, *Wojennaja tiechnika i woorużenije Kitaja. Wypusk pierwyj. Tanki*, Sarańsk 2003, p. 108.

the human resources at its disposal, or at least presented such an attitude towards the powers from which it sought to negotiate specific concessions[153].

Internal transformations, such as the so-called 'Great Leap Forward' and the subsequent 'Cultural Revolution', were equally dramatic. The true objective of the 'Great Leap Forward' was by no means an economic leap achieved by melting down pots and other everyday items into unusable 'ore', but rather the complete subjugation of both the entire society and the party[154]. Mao utilised Soviet models and, in a slightly different form, repeated the scenario that had unfolded much earlier in Ukraine (the so-called Great Famine[155]). The end result was millions of victims and the complete obedience of subsequent generations to the government. The Cultural Revolution, in turn, was directed primarily against circles that were overly freethinking and oppositional to the Maoists, which had begun to emerge within the CCP at that time. The first glimpses of the Four Modernisations programme appeared as early as the 1950s, and subsequently in the 1960s. Initially at regional conferences, then before a wider audience, yet still unofficially. On the one hand, the objective was to gauge party and public opinion regarding these intentions, and on the other, to gradually accustom society to a programme that essentially negated the economic foundations of socialism, let alone communism[156]. The question therefore arises as to why this programme was implemented only after Mao's death, given that the

153 V. P. Malik, *Kargil from Surprise to Victory*, HarperCollins Publishers India 2010, p. 343; B. Kiernan, *Viet Nam: A History from Earliest Times to the Present*, Oxford University Press 2017, p. 582.

154 J. Fenby, op. cit., pp. 540–554.

155 R. Kuśnierz, *Głód na Ukrainie w latach 1932–1933 w świetle zbiorów Archiwum Akt Nowych oraz Centralnego Archiwum Wojskowego w Warszawie*, "Dzieje Najnowsze" 2007, No. 2, pp. 129–159.

156 P. B. Ebrey, *Four Modernizations Era. A Visual Sourcebook of Chinese Civilization*, University of Washington, http://depts.washington. edu/chinaciv/graph/9confour.htm, 30.07.2011; I. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, Oxford University Press, New York 2000; J. R. Evans, *Deng Xiaoping and the making of modern China*, Penguin Books, London 1995.

entire concept of the reform implemented in the late 1970s was born precisely during his rule. The reason appears to be prosaic: introducing the programme before society and the party had been completely subjugated to the will of the Great Helmsman would have meant strengthening the oppositionists. The Chairman himself simply did not live to see the introduction of the programme, the official initiation of which fell to his successor, Deng Xiaoping[157]. This clearly demonstrates the highly contextual, long-term, and collective policy of Chinese decision-makers, whilst unfortunately being simultaneously characterised by a very high power distance with respect to their own society.

The 1980s and 1990s were a period of building economic standing, conducting gradual and unhurried reconnaissance for future investment opportunities, and initiating a programme of reform and modernisation of the armed forces[158]. During this period, Beijing avoided aggression, observing rather than engaging in any conflicts. It was not until the beginning of the 21st century that the first minor border incidents and provocative actions were initiated to test the reaction of the surrounding environment. The lack of a resolute reaction from international public opinion served as an encouragement for somewhat more assertive actions. Among other things, more definitive territorial claims emerged compared to previous years, particularly concerning rights to the waters of the East and South China Seas[159]. Simultaneously, economic dependencies continued to be actively developed and strengthened, whilst rhetoric towards Taiwan and the remaining Southeast Asian states was escalated.

Until the end of the first decade of the 21st century, modernisation primarily concerned the navy, the air force, and the slowly developing so-called space forces. A further step is the project, initiated in the second decade of the 21st century, to construct militarised

157 J. Fenby, op. cit., pp. 706–762.
158 Ibidem, pp. 844–898.
159 D. Brążkiewicz, Z. Śliwa, *Azja – konflikty i zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw 2011, pp. 49–68.

artificial islands in disputed waters, as well as the commissioning of aircraft carriers[160]. This so-called 'fait accompli' method draws sharp criticism upon Beijing from international public opinion, alongside an increasingly visible and significant strengthening of the United States naval presence in the region. Other states, led by wealthy countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, are increasing their expenditure on modernisation and armaments. Almost at the critical juncture of mounting tension across East and Southeast Asia, Russia annexed Crimea, and shortly thereafter a civil war began in Ukraine, diverting the world's attention away from Beijing's actions in Asia. The Chinese automatically became the natural ally of an isolated Moscow, a position they ruthlessly exploit by buying up Russian raw materials for almost nothing, and shortly afterwards reaching for the most advanced military technologies[161]. Furthermore, since 2014, the Chinese process of investing in and settling Eastern Siberia has intensified with the tacit consent of Putin's regime (prior to 2014, Chinese colonisation was deliberately restricted)[162]. This once again demonstrates the multifaceted manner in which Chinese decision-makers can play the international situation, typically anticipating several benefits simultaneously, where achieving merely a portion of them already constitutes a significant added value. Moreover, these calculations are usually long-term, and quite often, currently undertaken actions simultaneously serve to lay the groundwork for delayed, yet almost certain, benefits.

Beijing's decision-makers possess an advantage over the decision-makers of fallen empires (including the German Reich or Imperial Japan). Typically, they do not stake everything on a single gamble, and orchestrated international situations that are seemingly more dangerous than in reality are merely an element of the game. An element calculated in such a way that, in the event of failure, it does not

160 M. Górnikiewicz, *Modelowanie...*, pp. 150–154.
161 Ibidem, pp. 217–218.
162 F. Jacobs, *Why China Will Reclaim Siberia*, "The New York Times", https://www.ny-times.com/roomfordebate/2014/07/03/where-do-borders-need-to-be-redrawn/why-china – will-reclaim-siberia, 28 February 2018.

disrupt the execution of the overall plan aimed at achieving those true, typically long-term objectives.

Table 19. The Chinese decision-making process determined by specific cultural code values

Decision content	PD	MAS	COL	LUA	LTO	HC
Utilising the support of the USSR to consolidate the Kuomintang and establish regular armed forces capable of defeating the generals in the north, followed, after the initial victories, by the severing of cooperation with the CCP and a massacre of communists and their allies carried out by Chiang Kai-shek within his own ranks.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Concluding an alliance in defence against a common enemy, Japan, from 1937 to 1945. The ability to adapt to changing conditions and planned action regardless of harboured resentments and emotions. During this period, the significantly weakened communists effectively limited themselves to remaining neutral and gathering strength prior to the final confrontation with the Kuomintang.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The policy of double standards in diplomatic recognition between Beijing and Taipei from 1949 to the present.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Participation in the Korean War in order to draw the USSR and the USA into an exhausting conflict, whilst simultaneously exerting pressure on Moscow to grant access to military technologies.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Initiating crises in the Taiwan Strait in order to extract new military technologies from the USSR (playing a game between Washington and Moscow).	x	x	x	x	x	x
The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution programmes, acting to prepare society and the party for the previously planned Four Modernisations programme.	x	x	x	x	x	x
An attempt to weaken the USSR among other socialist states and to strengthen its own position and prestige.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The gradual strengthening of economic potential and the modernisation of the armed forces in the 1980s and 1990s in order to lay the groundwork for the operation to seize control of the East and South China Seas.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Testing the reaction of international public opinion to more decisive and aggressive behaviour in the East and South China Seas, alongside the commissioning of aircraft carriers in parallel with the construction of artificial islands. A significant premise is also presenting China as the greatest guarantor of stability, provided one enters into a suitable alliance with Beijing. It is, therefore, an element of the rivalry with Washington for primacy in the region.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Exploiting Moscow's dependence on Beijing's support in order to acquire raw materials for almost nothing, obtain the most advanced military technologies, and facilitate the colonisation of Eastern Siberia.	x	x	x	x	x	x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning China's international relations: 100%.

India

Indians have created a civilisation that is now thousands of years old. A civilisation which from its inception has bordered and frequently clashed with Chinese civilisation. The mutual relations and interpenetration of these two cultures, however, never led to unification, but rather to the adaptation of the products of both cultures, such as philosophical and religious movements, to their own respective conditions[163]. Buddhism was born precisely in ancient India, from where it gradually began to permeate Chinese soil, where it too underwent an 'adaptation' to local cultural conditions[164]. Previously, the ancient Chinese believed in polytheism, which, incidentally, still has many followers in China to this day. This religious and philosophical interpenetration of the two cultures influenced the formation of entirely new ideas, such as Confucianism or Taoism. This is particularly interesting given that in Europe and the Middle East, polytheism was replaced by the belief in one God. In other words, the mental sphere of the so-called Western and Far Eastern civilisations was formed on a completely different cultural foundation. This is the reason why the cultural codes that constitute the mental programming of individual social groups also differ between the aforementioned civilisational spheres. At the same time, however, the Indian cultural sphere has retained a great deal of distinctiveness in relation to China and other Southeast Asian countries, where Chinese and Indian cultural influences have been intertwining for centuries. Today, India has become both an economic and a military power. The fact that it continues to develop somewhat in the media shadow of its northern

[163] R. Meredith, *Chiny i Indie. Supermocarstwa XXI wieku*, Nadir Media Lazar, Warsaw 2009, pp. 7–34.
[164] P. Occhiogrosso, *Sekty, religie, wyznania*, Muza SA, Warsaw 1999, pp. 129––202.

neighbour is evidence of how effective the Indian strategy for building its own power truly is. Beijing effectively draws the attention of the entire world upon itself, whilst Delhi, undisturbed by anyone, pursues a peaceful and as non-confrontational a strategy as possible, calculated to achieve its own geopolitical objectives. According to the results of G. Hofstede's research, Indian activity is determined by the following cultural values:

Table 20. Cultural code values: India

Cultural codes: India					
High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
High / Low	8	IND/COL:5	MAS:5.5	6	5

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

The picture of the Indian decision-making process based on the aforementioned codes does not appear very favourable in comparison with the Chinese one. It might seem that the extraordinary effectiveness of Indian decision-makers, who are quietly building their own power, is merely the result of a balance of power on the international stage that is fortunate for Delhi. A detailed analysis of specific decisions made in the 20th and early 21st centuries should help determine the validity of the cultural determinants presented above. It follows from the preceding points that Indian decision-makers view the world similarly to their Chinese neighbours, through the prism of hierarchically arranged spheres of influence belonging to regional or global powers. At the same time, the medium level of collectivism and individualism means that, depending on the situation, Indian decision-makers can enter even into long-term alliances; however, they are not driven by an internal compulsion to build lasting intergovernmental organisations. A masculinity value slightly above the average means that Indians are inclined to resort to forceful solutions only in specific cases, and typically to a limited extent. A level

of uncertainty avoidance only slightly higher than the average makes them prepared to take risks, yet they prefer solutions with a correspondingly higher degree of stability. Simultaneously, they are able to plan and foresee the consequences of their own actions only within a limited time perspective. This, combined with the medium level of masculinity and a slightly higher level of uncertainty avoidance, should result in Delhi's policy being characterised by caution and a balanced approach to changes in the international arena. In other words, India does not appear to be a country with imperial aspirations regardless of the level of its own power, but rather focuses on its immediate surroundings instead of a comprehensively perceived international reality. Indeed, at first glance, such an approach would fit Indian policy in the region and, even more so, globally. It remains, therefore, to verify whether these values truly corresponded, and continue to correspond, to the realities of the decision-making process determining foreign policy in the 20th and 21st centuries.

The 19th century, as well as the first half of the 20th century, was spent by Indians attempting to win independence and break free from the compulsory tutelage of the British Crown[165]. Changes occurring in the mental sphere of European societies also influenced urban intellectual elites educated along Western models. This resulted in the establishment in 1885 of the Congress Party, which demanded the participation of Indian society in the still typically colonial system of governance in their own country (India was still ruled on behalf of London by a viceroy who, as late as 1912, relocated the capital to Delhi, among other things). Following the end of the First World War, Indian independence circles made further attempts to win independence, which met with a firm and usually brutal response from the authorities[166]. Only towards the end of the

[165] E. Wright, *A Dictionary of World History*, Oxford University Press 2015, p. 537; S. A. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale: revolution and reform in the making of modern India*, Oxford University Press 1991, p. 67; M. Edwardes, *High Noon of Empire: India under Curzon*, Published by Eyre & Spottiswoode, London 1965, p. 77.

[166] D. C. Potter, *Manpower Shortage and the End of Colonialism: The Case of*

Second World War (evidently influenced by rapidly unfolding global changes) did the British side decide to enter into talks with Indian representatives of independence circles[167]. Faced with the prospect of the inevitable collapse of the former colonial system, decision-makers in London decided upon a step that would enable them to preserve the maximum possible benefits. Especially given the necessity of rapidly rebuilding the economy. The Indian opposition was represented by:

- the Indian National Congress, acting as the largest socio-political platform at the time, uniting a wide variety of organisations (both secular and religious);
- the All-India Muslim League, extremely radical and antagonistic towards the INC;
- the social movement centred around Mohandas K. Gandhi, who encouraged the use of passive resistance without resorting to any acts of violence.

Despite Gandhi's clear opposition, the country was partitioned into India and Muslim Pakistan; the latter state encompassed the former strictly Indian territories of Sind, Balochistan, part of the Punjab, as well as East Bengal (referred to as East Pakistan), a territory separated from the rest of the country by almost the entirety of India. During this time, Gandhi strove to mitigate the escalating disputes and the numerous resulting pogroms driven by religious differences. In January 1948, Gandhi was assassinated by a fanatical Hindu and nationalist[168]. In accordance with London's will, both India and Pakistan received the status of dominions, which meant that they remained under London's tutelage, albeit with increased auton-

Indian Civil Service, Modern Asian Studies, No. 7 (1), January 1973, pp. 47–73; S. Epstein, *District Officers in Decline: The Erosion of British Authority in the Bombay Countryside, 1919 to 1947*, Modern Asian Studies, No. 16 (3), May 1982, pp. 493–518.

[167] D. Judd, *The Lion and the Tiger: The Rise and Fall of the British Raj, 1600––1947*, Oxford University Press, Oxford–New York 2004, pp. 170–173.

[168] C. Clément, *Gandhi – mocarz wolności*, Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, Wrocław 1994, p. 121.

omy. The period between 1948 and 1950 passed in an atmosphere of numerous clashes between Muslims and followers of Hinduism. In 1950, the constitution was adopted. India became a secular republic with a parliamentary system, entirely independent of London. Jawaharlal Nehru, who hailed from the Congress, became the first prime minister. From this point onwards, one can speak of Delhi's independent foreign policy towards other states[169].

The basis was a strategy resulting from the teachings of Gandhi, who advocated peaceful coexistence and non-involvement in the disputes of other states, especially those of the great powers which had previously been colonial empires influencing events in Asia. This approach was formally expressed in the 1954 concept of peaceful coexistence, Panchsheel, in the form of five principles[170]:

- mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- mutual non-aggression,
- mutual non-interference in internal affairs,
- equality and mutual benefit,
- peaceful coexistence.

In the meantime, also in reference to Mahatma Gandhi's concepts in the 1940s and 1950s, an initiative was undertaken to establish the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1947 in New Delhi (the conference of Asian states) and subsequently in 1949 (the conference uniting Asian and African states), the postulates of pacifism and resistance against violence were adopted. A democratic formula was adopted for the decision-making process, and the following objectives were identified for implementation[171]:

- exerting influence on UN decisions,
- maintaining the independence of states,

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169 Reba Som, *Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over Substance?*, „Modern Asian Studies" 1994, No. 28 (1), pp. 165–194.

170 A. Kuszewska, *Indie i Pakistan w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Konflikty, strategie, bezpieczeństwo*, Wydawnictwo Difin, Warsaw 2013, pp. 281–282.

171 P. Zieliński, *Konferencja w Bandungu – Trzeci Świat dochodzi do głosu*, Konflikty.pl, http://www.konflikty.pl/historia/czasy-najnowsze/konferencja-w-bandungu-trzeci-swiat-dochodzi-do-glosu/, 1 June 2011.

- safeguarding against satellisation,
- resistance against violence and force,
- democratic decision-making (reaching agreement in international relations).

One of the first moves of the independent government in Delhi was the incorporation of the princely states of Junagadh and Hyderabad, which had previously functioned as independent entities. In 1956, the French possession of Pondicherry was annexed. Five years later, the government also laid claim to the hitherto Portuguese Goa, where the army marched in[172]. All of this transpired peacefully and was aimed at the gradual stabilisation of the borders, whose shape, along with the existence of smaller state entities, was a remnant of British colonial policy. London, wishing to separate India from China, established a series of formally independent small states along the border, which constituted a buffer zone enabling more effective management of the territory of India proper. This was also the result of masterfully exploiting various divisions within the highest castes, which allowed for the effective management of the entire territory. Therefore, following India's regaining of independence, border issues became one of the first and most serious problems. This was particularly interesting insofar as the course of the borders according to Indian cartographers did not correspond to that shown on Chinese maps. This soon became a cause of conflict. The same was true of the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. In fact, Indian decision-makers rarely sought conflict, preferring instead to resolve disputes through diplomatic means, whereas clashes and wars were the result of somewhat more aggressive actions by neighbouring states. At that time, India entered the fray with varying degrees of success, sometimes losing and sometimes gaining the disputed territories. Returning to the 1950s, the process of normalising borders, which consisted of incorporating smaller and poorly

[172] M. Lane, *A short history of long speeches*, BBC News Magazine, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8272473.stm, 19.09.2009; A. A. Majid, *Can self-determination solve the Kashmir Dispute?*, „Romanian Journal of European Affairs" 2007, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 38–57.

defended territories, led to territorial frictions with China. In the 1960s, a dispute flared up between Delhi and Beijing over northern Kashmir and the so-called NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency). This resulted in the Chinese occupation of the disputed territory of Aksai Chin[173].

As a result of the military operations conducted, India's military weakness was exposed. This came as a profound shock both to the Indians themselves and to international public opinion. Indian decision-makers realised that they could rely solely on themselves, which led to a break with their previous policy of non-aggression, the initiation of an arms buildup, and the future acquisition of nuclear weapons. At that point, they began to rely on arms deliveries from the United States, Europe, and the USSR. The conflict with Pakistan over control of Kashmir was also not without significance. Prime Minister Nehru decided to intervene in order to expel the Pakistan-backed militants who had unlawfully occupied the disputed territory. Hostilities ultimately ended in a bilateral ceasefire under pressure from the UN. This resulted in the establishment of the *United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan* (UNMOGIP), which demarcated a line separating the parties to the conflict. The promised plebiscite was ultimately never held. The situation remained unresolved; furthermore, sporadic and short-lived territorial disputes continued to erupt, eventually culminating in a full-scale war in 1965. The trigger was an unsuccessful attempt by Pakistani diversionary forces to incite an uprising, which resulted in the intervention of the Indian army. Subsequently, Pakistan officially declared war, with Islamabad receiving support from various Muslim countries. The conflict ended in 1966, once again under the influence of the UN, and both sides committed to withdrawing beyond the demarcation line and undertaking talks towards a peaceful resolution of the escalated dispute[174].

[173] R. Samaddar, *Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947–2000*, Sage India 2003, p. 285.

[174] *India-Pakistan troubled relations*, 1947–48, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeli-

Until 1966, it was Pakistan that had more or less openly provoked conflicts, whereas in 1971, India provided support to the independence organisation fighting for the liberation of Bangladesh. The Pakistani army launched lightning operations aimed at pacifying the uprising. The air force conducted air strikes, some of which struck areas bordering India, becoming the direct reason for declaring war on Pakistan. This time, however, the Indian army was significantly better equipped and prepared. Consequently, it crushed the enemy forces across the entirety of East Pakistan, contributing to the establishment of the independent state of Bangladesh[175]. In 1972, an agreement was concluded regarding Kashmir, where the Indian military had once again gained the upper hand over the Pakistani forces. A new demarcation line was agreed upon, alongside commitments to cease propaganda and to resolve the border issue peacefully. In 1976, normal diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries were restored[176].

In the 1980s and 1990s, pro-Pakistani separatist organisations, typically with strong ties to the Islamic movement, gradually began to develop in Kashmir. An uprising broke out, fuelled mainly by Pakistani mujahideen. In 1986, India deployed 150,000 soldiers to the border, which was met with a similar response from Pakistan. In 1987, both sides withdrew their forces as a result of international mediation; however, a rebellion broke out in 1988, and Delhi accused Islamabad of providing the mujahideen with support in the form of equipment and weaponry[177]. The two capitals did not resume talks until 1996.

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ne/1947_48.stm, 3 March.2018; *India-Pakistan troubled relations*, 1965, BBC News, http://news.bbc. co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1965.stm, 3.03. 2018.

175 J. Kukułka, *Historia współczesna stosunków międzynarodowych 1945–1996*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2008, pp. 239–242.

176 *India-Pakistan troubled relations*, 1971, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ eng-lish/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1971.stm, 3 March 2018; *India-Pakistan troubled relations*, 1989, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1989.stm, 3.03.2018.

177 P. Pacuła, *Indyjsko-pakistański konflikt o Kaszmir jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa w Azji. Historia i perspektywy*, "Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe", Kwartalnik BBN, II – 2014/30, Warsaw 2014, pp. 243–244.

Nevertheless, in 1998, India conducted a series of nuclear tests in the Pokhran desert, and Pakistan responded in kind, demonstrating a similar show of force just a few days later. The situation became dangerous, as both sides resorted for the first time to such an overt display of their own capabilities from their arsenals of mass destruction. Under strong pressure from international public opinion, both countries signed an agreement in 1999 to cease further testing of nuclear weapons[178]. Unfortunately, as early as 2001, the armed forces of India and Pakistan were placed on high alert following Delhi's allegations of Islamabad's involvement in an attack on the Indian parliament. Thanks to further mediation and pressure from Washington, peace talks were resumed, and diplomatic relations between the two capitals were restored once again in 2003. In 2008, attacks took place on luxury hotels in Mumbai, claiming the lives of approximately 160–180 people. In the same year, there was also an attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, resulting in the deaths of around 60 people. Islamabad openly denied any links to the attacks, which were suspected to have been orchestrated by Pakistani mujahideen. Islamabad furthermore announced its readiness to support the international fight against terrorism. The Islamic rebellion in Kashmir continues to this day[179].

Table 21. The Indian decision-making process determined by specific cultural code values

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL/ IND	H/ LUA	LTO/ STO	H/LC
Strikes and protests directed against the British, involving an increasingly large percentage of the Indian population, as well as internal fighting between Hindus and Muslims, up until India regained its independence.	x	x	x	x	x	x

178 Ibidem, p. 242.

179 A. Peerzada, *Kashmir tense after Shopian civilian killings*, The Hindu, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/kashmir-tense-after-shopian-civilian-killings/article22541503.ece, 3 March 2018; *Who are the Kashmir militants?*, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18738906, 1 August 2012.

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL/ IND	H/ LUA	LTO/ STO	H/LC
Pursuing a policy of neutrality, and in the face of the developing so-called Cold War, adopting a strategy of not explicitly siding with either party (the 1954 Panchsheel concept).		x	x	x		x
The gradual incorporation of independent territories into India, typically in a peaceful manner, without resorting to violence.	x	x	x	x		x
Contributing to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, whose members wished to remain neutral in the Cold War conflict. At its peak, the movement comprised nearly one hundred states from Asia and Africa.	x	x	x	x		x
The Sino-Indian War in 1962, provoked by Beijing and ending with the annexation of the disputed Aksai Chin territory by the PRC.	x	x	x	x	x	x
As a result of the exposure of India's military weakness, the initiation by the Indian authorities of a large-scale programme to build up their military capabilities, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons.	x	x	x	x		x
The continuation of the policy of peaceful coexistence, but with a shift regarding the expansion of their own military capabilities (given the inability to rely on allies), and a greater emphasis on cooperation among states that preferred to remain neutral.	x	x	x	x		x
India's wars with Pakistan over Kashmir: 1947–1948, 1965, and 1971.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Succumbing to the pressure and mediation of international public opinion, which in each instance sought to conclude peace with Pakistan during successive wars.	x	x	x	x		x
The continuation of the policy of economic and military growth, while simultaneously avoiding crises in relations with international public opinion regarding issues such as environmental degradation: on the one hand, industrial development causes damage; on the other, Indian authorities offer assurances of their efforts to protect the environment in Kashmir, even though this dispute has not been definitively resolved to this day, and Kashmir itself remains a flashpoint in the region.	x	x	x	x		x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning India's international relations: 88%.

Libya

Libya gained notoriety in particular in the memorable year of 2011, when the juggernaut of the Arab Spring swept across North Africa

and the Middle East, toppling Gaddafi's seemingly unshakeable regime in its wake. Consequently, the country plunged into a devastating civil war. The territory was divided into larger and smaller spheres of influence governed by various interest groups. There is no indication that the situation will change in any way in the foreseeable future[180]. This makes it all the more worthwhile to delve into the history of this remarkable region, where civilisation was already developing in antiquity. Between the 11th and 10th centuries BC, the coast of modern-day Libya was colonised by the Phoenicians, while from the 8th century BC onwards, colonies established by the Greeks began to operate in the eastern part. In the 6th century BC, this area was incorporated into Carthage, and in the 1st century BC, it came under the suzerainty of an increasingly powerful Rome. In the 4th century AD, the Libyan coast fell under the rule of the Germanic Vandals. For a brief period in the 6th century, control over this territory was seized by the Byzantine Empire, which in the 7th century lost its dominion to the rapidly expanding Arab empire, perpetually hungry for new acquisitions. In the following centuries, rule over this area was exercised by successive dynasties as well as various branches of Islam. Libya was also divided between Egypt and Tunisia, while Tripolitania itself served as a pirate stronghold for some time. Ultimately, in the 16th century, the entire territory came under the dominion of the Ottoman Empire. It was not until the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912 that Rome assumed suzerainty over Libya. Attempts at colonisation and settlement met with exceptionally fierce armed resistance from local tribes. It was only the fascists' rise to power that led the Italians to treat the Libyans as subhumans, committing mass murders, carrying out deportations of the Bedouins, and establishing concentration camps in which thousands of people perished. In 1942, alongside the Allied advance during the war, the country found itself under British and French occupation. Under the 1947 peace treaty, Italy formally renounced

[180] M. Górnikiewicz, T. Szczurek, *Social Media Wars – Revolution Has Just Begun*, Military University of Technology, Warsaw 2017, pp. 52–56.

its claims to Libya, and in 1951, the country became completely independent for the first time in its history[181]. From this moment onwards, one can speak of Libya pursuing an independent foreign policy. Nevertheless, the historical legacy outlined above, which influences the present-day ethnic structure of society, had over the preceding centuries shaped the cultural patterns applied in the subsequent decision-making process.

Table 22. Cultural code values: Libya

Cultural codes: Libya					
High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
Low	8	COL: 5	MAS: 5	7	2

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

With reference to the above data, one might get the impression that Libyan decision-makers are characterised by a very short decision-making horizon, which means that they are incapable of planning and foreseeing the consequences of their own actions in the longer term. It follows from this that they interpret the existing reality 'here and now', and are unable to anticipate changes with sufficient foresight even in their immediate social environment, let alone in the international one. On the other hand, a high level of power distance should translate into a tendency towards submissiveness to entities they inherently regard as authorities, or into a deep respect for stronger entities. A slight predominance of collectivism may also indicate a limited tendency to enter into relations with other states for the purpose of building joint alliances or joining existing ones. In this context, it is interesting to note their unequivocal avoidance of limiting their own sovereignty in favour of the USSR, while simultaneously displaying noticeable submissiveness to Moscow's remarks

[181] *Libia. Historia*, *Encyklopedia PWN*, https://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/Libia-Historia; 4574625.html, 5 March 2018.

and suggestions. When dealing with countries outside Europe and Asia (regions with which the USSR and the Warsaw Pact satellite states shared direct borders), Soviet decision-makers applied a strategy of building alliances that was nonetheless based on a high degree of independence for those states. This was a significant difference, as it allowed them to sell numerous goods (including weapons) at near-market prices, while simultaneously leveraging these relations as a bargaining chip with the West. Tripoli remained a loyal ally of Moscow almost to the very end, and reoriented its foreign policy only when it became clear that the United States remained the sole major player left in the arena, and one which, moreover, had no qualms about removing defiant dictators from their own countries, even by means of direct military intervention[182]. Furthermore, what stands out is the inability to foresee the trajectory of international developments, alongside waiting until the very last moment to make a decision regarding a change in the scope of previous activities, part of which involved the almost overt sponsorship and instigation of terrorism[183]. Such a policy was evidently not only short-sighted, but quite simply brought about significantly more harm than any benefits in the near future. Finally, it is worth noting that the regime proved utterly unprepared for the unfolding of the Arab Spring, entirely disregarded public sentiment (which, after all, had been the driving force behind the overthrow of the previous, self-proclaimed ruler several decades earlier), and ultimately failed to effectively counteract this phenomenon. In fact, the only code that raises distinct reservations is the moderate level of masculinity, which, given the country's history, should exhibit a correspondingly higher value; similarly, uncertainty avoidance should have a lower value.

From gaining independence until 1963, Libya was a federation, and was subsequently transformed into a unitary state ruled by King Idris

182 E. Wittakers, *A Revolutionary or A Terrorist: Muammar Gaddafi of Libya*, Think Tank Publications 2016.

183 T. Joscelyn, *The Libyan Terrorist: Muammar Qaddafi*, The Weekly Standard, The Libyan Terrorist: Muammar Qaddafi, http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-libyan-terrorist-muammar-qaddafi/article/552474, 5 March 2018.

I. The figure of the monarch was interesting insofar as the Libyans had not previously had their own kings, meaning they also had no dynastic lines with a legitimate claim to return to the throne. This was all the more striking at the close of the Second World War, when the entire world was moving towards more or less sophisticated forms of democracy and parliamentarianism (even one-party systems, as was the case with states behind the so-called Iron Curtain). In other words, even dictators who established absolute rule styled themselves as the chosen representatives of the nation, and none of them bore the title of king. It seems that this approach, and its initial social acceptance, stemmed from a high power distance as well as the fact that, aside from nomadic tribes, the rest of the population had grown accustomed to an absolute, colonial method of governance. The only people to take up arms against Italian settlement between 1920 and 1932 were the nomads. In other words, the majority of Libya's inhabitants received their freedom as a post-war gift from the Allies and presumably did not quite know what to do with it. As-Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi as-Sanusi himself, later King Idris I, began his major political career as the Emir of Cyrenaica in 1917, and subsequently also of Tripolitania from 1929. In 1942, both of these territories fell under British occupation. In other words, the incumbent emir, who had assumed power during Italian rule, was able to ingratiate himself just as adeptly with the new, albeit pre-existing, 'protectors'. Following Libya's independence, he quite simply appeared to be the only viable contender for power over a country, the majority of which he had ruled for the preceding decades. As King Idris I, As-Sayyid established an absolute monarchy and banned the activities of any political parties. During his reign, oil reserves were discovered, from which the self-proclaimed monarch derived the greatest benefits. The centralised policy negatively impacted religious and tribal divisions, which translated into a gradual decline in the popularity of Idris I[184]. Accusations of favouring the West and Israel, widespread corruption

[184] *Libia. Historia, Encyklopedia PWN*, https://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/Libia-His-toria;4574625.html, 5 March 2018.

and poverty, as well as the failure to provide support to Egypt in the Six-Day War, led to severe riots and strikes, including the participation in protests of workers from the oil sector, which was vital to the ruler. In 1969, Idris I abdicated, handing over power to his nephew, presumably hoping that such a ploy would placate the public and allow him to retain actual power. The very next day, a military coup led by Colonel Gaddafi took place, overthrowing the existing system of government[185].

The dethroned Idris I, with a death sentence passed in absentia by the newly established Libyan People's Court, went to Egypt, where he lived to an advanced age. Gaddafi changed Libya's name to the 'Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya' and completely overhauled the political system, creating a socio-political framework that drew on Arab socialism and political Islam[186]. In 1979, he formally ceased to hold any official positions, but in reality, he retained absolute power. While the foreign policy of his predecessor had been markedly subdued, showing slight support for Western powers (Idris I, having learned from his own experience, assumed that there was no point in challenging those greater than himself, and that it was better to reach an accommodation with them), Gaddafi's foreign policy was entirely different. In the early years of the republic's existence, the direction of Tripoli's international activity could be described as adventurist:

- following the conclusion of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, Tripoli formally severed ties with Cairo;
- it criticised Arab states pursuing a conciliatory international policy (especially towards Western powers and Israel);
- it supported Iran in the Iran–Iraq War;
- it supported Palestinian independence organisations, particularly their radical wings, while simultaneously accusing Yasser Arafat of being overly conciliatory;

185 M. Asser, *The Muammar Gaddafi story*, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-africa-12688033, 5 March 2018.

186 D. Kawczynski, *Seeking Gaddafi: Libya, the West and the Arab Spring*, Biteback 2011, p. 225.

- it gradually and increasingly vocally criticised the foreign policy of the United States.

Such a strident foreign policy tone could not go unanswered by the international community. In the second half of the 1980s, it led to the imposition of economic sanctions on Libya and provoked airstrikes by the United States Air Force. In the late 1980s, likely influenced by the noticeable weakening of the Soviet Union and the entire Warsaw Pact (largely as a result of increasingly severe economic problems), Tripoli made the decision to pursue both political and economic liberalisation. The next step, likely by way of seeking a counterweight to Washington's then-growing power, was the search for allies capable of supporting Libya's development and alleviating the existing tensions in Libyan–American relations without having to resort to direct gestures of reconciliation towards American decision-makers, which Gaddafi deemed humiliating[187].

Subsequently, Libya began to gradually warm and develop relations with Western European countries (primarily France and the United Kingdom) as well as previously criticised Arab states (Iraq, Jordan, Egypt), which were pursuing a relatively neutral foreign policy[188]. A highly important and strictly personal motive was Gaddafi's observations regarding the demise of dictatorial regimes in countries with exceptionally weak economies. This was also one of the direct reasons for the initiated changes, which were intended to improve the living conditions of the average citizen. Unfortunately, Gaddafi supported Iraq during its invasion of Kuwait, which was met with a negative reaction from international public opinion and, furthermore, resulted in the imposition of UN sanctions on Tripoli in 1992 for harbouring terrorism suspects on its territory[189]. A turning point occurred in 1999, when Libya handed over the individuals suspected

187 Ibidem, pp. 115–130.

188 D. Vandewalle, *From International Reconciliation to Civil War: 2003–2011*, Libya Since 1969: Qadhafi's Revolution Revisited (revised edition), Palgrave Macmillan 2011, pp. 215–239.

189 *Libia. Historia, Encyklopedia PWN*, https://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/Libia-Historia;4574625.html, 5 March 2018.

of the Lockerbie bombing[190]. Shortly thereafter, Gaddafi also condemned terrorism, which allowed for the normalisation of relations between Libya, the European Union, and the USA. Unfortunately for Gaddafi, a revolution broke out in 2011, which not only led to his death but also plunged the country into a permanent civil war[191].

Table 23. The Libyan decision-making process determined by specific cultural code values

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL	HUA	STO	LC
The 1951–1969 policy of neutrality, characterised by subtle support for Western powers, and thus for Israel, is also referred to as a policy of isolationism, given that Libya was not particularly active in the international arena during this period.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The 1969 military coup, which enjoyed public support, overthrew the monarchy, marking the beginning of Gaddafi's dictatorial rule.			x		x	x
Gaddafi's declaration of a struggle against global imperialism, by which he meant a struggle against the United States; shortly thereafter, he also provided support to Egypt during its war with Israel, which met with the approval of the USSR but drew strong criticism from the West.	x		x		x	x
From 1981 onwards, following Reagan's assumption of the US presidency, Washington offered support to African countries that refused to cooperate with Libya. During this time, Tripoli financed numerous revolutionary movements across Africa.	x		x		x	x
Gaddafi was accused of ordering political assassinations, including that of the American attaché in Paris in 1981, for which Washington imposed further severe economic sanctions on Tripoli.	x		x		x	x
By the mid-1980s, acts of terror, which Gaddafi did not claim responsibility for but publicly praised, had multiplied. In 1986, an unequal clash occurred between three US Navy carrier strike groups and Gaddafi's forces, ending in the latter's defeat. Gaddafi subsequently responded with acts of terror and announced the necessity of killing Americans, including civilians, anywhere in the world. That same year, the US Air Force bombed a number of military targets as well as the dictator's villa, which was intended to exert pressure on Gaddafi so that he would cease initiating further terrorist attacks.	x		x		x	x

190 E. Cody, *Pan Am Jet Crashes in Scotland, Killing 270*, Washington Post Foreign Service, Thursday, December 22, 1988; Page A01.

191 M. Górnikiewicz, T. Szczurek, *Social Media Wars...*, p. 77.

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL	HUA	STO	LC
In 1988, the notorious bombing of a Pan American flight took place, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. The operation was carried out by Libyan intelligence officers.	x		x		x	x
As a result of pressure from international public opinion and the fall of numerous socialist and dictatorial regimes after 1988 (including the regime in Iraq), Gaddafi drastically changed his approach and took steps towards the gradual normalisation of relations with the West.	x		x		x	x
In 1999, Tripoli handed over the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing, and in 2003, it officially admitted to orchestrating the attack and paid compensation to the families of the victims.	x		x		x	x
The Arab revolution and the overthrow of Gaddafi's regime in 2011; the beginning of an endless civil war.			x		x	x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning Libya's international relations: 64%.

Egypt

The Egyptians created one of the first and oldest civilisations, whose population has largely retained its ethnic homogeneity to the present day. In this respect, Egypt is undoubtedly unique, much like China and India. An entirely different fate befell the former Roman Empire, or more precisely, the population inhabiting the Apennine Peninsula in antiquity. With the Migration Period and successive migratory movements over subsequent centuries, a nation emerged whose roots can be traced in part to the ancient Romans, Greeks, Germanic tribes, and many other ethnic groups that inhabited this historically unique peninsula for an extended period[192]. One need only look at the physical appearance of an average Roman, visible in numerous paintings and statues, to understand that modern-day Italy is inhabited by people who have little in common with Romu-

[192] *O pochodzeniu Włochów słów kilka*, Pod słońcem Italii, http://podsloncemitalii.pl/ pochodzenie-wlochow/o-pochodzeniu-wlochow-slow-kilka, 5.03.2018.

lus and Remus. Egypt, however, has largely retained its homogeneity, which would imply that its cultural values also evolved correspondingly slower than those of nations that intermingled with other populations as a result of historical developments. Of course, it should be borne in mind that cultural values are characteristic of a given social group, regardless of origin. Individuals raised from childhood within a particular cultural sphere gradually acquire the same traits. On the other hand, there are also genetic codes through which knowledge (including patterns) is passed down from ancestors. The allocation of these codes, however, appears to be random, or at least it may seem so to us, external observers of the process of 'distributing' genetic determinants[193] It is worth recalling the fate shared by many Polish and Ukrainian children who were abducted by the Nazis during the Second World War. Specifically, children with blond hair and blue eyes were deemed suitable for adoption and upbringing in accordance with Nazi models. In practice, however, it transpired that these children, upon joining the army, exhibited a reluctance to engage in practices that required them to demonstrate the ruthlessness characteristic of adepts of the Nazi art of war[194]. This problem was noted during meticulous German observations of the educational and adaptation process of these young people. Although their physical appearance matched Nazi ideals, in terms of character they did not fit the mould of the golden youth of the Third Reich. Presumably, in light of the above, had the German Reich miraculously survived the war, Hitler would have been portrayed as a blue-eyed blond in order to better conform to the canon of Nazi perfection. Returning to Egypt, as in previous sections, the values derived from Hofstede's research and the history of the Egyp-

193 *Czy DNA dziedziczę po wszystkich przodkach? – Każdy ma dwa drzewa*, Genealogia genetyczna, http://www.genealogiagenetyczna.com/2015/08/czy-dna-dziedzicze-po-wszystkich.html, 5.03.2018.

194 V. R. Berghahn, *Germans and Poles 1871–1945*, [in:] *Germany and Eastern Eu-rope: Cultural Identities and Cultural Differences*, Rodopi, New York–Amsterdam 1999; H. N. Lynn, *Cruel World: The Children of Europe in the Nazi Web*, Vin-tage, New York 2006, p. 249.

tians will be discussed first, thereby making it possible to juxtapose political decisions with the values cited below.

Table 24. Cultural code values: Egypt

Cultural codes: Egypt					
High Context / Low Context	High / Low Power Distance	Individualism / Collectivism	Masculinity / Femininity	High / Low Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation
Low	7	COL: 7.5	MAS: 5	8	1

Source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/.

The above values paint a rather surprising and, at first glance, seemingly inaccurate picture of a people who built a powerful, centuries-old empire in antiquity. The value that is the most perplexing is the extremely low short-term orientation, roughly corresponding to that of tribal and clan-based African states (and even then, not all of them). This is compounded by a relatively high level of power distance, which entails a respect for global powers, or at least those recognised as an authority. A high collectivism index virtually compels action in the international arena within the framework of international organisations, as well as the building of lasting and forward-looking alliances (although given such a low level of short-term orientation, it seems that Egyptian decision-makers might frequently misjudge situations). A very high level of uncertainty avoidance suggests an aversion to taking any risks. This, in turn, alongside the other cited values, should translate into a severe lack of activity in the international arena. Combined with a moderate level of masculinity, this would imply that Cairo should not harbour any aspirations towards other states, let alone those of a great power. In short, assuming the aforementioned values hold true, Egypt emerges as a state that is not only entirely inactive in the interstate arena but one that actively seeks alliances within which it can exist peacefully, undertaking essentially no actions that could alter the international situation. In turn, should a sufficiently strong state emerge, it would

gladly take shelter under its wing, allowing it to continue enjoying a stable existence. However, such an interpretation seems highly unjustified for a nation that, in the 20th century alone, endured several wars as well as revolutions. It therefore remains to juxtapose this cultural profile with the historical reality of the state of the pharaohs.

Egypt as a state social structure emerged around 3200 BC and until 2675 BC expanded along the Nile Delta. It was only later, up until 2170 BC, during the period of the so-called Old Kingdom, that it expanded to the east and west of the Nile, adopting a shape similar to its modern one. Subsequently, as a result of internal problems, the state underwent political fragmentation, from which the so-called Middle Kingdom of Egypt emerged. During this period, the area of the country almost doubled in comparison with the Old Kingdom. The Second Intermediate Period, on the other hand, was followed by the era of the New Kingdom, when Egypt reached the zenith of its power, once again significantly expanding its territorial reach, including seizing control of the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea and thereby establishing a border with the Hittite Empire (which ruled over the territories of modern-day Turkey, Assyria, and Mesopotamia). It was not until 671 BC that the Egyptians succumbed to the second Assyrian offensive, although the rulers of Assyria managed to conquer only a portion of the former empire. In 525 BC, Egypt, in turn, fell under Persian rule. It must be acknowledged that both the Assyrians and the Persians contented themselves with establishing their own suzerainty and did not excessively interfere in Egypt's internal affairs, leaving this to an administrative apparatus selected from among the Egyptians. Consequently, Egyptian culture could continue to evolve, enriching itself with borrowings from Assyrian and Persian cultures, while simultaneously retaining its own distinctiveness. Persian rulers, in turn, out of respect for and in reference to the centuries-old Egyptian culture, liked to depict themselves in pharaonic attire on the edifices they erected. Between 331 and 30 BC, Egypt was conquered by the Macedonians, and as a result, the country became one of the greatest powers of the Hel-

lenistic world. However, following the death of Cleopatra VII (the last representative of the Hellenistic Ptolemaic line), Egypt was incorporated into the Roman Empire, where it remained until 395 AD, when, by virtue of the division of the Empire into two parts, it became part of Byzantium[195]. It was then that ancient Egyptian culture began to undergo gradual erosion as a result of the promotion of Christianity as the new state religion. The country remained within the borders of the Byzantine Empire until its conquest by the Arabs in 642 AD. From that moment onwards, the population of Egypt became the subject of gradual, yet highly effective Islamisation, which completely eradicated the remnants of ancient traditions and beliefs. The Egyptians remained within the sphere of Islamic culture, despite changing rulers, until 1881, when the country became a British protectorate (earlier, very briefly, between 1798 and 1801, it had become part of Napoleon's empire, only to return to the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire)[196]. This intricate history is significant insofar as it demonstrates that while Egypt frequently changed hands, its indigenous population was not subject to major migratory processes; foreigners typically arrived in small numbers, serving in military and administrative roles or simply acting as merchants. Consequently, what most profoundly influenced the formation of cultural values were the influences of the world's two largest religions: Christianity and Islam. On 28 February 1922, the Egyptians declared independence, making the monarch named Fu'ad the first king of modern Egypt. Despite this formal declaration, Cairo remained under the strong influence of London. Nevertheless, a constitutional monarchy was introduced in the country, and thereby a parliamentary system. The main party was the Wafd. Monarch Fu'ad, displeased with the limitation of his power, attempted to dismantle the political system

195 G. Ostrogorski, *Dzieje Bizancjum*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2008, p. 602; J. Wolski, *Historia powszechna. Starożytność*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2002, pp. 79–82.

196 J. Kamil, *Coptic Egypt: History and Guide*, American University in Cairo, Cairo 1997, p. 39; D. Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922*, Cambridge University Press 2005, p. 115.

and make himself the head of government. Faced with strong public opposition, he abandoned these plans, and the previous parliamentary system was restored. The role of the prime minister was strengthened, which enabled him to implement broader internal reforms and initiate talks with the British regarding the withdrawal of their troops from Egypt[197]. In 1937, Egypt officially became a member state of the League of Nations, which was essentially an unequivocal signal that the country had become entirely independent de jure[198]. Despite the signing of a treaty concerning the withdrawal of British garrisons, London's influence remained very strong. Following the Second World War, Egypt's situation was no better than it had been prior to the outbreak of the war. Great Britain also had no intention of relinquishing its influence, hoping to retain the benefits derived from it, even if Egypt was de jure independent. Due to the absence of any changes in Egypt's status and the party elites' ties to the aristocracy and wealthy entrepreneurs, resistance mounted among the impoverished population against the existing disparities, as well as against the lack of full independence for their country.

In 1952, a revolution broke out, which was in reality a well-planned military coup known as the Free Officers Revolution. The rebellion drew the support of the public, enabling the overthrow of the monarchy and the seizure of power without major difficulties (by the Revolutionary Command Council)[199]. The agrarian reform introduced at that time abolished large landholdings; furthermore, the constitution was suspended, and discredited political parties were banned. To put it bluntly, the military assumed absolute power with the backing of the public. Foreign policy directions also changed, with a reorientation from a pro-Western to a pro-Soviet stance. A rivalry with Iraq for primacy in the Arab world also ensued, which in turn resulted in a marked cooling of relations with Israel. As a result

197 J. Jankowski, *Egypt. A Short History*, Oneworld Publications 2000, p. 112.
198 B. Stępniewska-Holzer, J. Holzer, *Egipt. Stulecie przemian*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warsaw 2006, pp. 57–59.
199 J. Zdanowski, *Historia Bliskiego Wschodu w XX wieku*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 2010, pp. 176–178.

of this newly adopted geopolitical orientation, Egypt began receiving military aid from the USSR. A power struggle also erupted among the leaders of the coup, which was ultimately won by Gamal Abdel Nasser[200]. In 1953, the Regency Council was officially dissolved, and a republican system was introduced. In 1955, having ousted his political rivals from power (particularly Naguib, who was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, among others), Nasser initiated internal reforms aimed at building a classless socialist society, while simultaneously preserving a free-market economy coupled with state control over key sectors. In 1956, a new constitution was introduced, granting the president absolute executive power, while vesting legislative power in a National Assembly elected by universal suffrage. The main directions of Nasser's foreign policy during this period included[201]:

- Pan-Arabism (with an emphasis on Pan-Islamism);
- maintaining support for Egyptian nationalism;
- opposition to the Baghdad Pact, which was led by Iraq, Egypt's main rival for primacy in the Arab world;
- joining the Non-Aligned Movement, which was intended to provide Egypt with the ability to balance between the two sides of the Iron Curtain.

That same year, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company was announced, thereby seizing the shares of Great Britain and France without any negotiations, let alone compensation. As a result, a war broke out between Egypt and a British–French–Israeli coalition, which ended in utter defeat for Cairo[202]. Despite prior preparations and modernisation, the army was unable to match the experienced and highly equipped forces of the powers that had won two world wars. This move by Cairo was rather surprising. Equally

200 B. Stępniewska-Holzer, J. Holzer, op. cit., pp. 117–122.

201 T. Osman, *Egypt on the brink: from Nasser to Mubarak*, Yale University Press, New Haven–London 2010, pp. 122–123.

202 D. Cash, *Suez crisis*, Oxford University Press 2001; I. and A. McLean, *Suez crisis, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003.

interesting is what followed. The Western European intervention met with criticism from both the United States and the USSR at the UN Security Council. As a result of this pressure (especially from Washington, which was financing the reconstruction of war-torn Europe), British, French, and Israeli troops were withdrawn from the Suez Canal zone, and UN peacekeeping forces entered the demarcation line. In 1967, the so-called Six-Day War took place, exposing the weakness of the Arab states and demonstrating the remarkable agility and effectiveness of the Israeli armed forces[203].

In 1971, Anwar al-Sadat assumed power; he opened Egypt up to foreign investment and, taking advantage of a favourable international climate, contributed to the country's steady economic growth. Unfortunately, this primarily benefited the elites, which fostered growing social stratification. In 1973, another war with Israel broke out when joint Egyptian–Syrian forces attempted to forcibly seize control of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, which had been occupied during the Six-Day War. This attempt once again ended in utter defeat[204]. In 1977, a war with Libya subsequently broke out. In 1978, Cairo became the only state in the region to normalise relations with Israel. Unfortunately, despite being awarded the Nobel Prize for this achievement, President Sadat was assassinated by an Islamic radical in 1981: Islamist circles accused the president of being overly submissive to Tel Aviv[205].

He was succeeded by the incumbent vice-president, Hosni Mubarak. He introduced privatisation-oriented economic reforms, but abandoned the democratisation of the system and maintained the political framework of his predecessor. Due to the 1986 downturn in the oil market and economic decline, the new president be-

[203] M. Bar-On, B. Morris, M. Golani, *Reassessing Israel's Road to Sinai/Suez, 1956: A „Trialogue"*, [in:] *Traditions and Transitions in Israel Studies*, ed. G. A. Olson, SUNY Press, Books on Israel, Vol. VI, 2002, pp. 3–42.
[204] J. Zdanowski, *Historia Bliskiego Wschodu w XX wieku*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 2010, pp. 196–197.
[205] T. Osman, *Egypt on the brink: from Nasser to Mubarak*, Yale University Press, New Haven–London 2010, pp. 128–129.

gan to gradually scale back Sadat's social welfare programmes. In the 1990s, faced with persistent economic problems, he initiated further economic reforms: in 1991, he established cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and signed an agreement with the World Bank. As a result, prices were liberalised, hundreds of enterprises were privatised, and restrictions on international trade were lifted. At that time, the World Bank wrote off half of Egypt's debt. On the one hand, macroeconomic indicators improved; on the other, 23% of the population continued to live in extreme poverty, which fostered the popularity of radical Islamic ideologies. During the 1990s, frequent terrorist attacks took place, which diminished tourism revenues. In 1997, Mubarak introduced special protection for tourists and adopted a firm stance against radical Islamism. He also forged much closer ties with the United States. In 1999, he secured multi-million dollar aid for economic development, alongside a significantly larger sum of 1.3 billion dollars for training and equipping the army. During this period, the president also permitted the formation of new political parties. Unfortunately, the situation of the most impoverished failed to improve, which fostered public discontent[206].

In 2011, the Arab Spring erupted, ousting Mubarak from power. Despite attempts to retain his position by force, the president was ultimately compelled to step down under pressure from the military. The armed forces seized power at a crucial moment, and the presidency was eventually assumed by a representative of the military high command: General Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi. In one of his statements, the new president explicitly asserted that Egyptians were not yet ready for a fully-fledged democracy as a system of governance[207].

[206] J. Zdanowski, op. cit., pp. 360–363.
[207] M. Górnikiewicz, T. Szczurek, *Social Media Wars*…, pp. 60–70.

Table 25. The Egyptian decision-making process determined by specific cultural code values

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL	HUA	STO	LC
Gradual negotiations with the British for the withdrawal of garrisons and the recognition of Egypt's genuine independence, without resorting to violence following 1922 and the formal declaration of independence.	x	x	x	x		x
Egypt's entry into the League of Nations in 1937 and the signing of a treaty with Great Britain on the gradual withdrawal of the garrison over a period of ten years.	x	x	x	x		x
The Free Officers Revolution in 1952 and the overthrow of the monarchy.	x		x		x	x
Adopting a pro-Soviet orientation, initiating a rivalry with Iraq for dominance in the Arab world, and taking an antagonistic stance towards Israel			x		x	x
Joining the Non-Aligned Movement	x		x	x	x	x
The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company and the conflict with the British-French-Israeli coalition	x		x		x	x
The Six-Day War in 1967 and the war with Israel in 1971	x		x	x		x
The 1977 border conflict with Libya	x		x	x		x
The normalisation of relations with Israel in 1978 through the formal conclusion of peace at Camp David, alongside the tacit recognition of the US position	x		x	x		x
In the 1990s, the conclusion of an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank (WB), alongside a continuing policy of forging closer ties with the US, which enabled Cairo to secure the write-off of half its debt and substantial financial support from Washington; free-market reforms and limited democratisation were also introduced by permitting the formation of political parties.	x		x	x		x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning Egypt's international relations: 54%.

4.2. Conclusions

This subchapter presents the results of verifying the correspondence between the values of cultural codes, according to G. Hofstede,

M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall, and the decision-making processes of the ten examined societies over the past century.

In the British decision-making process, values such as masculinity and a low degree of uncertainty avoidance, which should in fact drive aggressive behaviour towards other states, did not manifest themselves. As a result, British policy in the examined period could generate threats to other societies only in the event of the latter's evident weakness, or indeed when they were not recognised by London as fully-fledged societies: namely, in relation to the so-called colonial and post-colonial areas. Towards European societies, London exhibited far-reaching restraint and a desire to build a harmonious and stable international environment.

The values of French cultural codes, as determined in previous studies, aligned with the values resulting from the course of the decision-making process. It was only in the last fifty years that a slight increase in masculinity was noted relative to the level of this value in previous decades. This could have been influenced by the gradually progressing ethnic and cultural diversification of the French social structure following the Second World War.

The examination of the German decision-making process revealed a lack of correspondence regarding three values established during earlier anthropological studies. The presence of a high power distance, low uncertainty avoidance, and medium-term orientation was identified. The adjusted values of the German cultural codes corresponded to the historically observed, recurring tendency to put everything on the line without making adequate long-term calculations beforehand, focusing solely on immediate gains. Consequently, Berlin's policy, impeccably calculated and well-thought-out from a narrow, short-term perspective, was fraught with numerous unpleasant surprises when it came to undertaking practical, let alone long-term, actions. This posed a threat to the security of both Germany itself and other states. Unfortunately, this is also the reason why Germany, despite its 'innate' reliability, remains a relatively easy target for manipulation by players raised in long-term and high-context cultures.

Russians achieved one of the highest levels of correspondence between the values of their cultural codes and their decision-making process in the international arena. The adjusted value pertained to the Russian propensity for rivalry and aggressive behaviour towards other societies. At the same time, the research results indicated that Russians are among the nations that base their decision-making process on the same, invariable values, regardless of any potential pressure caused by the emergence of a threat. Consequently, Russia's foreign policy should be highly predictable, characterised by a relatively high degree of predictive accuracy.

The values of Polish cultural codes exhibited an average correspondence of three-quarters, which, nevertheless, leaves some room for deeper reflection and interpretation. Noteworthy is the lack of correspondence regarding a high level of uncertainty avoidance and power distance, the respective high or low value of which depended on historical circumstances. During periods of partition and occupation, power distance plummeted almost to zero, whereas during periods of independence, it steadily increased, reaching a surprisingly high level. This indicates that external factors affecting Poles' internal sense of security cause this value to weaken or strengthen depending on the situation, thereby revising the decision-making process in its entirety.

Japanese cultural values were only partially reflected in the research results of G. Hofstede and his team. From at least the mid-19th century up to modern times, all the analysed political decisions have been characterised by high power distance as well as extreme collectivism. The disappearance of masculinity was characteristic only of the brief period of American occupation immediately following the Second World War; it was associated with absolute deference to the victorious power, which also corresponds to the level of power distance inherent to the Japanese.

In the case of the Chinese, the correspondence in cultural values proved to be complete (consistent), thereby directly indicating an unprecedented degree of correspondence between the previously

established values and those resulting from the decision-making process. These values exhibit extraordinary stability, and furthermore, no influence of individual codes on the content of the decisions made was observed. This unequivocally indicates a previously unseen predominance of cultural codes in the decision-making processes of China.

Indian values of cultural codes did not correspond with regard to two adjusted values: long-term orientation and high/low context. Nevertheless, the differences in values were not overly significant, and the influence of these two values themselves, given their correlation with the others, also did not significantly affect the content of the decisions (still referring solely to the values of cultural codes). Furthermore, no influence of individual codes was noted (despite the confirmed moderate value of individualism/collectivism).

The lack of correspondence in the Libyan values of cultural codes primarily pertained to the identified high uncertainty avoidance and merely moderate masculinity, whereas Libya's aggressive rhetoric in the international arena would suggest different values. On the other hand, the lack of genuine military involvement in ongoing conflicts, limited instead to cost-free support, can be considered an element of a specific, highly risk-averse North African diplomacy. The personal traits of the rulers also played a major role, although acting in a more or less risk-averse manner in the international arena was actually the domain of all Libyan decision-makers to date.

The values that did not find correspondence in the Egyptian decision-making process were the moderate level of masculinity/femininity, and, for over half of the decisions, an orientation with a predominance of long-term values. Given the cyclically changing leaders (during the examined period) as well as the influence of an entourage of numerous advisors, one can speak of a negative verification of these cultural patterns determining the decision-making process.

In summary, the majority of the narrowly defined values of cultural codes profiled by the author (Chapter III, 3.3), established

during the research by G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall, corresponded with the values resulting from the decision-making processes of the examined societies over the past century. At the same time, it must be strongly emphasised that, depending on the society, up to 40% of the total values of cultural codes were negatively verified. This clearly indicates that verifying the correspondence between the previously established values and the substance of the decision-making process was entirely justified. It is also worth noting that the results of these studies are preliminary in nature and serve as an introduction to a rigorous analysis and synthesis aimed at isolating the influence of individual codes on cultural codes, which is included in the subsequent chapter dedicated to addressing specific problem number three. In the case of each of the examined nations, the rate of correspondence between the values established during previous research and the substance of the decisions exceeded fifty percent; for half of the examined societies, it proved to be exceptionally high (in one case exceeding 70%, in three ranging between 80 and 90%, and for Chinese society reaching 100%).

In conclusion, the adopted **hypothesis was positively verified**. It was assumed that the majority of the previously established values would find correspondence in the actual decision-making processes examined. At the same time, the rate of discrepancy between the previously established values and those resulting from the decision-making processes, reaching up to 50% depending on the society (in the case of four societies), indicates that the verification procedures conducted and the adjustment of the correspondence were essential to verify the actual values of the cultural codes of the examined societies: correspondence for two societies: 100%; one society: over 83%; three societies: approx. 67%; four societies: 50%. Thus, the average rate of correspondence stood at 68%.

Table 26. Rate of correspondence between the values of the profiled cultural codes established in the research by G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall, and the values resulting from the examination of the decision-making process of ten selected societies

	United Kingdom	France	Germany	Russia	Poland	Japan	China	India	Libya	Egypt
W/NDW	NDW	WDW	WDW	WDW	P: WDW K: NDW	WDW	WDW	WDW	WDW	WDW
MS/KB	KB	KB	MS	MS	P: MS K: MS	MS	MS	MS/KB	MS	MS
IN/KL	IN	IN	IN	KL	P: IN K: IN	KL	KL	IN/KL	KL	KL
W/NUN	WUN	WUN	NUN	WUN	P: WUN K: NUN	WUN	NUN	W/NUN	NUN	WUN
0D/Ś/KT	OK-ŚT	OŚT	OŚT	ODT	P: ODT K: OKT	ODT	ODT	ODT	OKT	OŚ/KT
W/NK	NK	NK	NK	NK	P: NK K: NK	WK	WK	W/NK	NK	NK
Correspondence	67%	100%	50%	83%	83%	67%	100%	67%	50%	50%
Total correspondence	68%									

Source: own elaboration.

CHAPTER V

The Correspondence Between the Values of Profiled Cultural Codes and the Actual Course of the Decision-Making Process in the Realm of National and International Security

This chapter is devoted to reviewing source materials against the values of the profiled cultural codes (based on the values determined by G. Hofstede and his team). To this end, theoretical methods (analysis, synthesis, and comparison) were employed within the framework of the procedure outlined below, which aims to verify and propose values of cultural codes that correspond to reality. The purpose of these efforts was to estimate:

- the rate of correspondence between cultural codes and individual codes in the decision-making process conducted in the international arena;
- the degree to which the difference between cultural codes and individual codes impacts the final outcome of the decision-making process conducted in the international arena.

The procedure for the subsequent research stages proposed below is entirely original, which was necessitated by the need to apply an innovative approach to utilising knowledge of cultural codes in international forecasting. To date, as demonstrated by the literature review conducted in Chapters I and II, no research has been undertaken on any formula for cultural forecasting. Consequently, there was no prior knowledge to which the author could directly refer

when compiling the research results. This innovative procedure was divided into the following stages:

1) STAGE I (developed on the basis of the source material review in Chapter IV): Comparing the values of the cultural codes developed by G. Hofstede's team with the substance of selected decisions made by the examined nationalities over the past century, in order to determine the rate of correspondence between these values and the substance of individual decisions.
2) STAGE II: Determining the code values that match individual decisions and identifying the differences between the code values proposed by G. Hofstede and those corresponding to the decisions actually made.
3) STAGE III: Determining the extent to which individual codes influenced the course of the decision-making process over the 20th and early 21st centuries.
4) STAGE IV: Determining the degree to which individual codes impact the final substance of a decision (compared to the substance of a decision shaped by the influence of cultural codes).

Ten nationalities from Europe, Asia, and North Africa were examined, and within each of the selected nationalities, ten geopolitical decisions determining foreign policy over the past century were analysed. This made it possible to apply a percentage scale to estimate the aforementioned predictive accuracy rate of cultural codes according to G. Hofstede, as well as the rate of discrepancy between cultural and individual codes.

Below, in the tables dedicated to describing the decision-making process, a division into the actual decision-making process (upper section) and the theoretical decision-making process (lower section) has been applied. This latter type of decision-making process constitutes an analysis of a process that would find complete correspondence in the cultural values developed by G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall. The juxtaposition of the actual decision-making process and the analysis of the theoretical one was intended to clearly isolate the differences between the decisions made, specifically regarding the genu-

ine impact of these differences on the final shape of the examined state's policy. This made it possible to indicate whether the difference in cultural codes significantly influences the decision-making process, and at the same time, to separate the influence of cultural codes from that of individual codes as clearly as possible.

5.1. The Course and Results of the Research into the Correspondence of the Decision-Making Process of the Examined Societies with Regard to Cultural and Individual Codes: Determining the Rate of Discrepancy Between the Impact of Cultural and Individual Codes on the International Decision-Making Process

United Kingdom

STAGE I

Table 27. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the British decision-making process

The decision-making process determined by specific cultural values						
Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	LUA	STO	LC
A policy aimed at the exploitation of regions that were highly underdeveloped at the time, yet without investing in the development of overseas colonies or consolidating its own position in these parts of the world. In the case of low power distance, relations between the colonial population and London would likely be based on a partnership, which would presumably also make British decision-makers more attentive to the needs of the individual social groups inhabiting these territories. It can be assumed that this would enable the colonies to develop more rapidly with active support from the Crown, thereby maintaining the colonists' favourable attitude towards London.		x	x		x	x
A policy of resolving disputes through negotiation and avoiding conflicts with other powerful states. In the case of a high level of masculinity, it could be assumed that Great Britain would be more prone to rivalry with other countries; coupled with low uncertainty avoidance and a medium-term orientation, one could assume that London would have no objections to forceful solutions, even without the certainty of an outcome.	x		x		x	x

The decision-making process determined by specific cultural values						
Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	LUA	STO	LC
The balance of power policy aimed at offsetting Germany's aggressive policy prior to the First World War. Similar to the point above, the values of cultural codes according to G. Hofstede indicate that Great Britain should have set a clear boundary for Germany and not delayed armed confrontation. The medium-term orientation (5) suggests that the British would have been able to foresee the consequences of an overly cautious policy over the coming years. The approach demonstrated during the First World War does not correspond at all to a low power distance, let alone a low level of uncertainty avoidance.	x		x		x	x
A cautious approach to warfare during the First World War. As above.	x		x		x	x
A short-term perspective regarding the objectives adopted for implementation after the end of the First World War: a positive and conciliatory attitude towards a Germany rebuilding its power and imperial aspirations. As above.	x		x		x	x
A cautious approach to warfare during the First World War. As above.	x		x		x	x
A short-term perspective regarding the objectives adopted for implementation after the end of the First World War: a positive and conciliatory attitude towards a Germany rebuilding its power and imperial aspirations. As above.	x		x		x	x
Non-involvement in the European conflict following the Third Reich's invasion of Poland, despite an official declaration of war. As above.	x		x		x	x
Full-scale entry into the war only took place after Hitler's invasion of France, the collapse of the policy of balance of power, and the emergence of a direct threat to the United Kingdom. The impulse that compelled London to mount a genuine response was a sense of an actual threat and the necessity of defence. This is not an approach characteristic of countries with a high level of masculinity or a low level of uncertainty avoidance, which would have taken preventive measures much earlier.	x		x		x	x
Active participation in constructing the structures of the European community after the Second World War, driven by immediate interests resulting from the pursuit of security and a strong economic position. In the event of high masculinity, Great Britain would strive to gradually dominate weaker member states.	x		x		x	x

The decision-making process determined by specific cultural values						
Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	LUA	STO	LC
During the Cold War, efforts were directed at maintaining a balance of power between Europe and Washington, acting as a mediator, while at the same time not negating the strong position of the USSR as a party in maintaining relative stability in Europe. A high level of masculinity would likely foster rivalry with Moscow, Paris, and Washington on equal terms, rather than a desire to build a stable international environment. The values of a low degree of uncertainty avoidance and a low level of power distance could prove conducive to this.	x		x		x	x
Brexit In the case of a high level of masculinity, it could be assumed that London would seek to strengthen its position relative to other states within the Union rather than opt to withdraw from Community structures, and thereby from rivalry itself. At the same time, London's concerns over its future socio-economic position in light of numerous EU obligations were mounting, which was also a significant driver of Brexit.	x		x		x	x

Source: own elaboration.

STAGE II

In light of the above, the cultural codes determining the majority of London's geopolitical decisions in the past and present centuries were characterised by the following values:

- Low power distance (correspondence 9/10);
- **Femininity** (correspondence 9/10);
- Individualism (correspondence 10/10);
- **High degree of uncertainty avoidance** (correspondence 10/10);
- Medium – and short-term orientation (correspondence 10/10);
- Low context (correspondence 10/10).

The values that did not correspond with those proposed by G. G. Hofstede were masculinity and a low degree of uncertainty avoidance. At the same time, given the correspondingly high rate of correspondence of these values with the examined geopolitical decisions of British decision-makers, it can be assumed that both of these values might have been incorrectly assessed by G. Hofstede and his team. The low value of context might also be surprising; however, giv-

en the inability to maintain control over the colonies and the ineptly conducted foreign policy towards these dependent territories and their inhabitants, it serves as a highly conspicuous example of the validity of the adopted assumption. This is similarly evidenced by the complete inability to foresee the outbreak of the First and Second World Wars, which attests to a relatively narrow international perspective.

STAGE III and STAGE IV

The shape of colonial policy was the only instance in which a high level of masculinity manifested itself, which indicates that it was the result of centuries-old historical conditions rather than individual decisions. At the same time, it is worth noting that in the course of subsequent decisions made by London regarding events in the world and in Europe, this value disappeared entirely. Consequently, in the case of London, based on the analysed decisions and the shape of its foreign policy, no significant influence of individual codes was observed. This also signifies that both types of codes remained consistent in the case of the British.

France

STAGE I

Table 28. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the French decision-making process

Decision content	PD	FEM	IND	HUA	MTO	LC
A policy aimed at the ruthless exploitation of regions that were highly underdeveloped at the time, still without investing in development or consolidating its own position in these parts of the world. Reliance on immediate profit. The influence of a medium-term orientation, coupled with femininity, could slightly contribute to a greater interest in investment; however, when juxtaposed with the remaining values, this would not be of major significance.	x		x	x		x
Pursuing a balance of power policy without interfering in the internal affairs of other European states; avoiding open conflicts. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x

Decision content	PD	FEM	IND	HUA	MTO	LC
A balance of power policy aimed at offsetting the aggressive policy of the Second Reich. Complete correspondence (in this case, the difference between a medium – and long-term orientation is not significant).	x	x	x	x		x
Conducting predominantly defensive operations against the invasion of the Second Reich, with the exception of the forceful seizure, alongside the United Kingdom, of German overseas territories at the outbreak of the war. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
A brief occupation of the Ruhr basin and subsequent withdrawal in the face of opposition from the United Kingdom and the United States. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The construction of the Maginot Line as an unrealistic, yet colossal and forward-looking military project geared towards defence rather than offensive operations. A high value of power distance would dictate the development of projects enabling domination over other countries, albeit in a peaceful manner (the influence of femininity). Nevertheless, given the other values determining France's peaceful activity in Europe, such action appears justified, whilst at the same time not altering the overall tendency, which is defensive rather than offensive in nature.		x	x	x	x	x
A cautious approach to warfare during the Second World War, particularly towards the Polish ally, to whom France provided no genuine assistance, restricting itself merely to insignificant gestures (the Phoney War). Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
An attempt to forcefully maintain control over the colonies following the end of the war. Granting independence in the face of numerous difficulties, whilst retaining economic and political influence. Such an approach should be conducive to a higher level of masculinity, which, however, can be viewed in the context of the influence of strong personalities on Paris's post-colonial policy of that era.	x		x	x	x	x
Withdrawal from the military structures of NATO in 1966 as a demonstration of its own independence and strength, while remaining a member of the Alliance. In 1995, Paris partially returned to the North Atlantic structures, and in 2009 it once again became a full member of the alliance. The 1966 decision was made by General de Gaulle, which tied in with the course adopted at the time to build an image of a strong and independent France, a potential mediator in relations between the West and Moscow.			x		x	x
In reality, however, General de Gaulle never had any genuine intention of withdrawing from European structures; it was a typical move designed for public consumption. This is evidenced by the fact that France remained within NATO's civil structures at the time, even though the Americans withdrew their contingents from the country.						

Decision content	PD	FEM	IND	HUA	MTO	LC
Participation in building the structures of the European Community, driven by immediate interests stemming from the desire to ensure security and, over time, a strong economic position. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x

Source: own elaboration.

STAGE II

The values of the cultural codes influencing Paris's foreign policy throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries are:

- High power distance (correspondence 8/10),
- Femininity (correspondence 7/10),
- Individualism (correspondence 10/10),
- High degree of uncertainty avoidance (correspondence 9/10),
- Medium-term orientation (correspondence 8/10),
- Low context (correspondence 10/10).

In light of the above, it can be assumed that the values determined during the research by G. Hofstede corresponded with reality. Discrepancies with the generally functioning codes usually stemmed from the specific circumstances surrounding a given decision, as well as the influence of individual codes, which occurred in two out of the ten examined cases.

STAGE III

The degree of influence of individual codes in the conducted research hovered around 20% and was associated with a very strong, almost dictatorial manner of exercising executive power. Consequently, the cultural codes presented above can be considered consistent with Paris's political line in the international arena during the 20th and early 21st centuries.

STAGE IV
Decisions made under the influence of individual codes indeed deviated from the political line that would have taken shape under the influence of the cultural codes universal to the French. In the first instance, there would have been no question of attempting to retain the colonies by force, even using semi-formal measures. In the second instance, France would not have decided even on a demonstrative withdrawal from NATO's military structures, out of respect for strong foreign partners (high power distance) and a desire to avoid conflicts between Paris and Brussels, as well as between Paris and Washington. On the other hand, according to General de Gaulle, this action was intended to strengthen peace in Europe by creating a communication platform convenient for both sides in the form of an increasingly neutral France. At the same time, it should be noted that France remained in the camp of Western countries, by no means crossing over to Moscow's side, which was actually consistent with its cultural codes. Simultaneously, it must be stated that developing an international forecast based solely on cultural codes, without taking into account the individual codes of such a strong personality as President de Gaulle, would have yielded an erroneous forecast regarding the possibility of France withdrawing from NATO's military structures.

Germany

Table 29. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the German decision-making process

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	LTO	LC
A policy of investing in the development of the colonial base and the industry of the Second Reich. In the case of a low power distance, as G. Hofstede's research would suggest, the Second Reich would have been more likely to create a conglomerate of states dependent on and cooperating with Berlin, rather than attempting to establish colonies in the manner of previous centuries.		x	x	x	x	x

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	LTO	LC
A policy of triggering minor crises in order to destabilise the existing balance of power and territorially expand its own colonies. Gradually raising the temperature of mutual international relations, as well as attempting to impose its perspective on weaker states, does not align well with a low power distance or a high level of uncertainty avoidance. Were such an approach to be adopted, the very value determining risk avoidance would have fostered a drive to gradually develop economic and military potential, rather than provoking even minor crises, the consequences of which could prove unpredictable and dramatic. At the same time, limiting oneself solely to such a policy could still fall within a long-term plan of gradually securing various benefits, provided that open conflict is avoided (much like China). History shows that in this instance, crises served as a kind of testing ground prior to the Great War.		x	x		x	x
Instigating the First World War, intended to enable the Second Reich to achieve the status of a colonial power, particularly in relation to France, whose colonial possessions would then be priceless for Berlin. On the one hand, Germany prepared meticulously, as it did for most strategically important tasks; however, due to a low context, these preparations were inadequate, simply failing to foresee the scale and consequences of a war waged across such a vast theatre of operations. The decision to instigate the war was prompted by the alliance between Great Britain and France, which would ultimately have led to a gradual distancing from a Germany lacking colonies. On the other hand, the decision to go to war was highly risky, indicating that it was made in the heat of the moment and as a result of the influence of individual codes, driven by the mounting pressure of losing its status as a rising power.		x	x			x
Miscalculating the capabilities of its own economic and military base prior to the Second World War. As above.		x	x			x
A policy of gradually dismantling successive barriers and restrictions in rebuilding Germany's position following the First World War. Once again, this would not have been possible without an ostensible display of compliance towards stronger states, whilst simultaneously harbouring a sense of one's own growing power. The withdrawal from rivalry during this period stemmed from a temporary weakness that precluded any use of their potential to exert pressure on other countries. Hence, the absence of the masculinity value can be interpreted as a circumstance dictated by the situation, rather than an error in assessing the codes.			x		x	x

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	LTO	LC
Building an image of a powerful Germany and acquiring new territories without a fight by intimidating the international community. In the case of a lack of power distance, manifesting in the belief in the right to impose one's will on the weaker (as well as submitting to the stronger or to those endowed with authority), as well as a high level of uncertainty, it is rather difficult to imagine Germany striving to impose its will on any nation. Of course, one can always assume that a low power distance, coupled with a high masculinity index, signifies a disregard for authority alongside a simultaneous drive for rivalry and confrontation.		x	x		x	x
In such a scenario, however, German decision-makers would not have sought to subjugate weaker nations on the assumption that this alone constituted sufficient grounds conferring the right to such actions.						
Instigating the Second World War in the pursuit of building its own "colonial" base to condition economic development, but this time primarily in Eastern Europe and Western Asia as a result of the war. As above.		x	x			x
Miscalculating the capabilities of its own economic and military base prior to the Second World War. As above.		x	x			x
Active participation in building and developing the European community, primarily as an economic project in which Berlin would play a leading role. The majority of the code values developed by G. Hofstede proved to correspond in this case, which, however, is merely an exception to the rule. Furthermore, attention should be drawn to the fact of the Germans' submission to the occupying powers during the occupation period, and their very slow, gradual regaining of the ability to conduct an independent policy based on a continuously strengthened potential.		x	x	x	x	x
It can also be assumed that Germany was preparing to assume a stable position in a new socio-economic reality, where the old (military) methods of pursuing national interests had become obsolete. At the same time, this exceptionally balanced policy met the criteria of both calculated caution and a long-term orientation.						
Inviting and admitting millions of refugees from Africa and the Middle East without prior, rigorous calculation and preparation for the magnitude of this social phenomenon. The German government's decision, unjustly attributed solely to Chancellor Merkel, proved, when analysed in terms of codes, to be perfectly aligned with the codes dictating German foreign policy during periods of both prominence and the necessity to act amidst a deepening crisis in international relations. To be clear, as this example demonstrates, these codes do not entail resorting to forceful solutions; rather, they dictate decisive actions wherein Berlin pays little heed to the opinions of other states, its allies included.		x	x			x

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	LTO	LC
As had been the case in the past, this decision too proved ill-considered and was made entirely prematurely, without securing adequate backing. Had German decision-makers been guided by a low power distance, they would likely have consulted this intention in advance with other member states on a partnership basis. In turn, the values of uncertainty avoidance and a long-term orientation should have significantly contributed to foreseeing the potential consequences of such an action, as well as ensuring adequate preparation. In other words, Berlin's decision would presumably have been coordinated with selected countries that had also opted to take in refugees, and it would have been implemented with due care, restricting its scope solely to refugees fleeing from Syria engulfed in civil war. A brief review of German political decisions indicates that the greatest threat to Germany's long-term prosperity is posed by decision-makers whose actions are subconsciously determined by their inherent cultural codes.						

Source: own elaboration.

STAGE II

The values of the cultural codes shaping Berlin's international policy throughout the 20th century and the first two decades of the 21st century are:

- **High power distance** (correspondence 10/10),
- Masculinity (correspondence 9/10),
- Individualism (correspondence 10/10),
- **Low degree of uncertainty avoidance** (correspondence 8/10),
- **Medium-term orientation** (correspondence 5/10)
- Low context (correspondence 10/10).

Upon juxtaposing the results, a picture emerges indicating that the values of two codes do not correspond to the realities of Berlin's decision-making process during the examined period. Germans should be characterised by an extremely high level of power distance and a relatively low level of uncertainty avoidance. This discrepancy may stem from G. Hofstede's interpretation of the ostensibly amicable and collegial relations between employer and employee. At the same time, however, even within such warm relations, the employee is perfectly aware of the distance separating them from their superior, as well as the position and authority of the orders issued. In the

case of Germans, this interpersonal closeness is nothing more than a learned politeness that every human being deserves. Similarly, every employee should be respected for the work they perform. The employee's attitude towards their superior is an entirely different matter, however, as they view the employer as an individual wielding significant power. Consequently, Berlin's decision-making process, aimed at the gradual expansion of its international sphere of influence, the exploitation of other states, and the pursuit of a broad military and economic expansion, should come as no surprise. Following the Second World War, the Germans as a nation had to atone for their guilt in unleashing the war and the Holocaust. For the first time in history, their country was divided into occupation zones, where various situations occurred that were often far from pleasant for the local population. Subsequently, independence was restored to the Germans very slowly and gradually, piece by piece, although this applied only to the western part. The East remained under Soviet occupation for several more decades. Consequently, the German nation underwent a protracted metamorphosis, which resulted in modifications to its approach to foreign policy. Today, Germany is a democratic and independent country, one of the cornerstones of the European community of nations. They have abandoned their dreams of military global conquest; however, as can be observed within the EU, they can still be highly resolute and shrewd in pushing their ideas through on the European stage. In other words, many of the cultural codes have survived, but instead of military expansion, they have taken the shape of a collective, socio-economic approach to promoting European values, thereby gradually expanding their economic sphere of influence and building a buffer zone comprised of new states eager to accede. No one in Berlin any longer contemplates the military subjugation of any nation; the modern German capital is multicultural and multi-ethnic, and the memory of Hitler is a source of embarrassment and shame, rather than pride. At the same time, however, in pushing forward this very multicultural Europe and their own vision of the future world, German

decision-makers, for all their impeccably cultivated courtesy, can be unyielding, pressing ahead regardless of various obstacles. From a research perspective, the case of modern Germany is exceptionally intriguing; it is fascinating to observe how many identical patterns can remain active despite what appears to be an absolute shift in its approach to the international arena. A prime example is the unilateral initiative to invite masses of refugees from Syria on behalf of Europe, driven by a genuine concern for the plight of those afflicted by the war. On the other hand, Berlin was undoubtedly considering the need to bolster its increasingly strained economy with a new workforce. At the same time, the sheer scale of the migration, which rapidly expanded to encompass many countries beyond Syria, came as a complete surprise and incidentally became the primary source of subsequent problems. In other words, Germany acted on behalf of the Community without having consulted other EU capitals on this noble, albeit highly audacious, idea. This indicates an assumption of the right to act on the global stage on behalf of the Community, thereby indirectly usurping the prerogative to determine what lies in the interests of the European Community's member states.

In reality, the cultural codes determining Berlin's perspective on its immediate international environment operated here in a virtually exemplary manner. A researcher's role is not to evaluate this phenomenon from any particular standpoint, but merely to establish whether it was the result of cultural codes or, as has frequently been assumed, individual ones. In the author's view, cultural codes undoubtedly played the predominant role in this instance.

STAGE III and STAGE IV

The values that deviate from those indicated by G. Hofstede are: high power distance and a low level of uncertainty avoidance. Conversely, no discrepancies indicating a significant influence of individual codes were observed; this implies that Berlin's decisions, even when the executive branch is represented by a strong personality, are the product of consultations conducted within a broader circle of

trusted associates and advisors. Consequently, in the case of Germany, cultural codes appear to be relatively significant in international forecasting. More interestingly, a convergence was also observed between the necessity to act in a situation of power and in a situation of crisis, which dictates the operation of the specific sequence of cultural codes described above.

Russia

STAGE I

Table 30. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the Russian decision-making process

Decision content	PD	FEM	COL	HUA	LTO	LC
A cautious and conservative approach to the preparation and conduct of military operations during the First World War (an unwanted war). Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
A lack of a sufficiently firm response to strikes and rebellions, as well as to opposition circles, prior to the outbreak of the First World War. The indecision resulted from the Tsar's complete lack of command capabilities and the incompetence of his closest and most trusted inner circle. Individual codes proved decisive.		x	x	x		x
The drive to spread the revolution by force, but by attacking states considered weaker or situated in a worse socio-economic position: with the aim of establishing a union republic and creating a network of interdependent and cooperating states. In the case of a predominance of femininity, efforts aimed at disseminating revolutionary ideas would have assumed a more peaceful character, geared, for example, towards gradually shaping public opinion in other countries.	x		x	x	x	x
The drive to subordinate weaker socialist and communist states through the creation of so-called union republics. As above.	x		x	x	x	x
The invasion of Poland in 1939 alongside the Third Reich, with a considerable delay and at a time when there was no longer any doubt that Poland would be unable to defend itself: the ultimate aim was the establishment of a union republic. As above.	x		x	x	x	x
Negotiations with the United States and Great Britain concerning the new shape of the world, in which many countries found themselves under Moscow's influence, not entirely in accordance with the original vision of the Western allies: the beginning of the Cold War. As above.	x		x	x	x	x

Decision content	PD	FEM	COL	HUA	LTO	LC
The Cold War as a clash of two powers manifesting itself in the avoidance of open conflict, and the waging of mutual skirmishes on the territories of other states. As above.	x		x	x	x	x
A lack of a firm response to the national independence movement in Poland, which became the catalyst for the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Much like prior to the revolution, the lack of a resolute stance among Soviet decision-makers enabled a bloodless revolution to unfold in the Warsaw Pact countries, initiated in Poland. In the event of a correspondingly high power distance, a bloody pacification would likely have ensued, just as in the darkest period of the communist regime. Individual codes proved decisive.		x	x	x		x
Armed intervention in rebellious Chechnya, whose secession could have led to a crisis in the Caucasus region and, consequently, a significant weakening of Russia's international position. Chechnya was initially pacified without consideration for the establishment of local authorities, although after the Second World War it was Chechens loyal to Moscow, led by Kadyrov, who were granted the right to organise a virtually autonomous state in exchange for complete subordination to Putin; in the final stages of the rebellion, this somewhat indicates a return to the concept of collective governance of the Federation. Individual codes proved decisive.	x			x	x	x
The attack on Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and support for the conflict in eastern Ukraine: the objective was to maintain buffer zones comprised of dependent or interdependent states. As with the conflicts described above.	x		x	x	x	x

Source: own elaboration.

STAGE II

The values of the cultural codes determining Moscow's international activity in the 20th and early 21st centuries are:

- High power distance (correspondence 8/10),
- **Masculinity** (correspondence 7/10),
- Collectivism (correspondence 9/10),
- High degree of uncertainty avoidance (correspondence 10/10),
- Long-term orientation (correspondence 8/10).
- Low context (correspondence 10/10).

The cultural identity of the Russians is exceptionally complex, particularly when viewed from the perspective of Western Europeans. Russian decision-makers appear to be cruel individuals, often devoid

of any logic or rationality, ready to unleash a devastating war on the slightest pretext. However, upon examining the values of the cultural codes, one can conclude that such a picture does not entirely correspond with reality. In fact, the only value that has not been positively verified is femininity. At the same time, however, Russian foreign policy has long been geared towards creating a coalition of diverse forms of statehood under Russian administration, alongside a periphery of such an "alliance" comprising interdependent states that form a buffer zone intended to ensure Moscow's security. Unfortunately, a high power distance dictates the assumption of the right to impose one's will on other countries and nations at one's own discretion, provided, of course, that these nations are weaker. Such an approach is corroborated by a high power distance, collectivism, a high level of uncertainty avoidance, and the masculinity unconfirmed by G. Hofstede. Interestingly, the combination of E. Hall's low context with a long-term orientation yields a similar effect as in the case of the Germans: a propensity for meticulous planning without the ability to take a comprehensive view, and thereby to foresee all factors (especially those that will only emerge as a direct result of the actions taken). As a result, despite meticulously prepared plans, they typically prove flawed (examples being the Soviet offensive against Poland during the interwar period, the attack on Finland, the invasion of Afghanistan, the aggression against Georgia, and the civil war in Ukraine). In each instance, operations were conducted against a significantly weaker opponent following the preparation of exceptionally detailed plans, which subsequently failed as they did not account for factors that emerged during the course of the operations.

STAGE III

The degree of influence of individual codes, based on the examined decisions, stood at 20%.

STAGE IV

Had there been no influence from individual codes, it can be assumed that the fate of Russia and its dependent states might have unfolded entirely differently. It is possible that the revolutionary unrest in the tsarist state would have been brutally suppressed (which would have been consistent with the cultural codes, as exemplified by Chechnya). A similar scenario could have played out several decades later in Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries. Considering that individuals with different cultural conditioning periodically emerge among Russian decision-makers, this would likely have presented the opportune moment for any insurgent movements striving to overthrow the existing regime. The second instance relates to the evident weakness of those in power and the inability to defend society. During the First World War, tsarist Russia was indeed weakened, but not to such an extent as to be unable to suppress the uprising, even if only through the use of mercenary or external forces. Failing to withdraw from military operations at the appropriate juncture was also an error. In the case of the collapse of the USSR, initiated by the Polish national liberation movement, the primary cause lay in the individual conditioning of the decision-makers who, fortunately for the populations of the Warsaw Pact countries, chose not to resort to forceful solutions. This in no way diminishes the courage of those who, in fighting for their freedom, were fully aware of the immense risk they were incurring for themselves and their families.

Poland

STAGE I

Table 31. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the Polish decision-making process

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	STO	LC
19th-century uprisings: the November Uprising, the January Uprising, the Greater Poland Uprisings, the Kraków Uprising, and the participation of Poles in the 1905 Revolution in Polish territories. In the event of a high power distance, as well as an extremely high level of uncertainty avoidance, successively repeated insurgent attempts would not have occurred. This is especially true given that they all had little chance of success. The fact that so many national liberation attempts took place in the 19th and early 20th centuries clearly indicates a low power distance, alongside a low level of uncertainty avoidance with a distinct propensity for entering into risky situations. A short-term orientation and a low context simultaneously point clearly to an inability to plan reliably and foresee the consequences of one's actions; this was also an inherent feature of all independence uprisings, the catalyst for which was typically the release of negative emotions associated with living under foreign occupation. History has shown that the Poles are one of those nations that value their own freedom above prosperity, which significantly distinguishes them from many other national and ethnic groups.		x	x		x	x
The formation of national liberation forces in 1912–1914 and participation in the 1914–1918 armed struggles aimed at the liberation of Poland. In the case of a high power distance and a high degree of uncertainty avoidance, the Poles would likely have remained within the armies of the partitioning powers, counting on a gradual expansion of autonomy rather than a risky, albeit successful, attempt to regain independence by force.		x	x		x	x
Internal struggles between various political factions immediately following the recovery of independence (1918–1926). Unfortunately, a lack of respect for the authorities exercising formal power on behalf of the nation, combined with a low level of uncertainty avoidance, a short-term orientation, a low context, and masculinity, constituted an explosive mix of codes that frequently severely limited the possibilities of conducting constructive work.		x	x		x	x
The May Coup of 1926, intended to restore political, and consequently economic, stability. Given a respect for a democratically elected (albeit rather inept) government, it is difficult to imagine an attempted coup d'état. In a country with a significantly high power distance and a high level of risk avoidance, the opposition would simply have preferred to wait until the next elections.		x	x		x	x

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	STO	LC
The rule of the Sanation following the death of Marshal J. Piłsudski, internal factional struggles within the ruling circles, susceptibility to various influences, and more or less official consent for policies and actions directed against minorities. As above.		x	x		x	x
Support for the Third Reich's territorial claims against Czechoslovakia and the annexation of Zaolzie region. In this instance, Polish decision-makers, positioning their country on an equal footing with other great powers, granted themselves the licence to subjugate weaker countries. At the same time, they paid absolutely no heed to the international consequences, which resulted in London and Paris criticising the actions of both Germany and Poland.	x	x	x		x	x
A firm refusal of the Third Reich's demands to assume control over the Free City of Gdańsk and of the plan to construct an extraterritorial motorway, instead of employing diplomatic stalling tactics despite the awareness of inadequate military readiness to independently repel potential aggression. Polish decision-makers concluded that Poland, as a rising power, could not afford to yield to German pressure. Consequently, disregarding other possibilities for resolving the dispute that would have precluded military intervention, they handled this situation much like many others in Poland's turbulent history: by bringing matters to a head.	x	x	x		x	x
The post-1989 drive to join NATO and the European Union as swiftly as possible as guarantors of security and, secondarily, to ensure rapid economic development. It should be noted that during the period of the Polish People's Republic, the value of high power distance, which originated in the interwar period, became firmly entrenched in a segment of Polish society. The USSR employed a highly calculated strategy of creating a formally independent Poland that was, in reality, completely dependent on Moscow. As a result, Poles regained their national colours, emblem, language, and other external manifestations of independent statehood; however, as time would tell, all major decisions were simultaneously made following "consultation" with Moscow. The generation that had survived the war did not know what to expect at the time, and moreover, was already exhausted by the constant struggle for survival. Therefore, it was only the subsequent, younger generations that took up the struggle for the true liberation of their ostensibly independent homeland. In the context of the functioning of the codes, this is significant inasmuch as it consolidated a high power distance, which subsequently translated into a drive to forge closer ties with a new and powerful alliance, namely NATO, and ultimately the EU as well. For Polish decision-makers, however, it was Washington that became the embodiment of authority, with which it was not only worthwhile, but indeed imperative to establish the closest possible cooperation. Furthermore, the decision to ally with the United States was indeed not only well-considered, but also offered a stable prospect of future benefits in the form of rapid national reconstruction and development.	x	x	x	x		x

Decision content	PD	MAS	IND	HUA	STO	LC
Prior to the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, a policy designed to maintain a geopolitical balance between the interests of individual EU countries and the United States. This specific balance between three centres of influence (Russia, the EU, and the US) was presumably aimed at gradually achieving independence from any single centre, yet simultaneously, it was conducted in an exceptionally measured and delicate manner, with respect for the interests of each party. At the same time, as a result of a low context, this approach failed to foresee all possible consequences. The war that broke out in Ukraine swiftly put to the test the hierarchy of values determining this approach.	x	x	x	x		x
Following the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, a shift in focus towards fostering the best possible relations with Washington, even at the expense of relations with Brussels. Polish foreign policy during this period was determined by similar factors: a high power distance towards the US; a high level of masculinity and individualism towards an antagonistic Russia, as well as towards European partners treated as equals; a high degree of uncertainty avoidance manifesting itself in the closest possible alignment with NATO's military structures, and thereby with the US; and a low context, which, as always, dictates an inability to foresee all the consequences of one's own decisions.	x	x	x	x		x

Source: own elaboration.

STAGE II

The values of the cultural codes determining Poland's international activity over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries have undergone numerous modifications. Essentially up until the interwar period, they were characterised by a low power distance, a high level of masculinity and individualism, a low degree of uncertainty avoidance, an exceptionally short-term orientation, and a low context. During the interwar period, however, alongside the growth in the country's potential, the cultural codes also began to evolve; the value of a high power distance relative to other nations began to take shape. This is a significant and highly intriguing shift, most likely triggered by the subconscious emulation of patterns associated with the partitioning powers. Unfortunately, this also found expression in Poland's participation in the annexation of Czechoslovak territories. During the period of the Polish People's Republic, this value was reinforced, except

that it dictated subordination to a considerably stronger Moscow. At the same time, however, the majority of the younger generation strove to overthrow the existing regime, which might indicate that, depending on the situation, the actions of Poles are determined by different types of codes, whereas decision-makers (whether elected or imposed by a foreign power) are almost always guided by a high power distance. Another equally interesting observation relates, as in the case of the Germans, to the functioning of the codes in times of threat or crisis. At such times, the codes characteristic of Poles during the occupation period become active. In other words, the segment of society that feels threatened takes action using this catalogue of codes, whilst the segment functioning with a sense of security is guided by the codes appropriate for an independent and strong Poland (consistent with the values established by G. Hofstede, excluding the value of a short-term orientation). Consequently, the following comparison was conducted based on the values corresponding to the codes determining Poland's foreign policy in the early 21st century:

- High power distance (correspondence 3/3),
- Masculinity (correspondence 3/3),
- Individualism (correspondence 3/3),
- High degree of uncertainty avoidance (correspondence 3/3),
- **Long-term orientation** (correspondence 3/3),
- Low context (correspondence 3/3).

In the event of crises and threats, the distribution of codes is as follows:

- **Low power distance** (correspondence 2/7),
- Masculinity (correspondence 7/7),
- Individualism (correspondence 7/7),
- **Low degree of uncertainty avoidance** (correspondence 7/7),
- Short-term orientation (correspondence 7/7),
- Low context (correspondence 7/7).

Therefore, the constant values, regardless of the situation, remain: masculinity (correspondence 10/10), individualism (10/10), and low context (10/10). Polish projects for various alliances with

other states were typically not, nor were they intended to be, in any way centralised. Their foundation also rested upon the strong independence of the member states, which reinforced the mutual individualism of the entities involved. This is not, therefore, evidence of a growing influence of collectivism in peacetime.

STAGE III and STAGE IV

No significant influence of individual codes was observed, even during the period of so-called authoritarianism. This implies that even if a strong personality is present in the decision-making process, the final shape of a decision is formulated through consultations with one's closest associates, rather than in complete isolation from external input.

Japan

STAGE I

Table 32. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the Japanese decision-making process

Decision content	H / LPD	MAS	IND/ COL	HUA	LTO	HC
The meticulously planned and implemented transformation of agrarian-feudal Japan into an industrial, technological, and military power. The plan was executed within a few decades at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Given a medium power distance and a lack of capacity for self-sacrifice for the common good, and thereby for the organisation of the labour of the entire society, it would have been impossible to achieve such a dynamic socio-economic leap and to narrow the technological and economic gap separating Japan from the great powers of the time.		x		x	x	x
The gradual utilisation of its growing power in relations with other states in order to revise disadvantageous international agreements, followed by a seamless transition to securing various territorial and economic concessions. On the one hand, a proper attitude towards stronger states, and on the other, the successive and increasingly dynamic utilisation of its own growing power in relations with other countries, bears witness to a perception of international reality through the prism of a high power distance. Once again, this process required the unified engagement of the entire society.		x		x	x	x

Decision content	H / LPD	MAS	IND/ COL	HUA	LTO	HC
The meticulously planned and executed military operation against China (1894–1895), and subsequently Russia (1905), while simultaneously maintaining and developing positive relations with potential revolutionary centres within European powers, including the Poles. The skilful planning of such a vast and short-term operation, coupled with investing in the building of allied backing (collectivism), is one of the best examples not only of the operation of the codes of high context and long-term orientation, but also of power distance in relation to weaker states. The absence of a drive to impose its will and permanent suzerainty on other states could have manifested itself, owing to an extremely high level of masculinity, in the provoking of numerous wars ending in the extraction of specific concessions without implementing such far-reaching border adjustments.		x		x	x	x
The gradual democratisation of public life in order to defuse mounting social tensions, thereby averting potential crises that could weaken Japan's growing potential: the capacity for adaptation and sacrifice in order to sustain the pursuit of overarching goals. The ability to appropriately catalogue its own needs and objectives in relation to its capabilities. As above.		x		x	x	x
Capitalising on the First World War and the temporary suspension of activity by European powers in East Asia in order to seize German possessions and extort numerous territorial concessions from a weaker China, the majority of which were subsequently retained and ‚legitimised' in the eyes of international public opinion, particularly within the forum of the major powers. As above.		x		x	x	x
Exploiting the weakness of the League of Nations and the absence of any state possessing genuine capabilities to militarily oppose Japan, and establishing by force the puppet state of Manchukuo, dependent on Tokyo, in the territory of Manchuria. The initiation of a militarisation process preparing the Japanese economy and society to seize control over the entirety of East, Central, and Southeast Asia. As above.		x		x	x	x
The premature commencement of military operations on the mainland and the occupation of China, reliant on the use of mass terror, without an adequately developed military and economic potential. The Japanese war machine was prepared to conduct highly effective military operations only in short-term conflicts and across a relatively territorially limited area. The scale of military operations conducted by Tokyo during the Second World War increasingly exceeded the actual capabilities of the Empire of the Rising Sun over time. It is difficult to determine the root cause of this deepening involvement in an unwinnable situation, followed by the attempt to open a second front, which proved to be the ultimate undoing of the Japanese. It therefore seems, given this absolute cultural anomaly, that these decisions were determined by the individual codes of the decision-makers. Had the actions taken at the time genuinely aligned with the previous values, Japan would have confined itself to a series of short-term conflicts within a pre-determined, limited theatre of operations (just as it had previously done during the victorious wars against China and Russia).		x			x	

Decision content	H / LPD	MAS	IND/ COL	HUA	LTO	HC
The decision to surrender unconditionally in 1945 and complete submission to the directives of the occupation authorities until the end of the occupation in 1952, and during the 1952–1989 period, systematic adherence to Washington's directives while simultaneously concentrating almost the entirety of societal effort on the country's economic and technological development. During this period, Washington supported Japan's economic growth, effectively reciprocating the allied loyalty demonstrated by Tokyo in the international arena. The only value that does not fit the canon developed above is masculinity; on the other hand, however, consenting to unconditional surrender as the price of national survival required undeniable courage.				x	x	x
The initiation of an investment process in Southeast Asia in the 1970s with the intention of creating a base for the development of its own economy, while simultaneously strengthening mutual economic relations with the remaining countries of the region. As above.		x		x	x	x
Following 1989, the continuation of the policy of close cooperation with Washington and remaining one of the closest allies of the United States in the region, aimed at further, continuous economic growth and the development of its own potential. Following the growth of Beijing's power and claims, Japan markedly strengthened its cooperation with its Western allies. As above.		x		x	x	x

Source: own elaboration.

Code coverage in the decision-making process concerning Japan's international relations: 61%.

STAGE II

The values of the cultural codes shaping Tokyo's policy in the 20th century:

- **High power distance** (correspondence 10/10),
- Masculinity (correspondence 9/10),
- **High power distance** (correspondence 10/10),
- High degree of uncertainty avoidance (correspondence 9/10),
- Long-term orientation (correspondence 10/10),
- High context (correspondence 10/10).

The values that did not correspond with those proposed by G. Hofstede are high power distance instead of medium, and collectivism instead of an intermediate value between collectivism and

individualism. In the international arena, it is evident that ever since Japan began to expand beyond its own territory, it started striving for admission to various international forums, as well as creating its own backing in the form of friendly (loyal) states. At the same time, it is worth noting the relatively stable and invariable nature of Japanese cultural codes.

STAGE III

The influence of individual codes on the timing and course of military operations during the Second World War completely failed to correspond with the established cultural codes. Nor was this the result of a specific situation or crisis, since in earlier and similar geopolitical circumstances, the decision-making process had unfolded entirely differently. Had cultural codes played a decisive role rather than individual ones, Japan's participation in the Second World War would likely have been confined to the occupation of Manchuria and the transformation of some Chinese cities into separate territorial units administered by the Chinese under Japanese supervision. Any potential further actions might have been geared towards the successive expansion of the sphere of influence through the creation of further satellite state entities. In such a scenario, however, war with the United States would likely never have occurred (or at least not as swiftly). Thus, in this instance, the influence of individual codes proved exceptionally significant, dramatically altering the course of the military operations.

STAGE IV

The degree of influence of individual codes on the aforementioned decision-making process shaping Japan's foreign policy in the 20th and early 21st centuries can be estimated at 10%. This influence, however, was highly significant, as it substantially modified the shape of the final decision of international consequence.

China

STAGE I

Table 33. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the Chinese decision-making process

Decision content	PD	MAS	COL	LUA	LTO	HC
Utilising the support of the USSR to consolidate the Kuomintang and establish regular armed forces capable of defeating the generals in the north, followed, after the initial victories, by the severing of cooperation with the CCP and a massacre of communists and their allies carried out by Chiang Kai-shek within his own ranks. Complete correspondence. This action was driven by a desire to assume control over all Chinese organisations, which stemmed from a high power distance, masculinity, and collectivism.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Concluding an alliance in defence against a common enemy, Japan, from 1937 to 1945. The ability to adapt to changing conditions and planned action regardless of harboured resentments and emotions. During this period, the significantly weakened communists effectively limited themselves to remaining neutral and gathering strength prior to the final confrontation with the Kuomintang. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The policy of double standards in diplomatic recognition between Beijing and Taipei from 1949 to the present. Complete correspondence. Regarding this point, it is worth briefly discussing the applicability of the values established by G. Hofstede. It is worth adopting the perspective of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan); these two states vie for the status of the legitimate China (for obvious reasons, Beijing has been winning this rivalry since the late 1970s).	x	x	x	x	x	x
This attests to a high power distance, as well as a high level of masculinity. Collectivism manifests itself in the continuous drive to maintain or secure the support of other states for the idea being promoted, and, de facto, in paying heed to international public opinion as expressed by a collective of states. A low degree of uncertainty manifests itself in risking, if not war, then international repercussions. Long-term orientation and high context, in turn, dictate that the aforementioned policy be conducted in a restrained manner; in the case of Beijing, this is gradually geared towards deepening economic dependencies, and in the case of Taipei, it involves deft balancing aimed at maintaining visibility, and thereby the informal recognition of the Republic of China's existence by other states. It is worth adding that this distinct rivalry between Beijing and Taipei is, on the one hand, a manifestation of Chinese cultural codes, and on the other, the only such instance in contemporary international relations.						

Decision content	PD	MAS	COL	LUA	LTO	HC
Participation in the Korean War in order to draw the USSR and the USA into an exhausting conflict, whilst simultaneously exerting pressure on Moscow to grant access to military technologies. Complete correspondence. Involvement in the Korean War stemmed from consultations with Moscow, and was simultaneously underpinned by Mao's expectation of securing tangible benefits from Stalin. At the same time, it was in keeping with the course set by Moscow, which could not involve itself directly, and without such involvement, the Korean communists would have lost the war.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Initiating crises in the Taiwan Strait in order to extract new military technologies from the USSR (playing a game between Washington and Moscow). Complete correspondence. Beijing's actions were driven by a decline in Moscow's authority in the eyes of Chinese decision-makers and by the undertaking of efforts to strengthen Beijing's position, including in the eyes of other socialist and communist states.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution programmes, acting to prepare society and the party for the previously planned Four Modernisations programme. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
An attempt to weaken the USSR among other socialist states and to strengthen its own position and prestige. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The gradual strengthening of economic potential and the modernisation of the armed forces in the 1980s and 1990s in order to lay the groundwork for the operation to seize control of the East and South China Seas. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Testing the reaction of international public opinion to more decisive and aggressive behaviour in the East and South China Seas, alongside the commissioning of aircraft carriers in parallel with the construction of artificial islands. A significant premise is also presenting China as the greatest guarantor of stability, provided one enters into a suitable alliance with Beijing. It is, therefore, an element of the rivalry with Washington for primacy in the region. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Exploiting Moscow's dependence on Beijing's support in order to acquire raw materials for almost nothing, obtain the most advanced military technologies, and facilitate the colonisation of Eastern Siberia. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x

Source: own elaboration.

STAGE II

As a preliminary remark, it is worth noting that this is the only instance thus far of complete correspondence between the cultural

codes developed by G. Hofstede and his team and the decision-making process of decision-makers in China over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. This may stem from the fact that this research relied on the assistance of specialists originating from the region, who helped to develop both the research tools and the findings. Accordingly, the distribution of the values of the cultural codes determining Beijing's policy to date is as follows:

- High power distance (correspondence 10/10),
- Masculinity (correspondence 10/10),
- Collectivism (correspondence 10/10),
- Low degree of uncertainty avoidance (correspondence 10/10),
- Long-term orientation (correspondence 10/10),
- High context (correspondence 10/10).

STAGE III and STAGE IV

No significant influence of individual codes was observed that would in any way distort the effect of the cultural codes on the decision-making process. The Chinese demonstrated an exceptional stability of collective codes in comparison with other nationalities.

India

STAGE I

Table 34. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the Indian decision-making process

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL/ IND	H/ LUA	LTO/ STO	H/LC
Strikes and protests directed against the British, involving an increasingly large percentage of the Indian population, as well as internal fighting between Hindus and Muslims, up until India regained its independence. Complete correspondence. It is worth noting that resistance against the British was relatively limited, whereas internal struggles between Hindus and Muslims were frequently very bloody. This means that, despite the crisis, the Indians were guided by a high power distance, and their propensity for aggression was to some extent controlled (masculinity/femininity).	x	x	x	x	x	x

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL/ IND	H/ LUA	LTO/ STO	H/LC
Pursuing a policy of neutrality, and in the face of the developing so-called Cold War, adopting a strategy of not explicitly siding with either party (the 1954 Panchsheel concept). In the initial period, India was not yet a strong state, and thus, in accordance with a high power distance, it should have followed the directives of strong states (blocs); nevertheless, it chose a middle path, which was decidedly the best and an extremely long-term solution.		x	x	x		x
The gradual incorporation of independent territories into India, typically in a peaceful manner, without resorting to violence. Such actions, which did not provoke a reaction from other states, were in keeping with a long-term policy of neutrality.	x	x	x	x		x
Contributing to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, whose members wished to remain neutral in the Cold War conflict. At its peak, the movement comprised nearly one hundred states from Asia and Africa. As above.	x	x	x	x		x
The Sino-Indian War in 1962, provoked by Beijing and ending with the annexation of the disputed Aksai Chin territory by the PRC. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
As a result of the exposure of India's military weakness, the initiation by the Indian authorities of a large-scale programme to build up their military capabilities, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Decision-makers remained focused on their immediate international environment, hence the intermediate value of high/low context fully corresponds with the activity being conducted. At the same time, it was an exceptionally long-term plan that was successively implemented.	x	x	x	x		x
The continuation of the policy of peaceful coexistence, but with a shift regarding the expansion of their own military capabilities (given the inability to rely on allies), and a greater emphasis on cooperation among states that preferred to remain neutral. As above.	x	x	x	x		x
India's wars with Pakistan over Kashmir: 1947–1948, 1965, and 1971. Complete correspondence.	x	x	x	x	x	x
Succumbing to the pressure and mediation of international public opinion, which in each instance sought to conclude peace with Pakistan during successive wars. This was linked to an adopted strategy of avoiding conflicts, especially with stronger states, whilst simultaneously striving to gradually strengthen its own power without becoming involved in crises, which corresponded to a medium level of masculinity.	x	x	x	x		x

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL/ IND	H/ LUA	LTO/ STO	H/LC
The continuation of the policy of economic and military growth, while simultaneously avoiding crises in relations with international public opinion regarding issues such as environmental degradation: on the one hand, industrial development causes damage; on the other, Indian authorities offer assurances of their efforts to protect the environment in Kashmir, even though this dispute has not been definitively resolved to this day, and Kashmir itself remains a flashpoint in the region. As above.	x	x	x	x		x

Source: own elaboration

STAGE II

The values of the cultural codes influencing the decisions of Indian decision-makers in the 20th and early 21st centuries:

- High power distance (correspondence 9/10),
- Masculinity/Femininity (correspondence 10/10),
- Individualism/Collectivism (correspondence 10/10),
- High/Low degree of uncertainty avoidance (correspondence 10/10),
- **Long-term orientation** (correspondence 7/10),
- High/Low context (correspondence 10/10).

Consequently, the only value differing from those proposed by G. Hofstede's team is long-term orientation, which, in the assessment of G. Hofstede's team, stood at 51 points, perfectly corresponding to the average. The manner of planning, acting, and anticipating the consequences of one's own actions clearly attests to the ability of the Indians to effectively plan and foresee their activities in the international arena. Conversely, a level of masculinity correspondingly lower than that of the neighbouring Chinese also dictates a more conciliatory policy, geared towards achieving benefits without the need to engage in conflicts with neighbouring states. At the same time, in the event of the need for defence, the Indians do not back down, whilst simultaneously demonstrating a reasonable receptiveness to the peaceful mediation of the international community, whose opinion they clearly respect in the context of achieving their long-term strategic goals.

STAGE III and IV

No influence of individual codes on the decision-making process was observed in the period under examination.

Libya

STAGE I

Table 35. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the Libyan decision-making process

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL	HUA	STO	LC
The 1951–1969 policy of neutrality, characterised by subtle support for Western powers, and thus for Israel, is also referred to as a policy of isolationism, given that Libya was not particularly active in the international arena during this period. Complete correspondence. A short-term orientation and a low context manifested themselves primarily in the squandering of a period of peace and of exploited oil reserves to serve the immediate needs of the monarch and his entourage, rather than the needs of the country. Similarly, the value of a high level of uncertainty avoidance, as well as a medium level of competitiveness, corresponded to the individual codes of the decision-maker rather than to the codes of the society.	x	x	x	x	x	x
The 1969 military coup, which enjoyed public support, overthrew the monarchy, marking the beginning of Gaddafi's dictatorial rule. Rebelling against the authorities ran contrary to a high power distance, and also attested to a high level of masculinity, as well as a low level of uncertainty avoidance.			x		x	x
Gaddafi's declaration of a struggle against global imperialism, by which he meant a struggle against the United States; shortly thereafter, he also provided support to Egypt during its war with Israel, which met with the approval of the USSR but drew strong criticism from the West. Had the Libyans been guided at the time by a high level of uncertainty avoidance and medium masculinity/femininity, they certainly would not have announced such far-reaching declarations to the world, and most certainly would not have attempted to implement them.	x		x		x	x
From 1981 onwards, following Reagan's assumption of the US presidency, Washington offered support to African countries that refused to cooperate with Libya. During this time, Tripoli financed numerous revolutionary movements across Africa. As above.	x		x		x	x

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL	HUA	STO	LC
Gaddafi was accused of ordering political assassinations, including that of the American attaché in Paris in 1981, for which Washington imposed further severe economic sanctions on Tripoli. As above.	x		x		x	x
By the mid-1980s, acts of terror, which Gaddafi did not claim responsibility for but publicly praised, had multiplied. In 1986, an unequal clash occurred between three US Navy carrier strike groups and Gaddafi's forces, ending in the latter's defeat. Gaddafi subsequently responded with acts of terror and announced the necessity of killing Americans, including civilians, anywhere in the world. That same year, the US Air Force bombed a number of military targets as well as the dictator's villa, which was intended to exert pressure on Gaddafi so that he would cease initiating further terrorist attacks. As above.	x		x		x	x
In 1988, the notorious bombing of a Pan American flight took place, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. The operation was carried out by Libyan intelligence officers. As above.	x		x		x	x
As a result of pressure from international public opinion and the fall of numerous socialist and dictatorial regimes after 1988 (including the regime in Iraq), Gaddafi drastically changed his approach and took steps towards the gradual normalisation of relations with the West. As above.	x		x		x	x
In 1999, Tripoli handed over the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing, and in 2003, it officially admitted to orchestrating the attack and paid compensation to the families of the victims. As above.	x		x		x	x
The Arab revolution and the overthrow of Gaddafi's regime in 2011; the beginning of an endless civil war. The revolution that broke out was a contradiction of a high power distance, a slight predominance of femininity, and high uncertainty avoidance.			x		x	x
Nevertheless, the consent of the majority of society to Gaddafi's rule over several preceding decades, alongside the very slow mounting of the rebellion, attest to a high level of power distance, a value that was transferred to the leaders of the insurgent opposition.						

Source: own elaboration.

STAGE II

The values of the cultural codes shaping Libya's foreign activity in the 20th and early 21st centuries:

- High power distance (correspondence 8/10);
- **Masculinity** (correspondence 9/10);
- Collectivism (correspondence 10/10);

- **Low degree of uncertainty avoidance** (correspondence 9/10);
- Short-term orientation (correspondence 10/10);
- Low context (correspondence 10/10).

The values that did not correspond with those proposed by G. Hofstede and his team are masculinity (instead of an intermediate value between masculinity and femininity) and a low degree of uncertainty avoidance (instead of a high one). In view of the above, Libyan decision-makers are prone to risky actions, and worse still, they are unable to plan and foresee the consequences of their behaviour even in the short term. A high level of masculinity, in turn, dictates rivalry with other states as well as aggressive behaviour. Libya, as a state aspiring to a leading role in the Arab world, whilst simultaneously being repeatedly restrained by the West, had no grounds for overtly aggressive behaviour towards neighbouring states. At the same time, this did not prevent Tripoli from criticising Egypt for reaching an accommodation with Israel, nor from attempting to utilise various Arab separatist organisations to satisfy its own leadership ambitions and assume a leading role in the Pan-Arab movement. Considering the sequence of cultural codes characteristic of the Libyans, it can be assumed that following its reconstruction, Libya may, depending on its geopolitical positioning, become an element conducive to stability or, conversely, successively provoke crises that destabilise the entire region.

STAGE III

The influence of the individual codes of the monarch and his court between 1951 and 1969 determined an exceptionally non-confrontational national policy, geared towards maximising the profits of the royal family. The cultural codes determining Gaddafi's decisions, on the other hand, proved to be consistent with the cultural codes. Therefore, one can conclude that there was a limited influence of individual codes on the course of Libya's decision-making process in the international arena during the period under examination.

STAGE IV

The degree of influence of individual codes stood at 10% and meant that, between 1951 and 1969, Libya's foreign policy was exceptionally conciliatory and its course of action resembled that of Western states. Consequently, the observed influence of individual codes was highly significant for the political decisions undertaken.

Egypt

STAGE I

Table 36. A discussion of the differences between the values of the profiled cultural codes and the actual course of the Egyptian decision-making process

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL	HUA	STO	LC
Gradual negotiations with the British for the withdrawal of garrisons and the recognition of Egypt's genuine independence, without resorting to violence following 1922 and the formal declaration of independence.	x	x	x	x		x
This approach was characterised by an exceptional long-term orientation, although it was a derivative of the situation, the high power distance relative to the British, and a high level of uncertainty avoidance. In other words, this was made possible by situational conditioning, rather than the influence of individual codes. Furthermore, in this instance, this value was of no major significance to the shape of the final decision.						
Egypt's entry into the League of Nations in 1937 and the signing of a treaty with Great Britain on the gradual withdrawal of the garrison over a period of ten years. As above.	x	x	x	x		x
The Free Officers Revolution in 1952 and the overthrow of the monarchy. The military revolt was directed against the legitimate authorities, and simultaneously demonstrated high masculinity. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the instigators were military personnel, who typically exhibit a greater propensity for forceful solutions than the majority of society. On the other hand, the Egyptians supported the military, who, as a professional class, enjoy public trust and support to this day. In a way, the military replaced the ancient caste of priests, which, in the eyes of average citizens, protected them in moments of crisis from both external and internal threats. This unusual situation can only be understood within the context of the Egyptian mentality.	x		x		x	x

Decision content	PD	MAS/ FEM	COL	HUA	STO	LC
Adopting a pro-Soviet orientation, initiating a rivalry with Iraq for dominance in the Arab world, and taking an antagonistic stance towards Israel. The alliance with the USSR was intended to substantially strengthen Egypt, as well as to enable the acquisition of modern technology and technological-economic support. At the same time, this rivalry took place under controlled conditions, maintaining an appropriate degree of caution.	x		x	x	x	x
Joining the Non-Aligned Movement. Regarding Egypt's accession to the Non-Aligned Movement, it is worth taking into account the context in which Egypt sought various means of strengthening its global position, thereby underscoring not only its own independence (as many African states belonged to the Non-Aligned Movement), but also its power.	x		x	x	x	x
The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company and the conflict with the British-French-Israeli coalition. This decision was entirely different from the previous ones and was determined by Nasser's individual codes. Had it proceeded in accordance with the cultural codes characteristic of most of its decisions, Cairo would have avoided open confrontation by concluding appropriate agreements. The outcome was a war that ended in complete defeat for Nasser and his entourage.	x		x		x	x
The Six-Day War in 1967 and the war with Israel in 1971. It is worth noting that Egypt was almost certain of victory during the Six-Day War, given the glaring disparity of forces. The 1971 war, on the other hand, was intended to aid in regaining its position in the Arab world, especially as it was waged in conjunction with Syrian forces.	x		x	x	x	x
The 1977 border conflict with Libya. Military operations were conducted on a highly limited scale, which would suggest a rather demonstrative character and a desire to project Egypt as a strong state against the backdrop of the international community of Arab states.	x		x	x	x	x
The normalisation of relations with Israel in 1978 through the formal conclusion of peace at Camp David, alongside the tacit recognition of the US position. This decision was not only thoroughly considered, but also indicated Egypt's actual objectives, which were accompanied by a drive to overcome economic problems and build its own power. Egyptian decision-makers understood that striving to assert oneself as the leader in the Arab world not only makes little sense, but is also costly. Faced with the necessity of securing substantial financial support and the increasingly noticeable weakening of the USSR (in economic terms), the decision was made to change allies.	x		x	x		x
In the 1990s, the conclusion of an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank (WB), alongside a continuing policy of forging closer ties with the US, which enabled Cairo to secure the write-off of half its debt and substantial financial support from Washington. Free-market reforms and limited democratisation were also introduced by permitting the formation of political parties. As above.	x		x	x		x

Source: own elaboration.

STAGE II
The values of the cultural codes determining the decisions of individual Egyptian decision-makers in the 20th century:

- High power distance (correspondence 10/10),
- **Masculinity** (correspondence 8/10),
- Collectivism (correspondence 10/10),
- High degree of uncertainty avoidance (correspondence 8/10),
- **Medium-/short-term orientation** (correspondence 4/10),
- Low context (correspondence 10/10).

The distribution of the individual values is interesting insofar as the decision-making process under examination would indicate the existence of at least a medium-term orientation. Furthermore, a noticeably higher value of masculinity dictated, and continues to dictate, a drive towards rivalry with other entities in the region. In the case of an intermediate value, this drive would be considerably more restrained. The value of a high degree of uncertainty avoidance also had a significant influence here, as it restrained excessively aggressive actions in the international arena, and most certainly those that were excessively risky. A clearly evident power distance, coupled with the perception of one's own state as aspiring to the status of a regional power (which, compared to the majority of African and Middle Eastern states, is not too far from the truth), entails, on the one hand, positioning Egypt within various forms of international cooperation (collectivism), whilst simultaneously attempting to utilise some of these forums to strengthen its own position relative to other states (high power distance and masculinity).

STAGE III
A significant influence of individual codes was observed in one instance, which translated into the making of a decision that resulted in a war that ended in defeat for Egypt. Had actions been taken in accordance with the cultural codes, such a situation would not have occurred, which indicates that in the case of Egyptian decision-

makers, it is worth taking into account the potential influence of individual codes. At the same time, considering the remaining decisions, the probability of such a situation occurring is statistically low.

STAGE IV
The degree of influence of individual codes on the shape of the decisions stood at 10%, based on the examined decisions.

5.2. Conclusions

Before discussing the results presented in the table below, it should be explicitly reiterated that the values of the cultural codes of G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall were developed for the purposes of the internal organisation of enterprises and took into account the indices of numerous variables[1]. In the present study, the author focused exclusively on the indices specified in the terminological framework, thereby significantly narrowing the understanding of cultural codes to the manner in which policy is conducted by the authorities of the society under examination[2]. As a result, discrepancies may have arisen in the developed values. This presumably stems not only from potential errors that may have occurred in the research results obtained by the aforementioned scholars (which is always possible given such a large number of examined indices), but also from the adopted perspective of applying merely a limited definitional scope of the said codes.

Table 37. Correspondence of the values of the profiled cultural codes with the actual course of the decision-making process of the societies under examination

No.	Nationality	H/L PD	MAS/ FEM	IND/ COL	H/L UA	L/M/ STO	H/L C	Ind. Code
1.	**United Kingdom**	LPD	FEM	IND	HUA	S-MTO	LC	0%
2.	**France**	HPD	FEM	IND	HUA	MTO	LC	20%
3.	**Germany**	HPD	MAS	IND	LUA	MTO	LC	0%

1 G. Hofstede, op. cit., pp. 15–18.
2 See: Chapter III, Subchapter 3.3 and Conclusions.

No.	Nationality	H/L PD	MAS/ FEM	IND/ COL	H/L UA	L/M/ STO	H/L C	Ind. Code
4.	**Russia**	HPD	MAS	COL	HUA	LTO	LC	20%
5.	**Poland**	P: HPD C: LPD	P: MAS C: MAS	P: IND C: IND	P: HUA C: LUA	P: LTO C: STO	P: LC C: LC	0%
6.	**Japan**	HPD	MAS	COL	HUA	LTO	HC	10%
7.	**China**	HPD	MAS	COL	LUA	LTO	HC	0%
8.	**India**	HPD	MAS/ FEM	IND/ COL	H/L UA	LTO	H/L C	0%
9.	**Libya**	HPD	MAS	COL	LUA	STO	LC	10%
10.	**Egypt**	HPD	MAS	COL	HUA	M/ST	LC	10%
XX	**COMPLIANCE**	7/10	6/10	9/10	6/10	6/10	7/10	5/10

Key:

- *Cells shaded in grey indicate a difference between the values of the cultural codes established by G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall and the actually implemented decision-making process.*
- *Cells shaded in white indicate the correspondence of the values of the cultural codes established by G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall with the actually implemented decision-making process.*
- *In the case of Poland, the letter 'P' denotes Peacetime, and 'C' denotes Time of Crisis.*

In reference to the questions posed within the framework of the third specific problem:

- The **rate of correspondence of cultural codes relative to individual codes** in the decision-making process carried out in the international arena for the examined decision-making processes ranged between **10% and 20%**.
- **The degree of influence of the difference between cultural codes and individual codes** on the final outcome of the decision-making process **(the substance of the decision)** carried out in the international arena for the examined decision-making processes stood at 100%. This means that, despite a proportionally low rate of activation of individual codes relative to cultural ones (10–20%), their influence invariably and significantly modified the substance of the decision taken.

With reference to the above results, the subsequent chapter presents the author's original proposal of cultural codes developed for

the purpose of the cultural forecasting of threats to national and international security. This proposal was also dictated by the impossibility of comprehensively applying the hitherto developed cultural patterns/codes relating to the research results of G. Hofstede, T. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall in the forecasting process: it should be noted that this profiling significantly modified the original understanding of the patterns/codes according to the aforementioned scholars. In view of the above, a rationale emerged for proposing codes tailored to forecasting threats in relations between states in the international arena.

In reference to the above, the adopted hypothesis was partially refuted and partially confirmed. For the ten examined societies and, correspondingly, the ten decisions taken in the international arena that had a significant impact on the subsequent fate of a given society (totalling one hundred decision-making processes): the statistically averaged proportion of individual codes was relatively low (10–20%); however, in those societies where it manifested, it significantly altered the substance of the decision (in comparison to a scenario in which the decision would have been taken solely on the basis of cultural codes). Consequently, the first part of the posited hypothesis was refuted (60% had been assumed, whereas in reality the rate stood at 80–90%), while the second part of this hypothesis was confirmed. It was therefore corroborated that one cannot disregard the influence of individual codes; although their impact manifests exceptionally rarely, when it does occur, it completely disrupts the forecast of threats to national and international security developed exclusively on the basis of the values of cultural codes.

CHAPTER VI

Prognostic Procedure: The Development of Cultural Codes and a Proposal of Stages for Forecasting Threats to National and International Security

This chapter is devoted to achieving the research objective, which was to develop an initial methodology for cultural forecasting. This objective was broken down into two sub-objectives, presented in the subchapters below:

- the development of cultural codes optimising the cultural forecasting process (6.1);
- the development of a proposal for cultural forecasting stages, enabling the most effective possible prediction of threats to national and international security (6.2).

6.1. The Development of Cultural Codes for Forecasting Threats to National and International Security

Comparing the research results of G. Hofstede, M. H. Bond, and E. T. Hall with the findings obtained by the author (presented in the preceding chapters of this publication) led to the conclusion that it is impossible to apply an excessively broad interpretation of individual codes for the purpose of forecasting international relations (particularly within the scope of national and international security). The absence of a code whose inclusion could enhance the accuracy of the

formulated forecasts was also noted. This gap was identified during the author's research into the decision-making processes of individual societies, which has found its expression in the proposal presented below. In constructing his own interpretation of the codes for the purpose of forecasting threats to national and international security, the author employed a scale frequently used by cultural anthropologists, which is based on the juxtaposition of two opposing values situated within an illustrative range from '10' to '0'. The interpretation of the codes presented below thus constitutes a compilation of the author's research into the potential application of any collective patterns conditioning human functioning in any given environment, with an emphasis on the course of the human decision-making process. The impossibility of applying the patterns/codes developed to date motivated the author to formulate his own conceptualisation of these codes, the interpretation of which would meet the requirements of forecasting threats to national and international security, and thereby be strictly embedded, both definitionally and methodologically, within security studies. The idea that accompanied the author from the outset of conducting this research was associated with making the most optimal possible use of the achievements of other fields and disciplines, and adapting the obtained results for the benefit of the aforementioned discipline. Consequently, it was not possible to comprehensively apply the existing knowledge; nonetheless, it was simultaneously absolutely essential to draw upon its potential. The outcome of these efforts is the interpretation of the six codes presented above, the last of which is not the result of processing existing knowledge, but is rather the author's own proposal stemming from the conducted research process. This code can be observed among numerous East Asian communities (in comparison with the societies of the so-called West) and undoubtedly influences both perception and the decisions taken in the sphere of national and international security, as well as broadly understood interstate relations. The ability to manage available resources in an optimally effective manner, including a correspondingly effective self-organisa-

tion of human resources, clearly affects the perception of any events in the environment of a given society (including opportunities, challenges, and threats), which in turn dictates the aforementioned decision-making process. Thus, in the author's opinion, this is a code that simply cannot be overlooked in future forecasting.

– High Discernment / Low Discernment (HD/LD)

High Discernment (HD): The propensity of weaker societies to respect and follow stronger states or those recognised as a leading authority; in the case of strong societies, assuming the right to impose their will on other societies and respecting only states with a similar or higher status.

Low Discernment (LD): In the case of weaker societies, a lack of particular respect for, let alone following, other states solely on the basis of their strong or leading position; in the case of strong societies, recognising other societies as equals regardless of their actual position in the international arena.

– Independence / Cooperation (IND/COO)

Independence (IND): The propensity for independent action without the need for prolonged cooperation with other states, where collaboration is permissible solely to achieve specific objectives (even long-term ones); societies with a high level of independence do not strive to create increasingly integrated international entities.

Cooperation (COO): The propensity to act in collaboration with other societies, and to establish increasingly stable and internally cohesive supranational organisations.

– Rivalry / Stabilisation (RIV/STA)

Rivalry (RIV): The propensity to compete with other societies, to achieve one's own objectives through the use of force, and to impose one's will on others.

Stabilisation (STA): The striving for peaceful coexistence with other societies, for stabilisation, and even for forgoing certain benefits in

order to preserve security and peaceful coexistence in the immediate international environment.

– High Uncertainty / Low Uncertainty (HU/LU)

High Uncertainty (HU): A lack of inclination to take risks if doing so could negatively impact the achievement of set objectives; a drive towards a slower, yet more stable, attainment of adopted goals.

Low Uncertainty (LU): The propensity to take risks if it can yield specific benefits: e.g., accelerating the achievement of a particular objective, even if there is a danger of incurring specific losses. Depending on the influence of other codes, this risk may be more or less calculated (especially the influence of "LTO").

– Long-Term Perspective / Short-Term Perspective (LTP/STP)

Long-Term Perspective (LTP): The ability to engage in the long-term planning of one's own actions in the international arena, and the capacity to anticipate the consequences of both one's own decisions and those of others.

Short-Term Perspective (STP): A lack of capacity for long-term planning, including the inability to anticipate the consequences of one's own decisions and actions, as well as those of others, over a longer timeframe.

– Selectivity / Comprehensiveness (SEL/COM)

Selectivity (SEL): The propensity to perceive the international environment solely through the prism of one's immediate neighbourhood; and in the case of global powers, due to the widespread distribution of their national interests, an inability to attain a comprehensive overview of events occurring in their near and distant environment.

Comprehensiveness (COM): The propensity for a comprehensive perception of international reality, and the ability to discern mutual relations occurring between individual societies, regardless of the distribution of interests and the distance separating these societies.

– High Self-Organisation / Low Self-Organisation (HSO/LSO)

High Self-Organisation (HSO): The ability to highly effectively manage and organise one's own resources (human, material, as well as intangible: e.g., know-how), and to manage the resources of others (given the parallel occurrence of COM) within one's reach in such a manner as to achieve optimal benefits.

Low Self-Organisation (LSO): A lack of ability to effectively manage one's own resources, as well as an inability to properly assess current and future capabilities resulting from the appropriate management of one's own resources.

The aforementioned codes were developed for the matrix presented below, by means of which it is possible to propose a specific scenario for the development of the international situation in the sphere of both national security (of a selected entity) and international security (of a group of entities). Similarly, it is possible to develop a scenario taking into account the influence of individual codes, by applying the differences for specific values observed during the research into the decision-making process to date of the examined society (as well as of the decision-makers). Consequently, the matrix below can be utilised to develop two variants incorporating the influence of the established values of both cultural and individual codes for the purpose of forecasting threats to the national and international security of a selected state or group of states.

Table 38. Cultural Codes Matrix (CCM) applicable in the forecasting process

	HD/LD	IND/COO	RIV/STA	LTP/STP	SEL/COM	HU/LU	HSO/LSO
Examined society	Code value	Code value	Code value	Code value	Code value	Code value	Code value
Description of a specific international situation: a potential or actual threat to national or international security	Description of the code's influence on the decision	Description of the code's influence on the decision	Description of the code's influence on the decision	Description of the code's influence on the decision	Description of the code's influence on the decision	Description of the code's influence on the decision	Description of the code's influence on the decision
Description of the influence of the averaged values on the decision.	Decision content						

Source: own elaboration.

Examples of utilising the CCM in a fictional forecasting process

Two examples are presented below in both descriptive and tabular form, illustrating the process of completing and utilising the Cultural Codes Matrix. The examples of two different international situations concern an attempt to forecast the decision-making process of fictional state 'A', where radically different cultural code values were assigned to the examined society 'A' for each of the variants (numbers 1 and 2). This was also intended to clearly illustrate the influence of specific values on the perception of decision-makers when faced with a concrete international situation posing potential threats to 'A'. The examples provided below do not refer to any contemporary global situation, and any similarities or convergences with real events are purely unintentional.

Example No. 1 (an economic threat to national security)

In the first example international situation, it is assumed that power 'B', bordering the weaker state 'C', has for some time been exerting pressure on the latter with the aim of subordinating its banking sector. To this end, it primarily employs economic and political means. The effect of power 'B' taking control of state 'C's banking sector could be a rise in the prices of raw materials imported by state 'A'. Therefore, the situation in the relationship between 'B' and 'C' constitutes a threat to the economic (primarily resource) security of state 'A'. It is also assumed that the decision-makers responsible for the foreign and security policy of state 'A' are aware of what the subordination of the banking sector in state 'C' by power 'B' might lead to. Thus, the question arises: in light of the above, what can the decision-makers of state 'A' do? The adopted values of the cultural codes are as extreme as they are, of course, entirely fictional; they serve merely to illustrate the possibility of utilising the Matrix in forecasting the decision-making process in the face of potential se-

curity threats to any selected examined society. An extremely high value of High Discernment suggests that state 'A' will exercise far-reaching caution and respect for the great-power policy pursued by the decision-makers of state 'B', while simultaneously not fully taking into account the situation of state 'C'. A high value of Independence indicates a drive to influence the decision-makers of state 'B' independently, rather than in consultation with the decision-makers of state 'C' (especially given the manifested lack of understanding of 'C's difficult situation). The propensity for rivalry, symbolised by RIV, assumes in turn the possibility of taking actions detrimental to state 'C' in the discussed situation, whilst simultaneously conducting tough negotiations with power 'B'. At the same time, given the aforementioned values, one can expect that these negotiations with the decision-makers of the great power will be conducted in a manner far removed from the possibility of provoking a crisis in mutual relations. A Short-Term Perspective will dictate a limited horizon, precluding the recognition of the full spectrum of threats to state 'A' arising from power 'B's takeover of the banking sector in state 'C'. Despite a high value of Comprehensiveness, when juxtaposed with a Short-Term Perspective, this broad perception will be constrained by a narrow time horizon. This means that if the takeover of the banking sector were to take place within a relatively short timeframe, the decision-makers of state 'A' might lean towards slightly harsher rhetoric in negotiations, whilst remaining mindful of 'B's great-power status. If, however, the actions taken by the decision-makers of 'B' were appropriately spread over time, the decision-makers of 'A' would be unable to properly assess the threat to their own society. Typically, the takeover of any economic sector is an activity planned well in advance and executed via a gradual, incremental approach. Consequently, the intersection of extremely high values of a Short-Term Perspective and Comprehensiveness, combined with High Discernment, will mean that the decision-

Table 39. An example of utilising the CCM in a fictional forecasting process: Example No. 1

	HD/LD	IND/COO	RIV/STA	LTP/STP	SEL/COM	HD/LD	HSO/LSO
State A	HD10	IND10	RIV10	STP10	COM10	HD/LD5	LSO10
Neighbouring power ‚B' is exerting pressure on state ‚C' with the aim of subordinating its banking sector, which may affect the prices of raw materials imported by state ‚A'.	Submissiveness towards power ‚B'; a lack of respect for state ‚C'. Understanding for the actions of ‚B' (the strong are entitled to more).	A drive to influence power ‚B' independently in order to avoid incurring excessive costs.	The possibility of playing to the detriment of ‚C' and of conducting tough negotiations with ‚B'.	An inability to properly calculate gains and losses in talks with ‚B' over a longer timeframe.	Constrained by the STP to a narrow horizon.	A propensity to take risks in talks with ‚B'; the possibility of limited pressure emerging.	An inability to secure alternative sources in a reasonable timeframe.
Description of the influence of the averaged values on the decision.	If the decision-makers of ‚A' fail to establish cooperation with another power and are left entirely to their own devices, then, in accordance with the cultural code values presented above, they will likely strive for direct negotiations with the decision-makers of power ‚B', ignoring the possibility of forming an alliance with ‚C' against ‚B'. During the forecast negotiations with ‚B', there is a possibility that the decision-makers of ‚A' will employ harsh rhetoric in order to secure better price conditions (also at the expense of ‚C'). Simultaneously, the decision-makers of ‚A' will not take into account the long-term consequences of their own policy, such as a significant increase in ‚B's capacity to influence ‚A' in the future (following ‚B's subordination of ‚C's banking sector). In conclusion, a lack of counteraction on the part of ‚A' in response to the aggressive actions of power ‚B' towards ‚C' is forecast.						

Source: own elaboration.

makers of 'A' will not be inclined to exert overly strong pressure on 'B'. In turn, a medium value of Low/High Uncertainty accounts for a limited propensity (dictated by current geopolitical conditions) to engage in situations involving calculated risk; against the backdrop of the aforementioned values, this may merely result in slightly harsher negotiating rhetoric with 'B' in order to secure short-term benefits. Furthermore, an extremely Low Self-Organisation, coupled with the preceding values, will translate into an inability to secure alternative sources of raw materials in a timely manner, which will ultimately expose the economy of 'A' to the risk of speculation on the part of power 'B'. Therefore, with regard to cultural codes, one can forecast that the decision-makers of state 'A' will disregard the risk of a threat to their resource security resulting from power 'B's drive to seize control of state 'C's banking sector. Nor will they strive to form an alliance with 'C' against 'B', restricting themselves to ad hoc negotiations in which they will settle for short-term gains, without considering a longer-term perspective or the prospect of eventually falling within the sphere of influence of power 'B's economic mechanisms.

Example No. 2 (a military threat to national security)

Low Discernment dictates the perception of power 'B' as an aggressor, and simultaneously as a state whose actions are aimed at destabilising the region. Consequently, the actions undertaken by power 'B' towards state 'C' will be interpreted as an indirect threat to state 'A' as well. The drive towards Cooperation means that the decision-makers of 'A' prefer the creation of diverse international forums and organisations constituting a convenient platform for collaboration between individual states. When juxtaposed with an extremely high value of Stabilisation, this propensity for cooperation translates into directing 'A's diplomatic efforts towards the peaceful coexistence of the states in the region. A Long-Term Perspective, in turn, allows for the anticipation of even distant consequences of

power 'B's activities, taking into account various scenarios for the development of the situation, including the takeover of control over state 'C'. The decision-makers of 'A' are fully aware of the resultant danger threatening them, even if this threat is to be significantly deferred in time. The influence of Selectivity is of no significance in the discussed case, as the situation concerns the region, and thus the value of the Long-Term Perspective retains its influence on both the perception and the decision-making process of 'A'. High Uncertainty, on the other hand, signifies the reluctance of the decision-makers of 'A' to enter into any open conflict with power 'B'. At the same time, the decision-makers of 'A' remain fully aware of the threat to their own national security provoked by the great power's military activity in state 'C'. High Self-Organisation, combined with the LTP, means that the decision-makers of 'A' will gradually prepare their society for the eventuality of the collapse of state 'C' and the anticipated, growing threat from power 'B' in the near or distant future. Nevertheless, the key to returning to the status quo, in the opinion of the decision-makers of 'A', will be to provide support (including military support) to state 'C', but in such a manner as to avoid provoking a crisis in relations with power 'B'.

Simultaneously, the decision-makers of 'A' will engage more heavily than before in developing international cooperation structures intended to unite the states of the region, in order to exert subtle pressure on the decision-makers of 'B' with a view to ending the conflict. At the same time, however, 'A' will utilise these cooperation structures to strengthen collective defence in the event of a direct threat emerging from 'B'. Consequently, one can forecast that 'A' will informally support 'C' to prevent its collapse, or at least to delay its fall as much as possible, thereby affording state 'A' the time to bolster its own defence capabilities and to appropriately develop regional cooperation structures designed to protect the national security of the individual member states.

Table 40. An example of utilising the CCM in a fictional forecasting process: Example No. 2

	HD/LD	IND/COO	RIV/STA	LTP/STP	SEL/COM	HU/LU	HSO/LSO
State A	LD10	COO10	STA10	LTP10	SEL10	HU10	HSO10
Neighbouring power ‚B' has provoked a military conflict in neighbouring ‚C', which threatens to destabilise the entire region. What will state ‚A', which also borders ‚B', do in this situation?	Perception of ‚B' as an aggressor.	A propensity to cooperate with both ‚B' and ‚C'.	A drive towards peaceful and stable coexistence with ‚B' and ‚C'.	Awareness of the threat to the stability of the region resulting from ‚B's actions.	Perception of the environment solely from the perspective of one's immediate surroundings. A realistic assessment of the situation and the ability to anticipate the consequences of ‚B's actions, but confined solely to one's own region.	A lack of inclination to incur any risk.	Skilful management of all one's own resources.
Description of the influence of the averaged values on the decision.	The decision-makers of ‚A' are aware of the threat to both the entire region and their own state in connection with ‚B's aggression against ‚C'. They are therefore aware that without support, state ‚C' may fail to defend itself, which will destabilise the region and strengthen the position of power ‚B'. Then, by continuously bolstering its own power, ‚B' could continue to threaten the stability of the region. At the same time, ‚A' does not desire an open conflict with ‚B', and the ideal solution would be the restoration of peace and a return to the status quo. Thus, ‚A's objective will be to prevent the collapse of ‚C', while simultaneously providing assistance through unofficial channels. Consequently, ‚A' will support ‚C' (even militarily, in the form of equipment and instructors), but will never officially admit to this, maintaining the appearance of good relations with ‚B'. In the event of an open protest from ‚B', ‚A' will not cease providing assistance, but will instead further conceal the entire process, for example by utilising other states cooperating with ‚A' (COO) to this end. It is also highly probable that ‚A', not wishing to antagonise ‚B', will simultaneously strive to organise various forms of regional cooperation between individual states, which would be intended to compel ‚B' to cease destabilising the region.						

Source: own elaboration.

6.2. Stages of Cultural Forecasting of Threats to National and International Security

This subchapter constitutes a culmination of the entirety of the research conducted by the author for this publication, ranging from the genesis of the mechanics of processes responsible for the emergence of cultural codes, to the research into the decision-making processes of individual societies. The uninterrupted evolution of our species has also influenced the continuously transforming threats, and thereby our inherent perspective on security. Humanity has been and remains subject to evolution in both biological and social dimensions. The previously adopted forms of organisation and mechanisms of collective functioning have, over time, given way to new solutions. These were not always superior, but they certainly constituted an attempt to respond to an incessantly changing reality. These changes affected relations occurring both within a single group and between various human communities. Depending on external and internal conditions, human communities developed a propensity to function on the basis of totalitarian, authoritarian, or democratic norms. Over time, gradual changes affected all processes resulting from the specific nature of the functioning of any social organisation, including processes geared towards ensuring an adequate level of security and opportunities for development.

Therefore, the ability to anticipate the direction in which current and potentially future threats are developing has acquired crucial significance. In this context, security can be understood in two ways: as a state and as a process. The truth lies somewhere in the middle, because within a specific unit of time we can speak of a state, whereas adopting a longer perspective makes it much more appropriate to view security as a process. Consequently, given the dynamics with which various internal and external factors influence the state of security of any human collective at a given moment, the ability to forecast threats provides the opportunity to counteract them sufficiently in

advance. In other words, effective forecasting significantly enhances the level of security of a given society. A review of human history conducted in the second chapter of this publication demonstrated that despite the ongoing evolution of social structures conditioned by civilisational development, forecasting remained in precisely the same place over the passing centuries. What did change was the quantity and diversity of the means employed to acquire information. At the same time, the very nature of pseudo-prognostic activity, limited to espionage and intelligence operations, remained unchanged over the passing ages. Until the mid-twentieth century, this resembled a situation where humanity operated on the basis of the exact same patterns known since antiquity, merely continuously expanding and refining them, and even creating an illusory impression of modernisation.

However, forecasting is something entirely different, and it is worth asking at this point why it had the opportunity to take root and gradually develop within the span of barely under a hundred years (against the backdrop of all human history). The only rational answer that comes to mind is the development of the information society, conditioned by the development of previously unknown mass media. People gradually gained the ability to share information on an increasingly broad forum. Information began to circulate increasingly rapidly within the social arteries of dynamically developing societies, inevitably propelled by advancing globalisation. This, in turn, intensified the process of exchanging both groundbreaking and utterly absurd ideas, thereby fostering the development of society-wide creativity. This process advanced in parallel with the development of academic circles, which were becoming increasingly accessible, thereby inviting a diverse range of individuals into their ranks primarily on the basis of intellectual parity. Academic institutions became the first distinct forums facilitating the birth of diverse ideas and theories, which were subsequently subjected to gradual and increasingly rigorous verification using methods recognised within a given academic discipline or field of study. This is also how forecasting as we know it today was born, being on the one hand the

result of academic brainstorming, and on the other, of the conditions of the emerging information society.

Scientific progress has been, and remains, visible in every possible area of knowledge. Furthermore, along with successive discoveries and achievements, the creation of entirely new, previously unknown fields and disciplines proves necessary. In this context, security studies, as a natural vehicle for the interdisciplinarity inherent in its nature, constitutes a new formula that responds to the opportunities, challenges, and threats stemming from increasingly rapid globalisation. Wherever there is talk of combining the achievements of numerous different fields and disciplines to achieve new goals, security studies provides a ready answer, the nature of which continues to evolve, supported by a variety of external and internal factors. Therefore, security studies appears to be optimally suited for conducting research into any new formulas for forecasting threats. The methodology of the cultural forecasting of threats to national and international security, presented indirectly during the research conducted for this publication, is encompassed within the procedure of sequential research activities, the arrangement of which is presented below as part of achieving the adopted research objective (see: Introduction).

Information layers: sources of knowledge about codes

Before detailing the individual stages of the proposed forecasting methodology, it is worth outlining the potential sources of knowledge that facilitate the acquisition of the necessary data. Since the subject of the research is the decision-making process of individuals responsible for shaping national or international security, the research effort should naturally be focused on the mental sphere of these individuals. Consequently, the question arises: how can such data be acquired? Referring to the contents of both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, it is possible to identify such sources, some of which will be accessible from the public, media-based information sphere. The remaining data can be obtained through observation and theoretical research activities intended for the appropriate processing of the acquired information from a forecast-

ing perspective (Chapters 4 and 5). Thus, on the one hand, information is gathered from the opinions expressed by the individuals under study, their statements, and even the comments of external experts. On the other, it is derived from observing the decisions they make and juxtaposing their content with the corresponding values of individual cultural codes. As a result, one obtains data constituting a direct expression of the opinions and views of the subjects themselves, as well as data resulting from the conducted research – information that cannot be acquired from other sources. Subsequently, data compiled in this manner can be collated, and on this basis, the decision-making process of the individuals under study can be reconstructed.

In reference to the third chapter of this publication, it is worth recalling at this juncture that if the human brain were to be compared to a computer, the mind would resemble software operating in four distinct modes: the unconscious, the subconscious, the conscious, and the superconscious. As the specific nature of the individual operating modes of the brain and mind has been described in detail in the aforementioned Chapter 3, the author will merely note that the previously mentioned data are processed exclusively in the conscious and subconscious modes. The unconscious and superconscious modes, due to their specific functioning characteristics, do not present significant value in this regard (see: Chapter 3).

In connection with the above, the author proposes dividing data sources into two primary **information layers**: the **subconscious** and the **conscious**, from which a researcher can draw information enabling the reconstruction of the decision-making process of the examined communities. The specific information layers utilised by the author in the research for this publication are characterised in detail below:


– **The Subconscious Layer**: This encompasses both individual codes and the cultural codes of interest to the readers of this publication. Knowledge of these codes can be acquired through empirical research (surveys, interviews, observation, document analysis) as well as theoretical research (analysis, synthesis, comparison, classification, inference, etc.).

– **The First Conscious Layer:** The current ideology, philosophy, religion, and other socio-political views held by representatives of the examined community (the codes determine the methods of achieving the goals arising from this ideology, philosophy, religion, or views; e.g., through military means, building alliances, peaceful coexistence, the gradual consolidation of spheres of influence over time, the advancement of the level of technological or civilisational development, etc.).

– **The Second Conscious Layer:** Media statements by decision-makers (understood as a collective of individuals making decisions in the sphere of national and international security of the examined entity), and official documents defining the foreign and security policy and strategy of a given state.

– **The Third Conscious Layer**: The overall potential of a given state relative to the potential of other states, encompassing economic, military, and social potential, etc. (the actual forces and capabilities for achieving the goals established during the examination of the preceding layers of the decision-making process).

Figure 6. Classification of data sources for the Cultural Codes Matrix: Information Layers




Source: own elaboration.

The informational value of both layers (the conscious and the subconscious) is similar, which means that the three types of the conscious layer distinguished above serve solely to facilitate the targeted collection of the most accurate data possible to assist in the subsequent forecasting process. The third conscious layer constitutes a distinct complement to the reconstructed rationality inherent to the examined community. It is impossible to make determinations regarding the behaviour of any social group (including the threats it poses to other groups) and possible disruptions to national or international security based solely on a correctly assessed potential. On the other hand, knowing the determinants of the decision-making process, it is absolutely essential to also know the potential of a given entity in order to determine whether, in a given situation, it will be inclined towards more or less aggressive behaviour (and towards which entities).

As a supplementary note, it is worth adding that the information constituting the resources of the subconscious layer (responsible for shaping and consolidating cultural codes, which can be juxtaposed with the CCM presented above) can also be found in the external and observable manifestations of the examined culture: adopted modes of communication (language), habits, customs, attitudes towards issues/people/symbols, the values held within a given community (the hierarchy of values to be satisfied), and self-awareness. The effective collection of useful data is merely half the task when attempting to establish the values of individual cultural codes that determine the decision-making process. The second, equally important component is an appropriate tool guiding the scope of the information being collected and processed. This is precisely the purpose of the matrix presented above. Furthermore, establishing the appropriate values (including extreme ones) of the individual codes is essential in the forecasting process, within the framework of which a somewhat simplified model can be employed:

Figure 7. The process of determining the values of cultural codes for the purpose of forecasting the course of the decision-making process



Source: own elaboration.

In reference to the preceding considerations, a proposal for a comprehensive cultural forecasting methodology is presented below. The entirety has been divided into stages, the substantive scope of which is the result of the author's research into verifying and establishing cultural codes that facilitate the anticipation of the decision-making processes of societies/states on the international stage in the face of threats to their security.

Stages of the cultural forecasting of threats to national and international security.

The forecasting stages were developed on the basis of the research process adopted by the author within the framework of the research conducted for this publication:

STAGE I

Determining the cultural codes of the examined societies.

This stage has been divided into a series of activities defined as sub-stages, which refer to the research activities previously conducted by the author of this publication.

1. Collecting data enabling the determination of the values of cultural codes, based on the information layers described above: the

subconscious and the conscious. For the subconscious layer, optionally following the author's example, one can draw upon the existing body of work in the field of cultural anthropology, with the proviso that data acquired in this manner be processed in accordance with the cultural forecasting methodology. Among the preferred empirical methods when independently exploring the subconscious layer, it is worth highlighting expert interviews, survey questionnaires, observation, and a specific form thereof: participant observation. In the course of such research, using the example of a single society, it is sufficient to focus the research effort on determining the extreme values. Estimating the exact values on a scale from "1" to "10" would require, following the example of the anthropologists cited above, conducting a comparison of numerous examined societies, where the adopted scale would, naturally, apply solely to such a selected research group. At the same time, based on the research conducted thus far and the author's experience, one can venture the assumption that for preliminary cultural forecasting, it is entirely sufficient to refer to extreme values without the need to estimate the exact potential of individual codes.

The data gathered from the aforementioned information layers (the subconscious and the conscious), once processed into values corresponding to individual cultural codes, can be utilised in the CCM (Stage II) for juxtaposition with possible variants of the decision-making procedure in relation to a specific international situation. Therefore, in order to be able to utilise this matrix, it is worthwhile, whilst still at Stage I, to perform the following activities in a manner analogous to the research procedure conducted by the author in Chapters 4 and 5 of this publication:

a. Collecting data from the information layers (the subconscious and the conscious).
b. Processing the collected data: determining the extreme values corresponding to the individual cultural codes.

2. Verifying the established code values against the decision-making process over the past decades: the timeframe depends on the generation of decision-makers and their influence on decisions made in the past (conducting analysis, synthesis, and comparison for each examined decision in relation to the individual values of cultural codes, as presented in Chapters 4 and 5 of this publication). To this end, one can employ the Matrix, but by entering into it situations that occurred in the past:

a. Entering the previously established values of cultural codes into the CCM with reference to a specific past international situation: describing the influence of each code on the decision-making process and developing possible situational scenarios.
b. Summarising the obtained results (the influence of individual cultural codes on the decision-making process in light of the examined international situation or threat to national/international security): establishing the averaged influence of all cultural codes and ultimately determining the substance of the forecast decision. Juxtaposing the decision formulated in this manner with the one actually made, and identifying any potential differences in the values of the individual codes. For the purpose of the discussed process of forecasting threats and establishing the appropriate values of cultural codes, the author proposes the following modified version of the CCM in the form of the Cultural Code Values Comparison Matrix (CCVCM), constituting a compilation of the research conducted in Chapter 5.

Table 41. Cultural Code Values Comparison Matrix (CCVCM): a comparison of the previously established values of cultural codes (Stage I) with the substance of actual decisions made in the past by the society subjected to the forecasting examination

		HD/LD	IND/COO	RIV/STA	LTP/STP	SEL/COM	HU/LU	HSO/LSO
Examined society		Code value	Code value	Code value	Code value	Code value	Code value	Code value
Description of a specific international situation: a potential or actual threat to national or international security	FORECAST	Description of the forecast influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the forecast influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the forecast influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the forecast influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the forecast influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the forecast influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the forecast influence of the code on the decision.
	REALITY	Description of the actual influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the actual influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the actual influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the actual influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the actual influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the actual influence of the code on the decision.	Description of the actual influence of the code on the decision.
	DESCRIPTION OF DIFFERENCES	Description of the differences in the code values for the forecast and the actual decision.	Description of the differences in the code values for the forecast and the actual decision.	Description of the differences in the code values for the forecast and the actual decision.	Description of the differences in the code values for the forecast and the actual decision.	Description of the differences in the code values for the forecast and the actual decision.	Description of the differences in the code values for the forecast and the actual decision.	Description of the differences in the code values for the forecast and the actual decision.
Description of the influence of the averaged values on the forecast decision.		Decision content						
Description of the influence of the averaged values on the actual decision.		Decision content						
Indication of potential differences between the forecast and the actual decision.		Description of the differences between the substance of the forecast and the actual decision.						

Source: own elaboration.

3. After making any potential corrections resulting from discrepancies between the established code values and the substance of individual decisions, establishing the appropriate values corresponding to the individual cultural codes (similarly as was the case in Chapter 5).

STAGE II
Utilising knowledge of cultural codes to develop the Cultural Codes Matrix (CCM) of the examined societies.

Completing the Cultural Codes Matrix in accordance with the examples presented above (see Subchapter 6.1).

Stage III
Forecasting the decision-making processes of states towards one another in the face of specific international situations.

Employing the completed Cultural Codes Matrix to forecast specific current (real-world) international situations that constitute an actual or potential threat to the national security of a selected entity, or to international security in the case of a group of entities. At this point, the final verification of the previously established values corresponding to the individual cultural codes of the examined societies will take place. Given that the proposed method is to be applied in real-world conditions, it is advisable to initially select situations involving a relatively small scale of forecast threats.

6.3. Conclusions

In this chapter, the author's original cultural forecasting methodology has been presented, which is applicable in the process of anticipating threats to the national and international security of any selected entity or entities (societies). Simultaneously, it is worth noting that the aforementioned methodology pertains exclusively

to forecasting based on cultural programming. When setting out to develop forecasts based on the mechanism proposed above, one should bear in mind that during the preceding research (Chapters 4 and 5), the potential for the individual codes of decision-makers to influence culturally based decision-making processes was observed. The likelihood of such an influence materialising was estimated at 10–20%; nevertheless, whenever it did occur, a significant modification to the substance of the ultimately adopted decision inevitably followed. Consequently, particular attention should be paid to those societies in whose history the influence of individual codes modifying the final shape of decisions has already been recorded. In such instances, it would be indispensable to additionally compile the psychological profiles of the decision-makers and to identify the discrepancies between the cultural codes shared by the community from which they originate and their own individual codes. This will facilitate the development of alternative scenarios for decisions made solely under the influence of cultural codes, and decisions dictated by individual codes. Ongoing observation of unfolding events, coupled with the simultaneous formulation of the aforementioned forecasts in two scenarios (cultural and individual), should make it possible to ascertain the direction in which the situation is developing, and thereby to adopt the appropriate scenario.

In summary, the objective of this work, which was to develop a preliminary cultural forecasting methodology based on the results obtained during the research, has been achieved in the form of the forecasting process stages described in detail in this chapter. Based on the research conducted thus far, the author has proposed his own catalogue of cultural codes (along with an original interpretation of their conceptual scope) capable of direct and optimal application in forecasting threats to national and international security, and thereby embedded both substantively and methodologically within security studies. In relation to this, the individual stages of the forecasting process have also been described in detail; for the purposes of this process, the author has proposed a primary tool in the form of

the Cultural Codes Matrix (CCM), which serves forecasting directly, as well as a supporting tool for the process of establishing the appropriate values of these codes, in the form of a modified version of the CCM: the Cultural Code Values Comparison Matrix (CCVCM). As with all forecasting methods, this method has also been subjected to a final and optimally reliable verification during the last stage, where real-world situations undergo forecasting. It is also at this point that final corrections can be introduced, which should assist in the comprehensive assessment of the values established thus far.

Conclusion

Scientific research should provide those involved with a great deal of satisfaction infused with a touch of self-propelling inspiration. At the same time, it should be conducted on solid, scientific foundations: the results of research conducted on the basis of verifiable methods, both theoretical and empirical. In the new discipline that security studies continues to be, the research methodology rooted in the field of social sciences is constantly being refined. Drawing upon the body of work of numerous other disciplines and fields is inherent to the interdisciplinary nature of these studies, which are simultaneously geared towards researching issues related to the security of the examined entities. Thus, by focusing his efforts on developing a new methodology for forecasting threats and drawing upon knowledge from various disciplines and fields, the author sought to develop the potential of his own discipline of security studies. This was possible due to genuine engagement in the subject matter and the drive to introduce a distinct innovation into the further development of this discipline. The passion that drives many scientists is an asset that is not only invaluable but often necessary to traverse this sometimes long and exceptionally arduous path of scientific inquiry. At the end, however, there always awaits a greater or lesser degree of satisfaction, even if the final result turns out to be entirely different from the assumed one. Science should allow us to peer into previously concealed realms, even if only to a minor degree, and even at the risk of making mistakes. In other words, as many esteemed professors used to say, it should bring a spark of something new. In the author's estimation, this publication constitutes such an attempt; whether it is a successful one is for the readers and experts in the subject matter it addresses to judge.

The cultural forecasting of threats to national and international security, in the approach presented by the author, is an entirely new method applicable to the forecasting practice of security studies. At the same time, as emphasised in the final chapter, it constitutes a method that requires supplementation with the examination of the personal profiles of decision-makers. The research conducted by the author confirmed the influence of individual determinants on the final shape of a decision determining the security of a specific society. Simultaneously, the research activities conducted (both empirical and theoretical) made it possible to ascertain the incidence rate of the aforementioned influence of individual codes on the substance of the decision, which falls within the range of 10–20%. Thus, given that the aforementioned correlation between subjective determinants and the influence of the cultural environment has the potential to emerge, it has been successfully demonstrated that cultural programming plays the primary role. In other words, in eight or nine out of ten cases of the examined situations involving threats to security (national or international), people are guided by decision-making patterns common to their own social group. This is particularly evident at the level of international relations, that is, relations occurring between large social groups, where decision-makers make decisions on behalf of the collectives they represent. This collective nature of the decision-making process at the international level means that a lack of knowledge regarding cultural programming can constitute a significant negative factor when formulating any forecasts. Equally important, however, is a reliance on a reliable assessment of the potential (so-called hard data) at the disposal of a given society, as well as the self-awareness of decision-makers regarding the scale of this potential. It may transpire that a decision-maker and their inner circle underestimate or even overestimate their own capabilities, and consequently make irrational decisions. All these elements play a highly significant role in the decision-making process at the interstate level, and thus are of paramount importance for forecasting interstate relations in the sphere of shared security.

The research conducted for this publication has demonstrated that cultural forecasting not only makes it possible to anticipate threats to national and international security, but also that it is characterised by a relatively high average effectiveness, which can reach the aforementioned 80–90%. Consequently, the adopted primary hypothesis has been confirmed. At the same time, it is worth bearing in mind that, like any forecasting methodology, the one proposed by the author is not without its flaws. Alongside the existing methods based primarily on assessing the potential of the examined states (societies), as well as analysing the psychological profiles of decision-makers, the cultural forecasting method could become an integral and vital component of future comprehensive forecasting methodologies. Viewed in this light, it appears that this publication not only provides a certain added value to the existing body of work, but also serves as an impetus for further, far more extensive research aimed at refining contemporary forecasting practice. In light of the above, it seems justified to consider future forecasting models based on the following framework:

Figure 8. Diagram of the comprehensive forecasting model



Source: own elaboration.

The author, for his part, can only harbour a quiet hope that the work he has undertaken will garner at least a modicum of interest from the readers of this publication, and perhaps serve as a catalyst for further research and publications.

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